Law Commons^™

The Supreme Court's Reticent Qualified Immunity Retreat, Katherine Mims Crocker

Faculty Publications

The recent outcry against qualified immunity, a doctrine that disallows damages actions against government officials for a wide swath of constitutional claims, has been deafening. But when the Supreme Court in November 2020 and February 2021 invalidated grants of qualified immunity based on reasoning at the heart of the doctrine for the first time since John Roberts became Chief Justice, the response was muted. With initial evaluations and competing understandings coming from legal commentators in the months since, this Essay explores what these cases appear to say about qualified immunity for today and tomorrow.

The Essay traces idealistic, pessimistic, and …

Will The Supreme Court Recover Its Own Fumble? How Alston Can Repair The Damage Resulting From Ncaa's Sports League Exemption, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

Horizontal restraints are unlawful per se unless a court can identify some redeeming virtue that such restraints may create. In National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma (“NCAA”), the Supreme Court rejected this standard, refusing to condemn horizontal restraints on price and output imposed by the NCAA without specifying any possible redeeming virtues. The Court emphasized that other restraints not before the Court were necessary to create and maintain athletic competition like that supervised by the NCAA. This exemption for sports leagues ensures that all restraints imposed by such entities merit Rule …

A Scapegoat Theory Of Bivens, Katherine Mims Crocker

Faculty Publications

Some scapegoats are innocent. Some warrant blame, but not the amount they are made to bear. Either way, scapegoating can allow in-groups to sidestep social problems by casting blame onto out-groups instead of confronting such problems--and the in-groups' complicity in perpetuating them--directly.

This Essay suggests that it may be productive to view the Bivens regime's rise as countering various exercises in scapegoating and its retrenchment as constituting an exercise in scapegoating. The earlier cases can be seen as responding to social structures that have scapegoated racial, economic, and other groups through overaggressive policing, mass incarceration, and inequitable government conduct more …

Reconsidering Section 1983'S Nonabrogation Of Sovereign Immunity, Katherine Mims Crocker

Faculty Publications

Motivated by civil unrest and the police conduct that prompted it, Americans have embarked on a major reexamination of how constitutional enforcement works. One important component is 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which allows civil suits against any "person" who violates federal rights. The U.S. Supreme Court has long held that "person" excludes states because Section 1983 flunks a condition of crystal clarity.

This Article reconsiders that conclusion--in legalese, Section 1983's nonabrogation of sovereign immunity--along multiple dimensions. Beginning with a negative critique, this Article argues that because the Court invented the crystal-clarity standard so long after Section 1983's enactment, the caselaw …

Rejecting Honorary Whiteness: Asian Americans And The Attack On Race-Conscious Admissions, Philip Lee

Faculty Publications

Since the 1960s, Asian Americans have been labeled by the dominant society as the “model minority.” This status is commonly juxtaposed against so-called “problem” minorities such as African Americans and Latinx Americans. In theory, the model minority narrative serves as living proof that racial barriers to social and economic development no longer exist in America. If Asians can succeed against all odds, the reasoning goes, so can everyone else. Further, if a member of a minority group fails, it is because of their own lack of diligence and ambition, and not some supposed systemic unfairness. However, the model minority narrative …

Reform Through Resignation: Why Chief Justice Roberts Should Resign (In 2023), Scott P. Bloomberg

Faculty Publications

Many proponents of reforming the Supreme Court have expressed support for adopting a system of eighteen-year staggered term limits. These proposals, however, are hobbled by constitutional constraints: Amending the Constitution to implement term limits is highly implausible and implementing term limits through statute is likely unconstitutional. This Essay offers an approach to implementing term limits that avoids these constitutional constraints. Just as President Washington was able to establish a de facto Presidential term limit by not seeking a third term in office, Chief Justice Roberts is uniquely positioned to establish a new norm of serving eighteen-year terms on the Court. …

Cracking The Whole Code Rule, Anita S. Krishnakumar

Faculty Publications

Over the past three decades, since the late Justice Scalia joined the Court and ushered in a new era of text-focused statutory analysis, there has been a marked move towards the holistic interpretation of statutes and “making sense of the corpus juris.” In particular, Justices on the modern Supreme Court now regularly compare or analogize between statutes that contain similar words or phrases—what some have called the “whole code rule.” Despite the prevalence of this interpretive practice, however, scholars have paid little attention to how the Court actually engages in whole code comparisons on the ground.

This Article provides the …

Requiem For A Lightweight: How Ncaa Continues To Distort Antitrust Doctrine, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

The Supreme Court speaks rarely about the meaning of the Sherman Act. When the Court does speak, its pronouncements have particular resonance and staying power among jurists, scholars, and enforcers. NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma was such a case. There the Court assessed agreements reducing the output and increasing the prices of televised college football games. After announcing that restraints imposed by sports leagues are exempt from per se condemnation, the Court went on to invalidate the challenged agreements under the rule of reason because they produced significant economic harm without offsetting benefits. In so …

Meta Rules For Ordinary Meaning, Anita S. Krishnakumar

Faculty Publications

(Excerpt)

“Ordinary meaning” is a notoriously undefined concept in statutory interpretation theory. Courts and scholars sometimes describe ordinary meaning as the meaning that a “reasonable reader” would ascribe to the statutory language at issue, but it remains unclear how judges and lawyers should go about identifying such meaning. Over the past few decades, as textualism has come to dominate statutory interpretation, courts increasingly have employed dictionary definitions as (purportedly) neutral, and sometimes dispositive, evidence of ordinary meaning. And in the past few years especially, some judges and scholars have advocated using corpus linguistics — patterns of usage across various English …

Attribution Time: Cal Tinney’S 1937 Quip, “A Switch In Time’Ll Save Nine”, John Q. Barrett

Faculty Publications

In the history of the United States Supreme Court, 1937 was a huge year—perhaps the Court’s most important year ever.

Before 1933, the Supreme Court sometimes held that progressive policies enacted by political branches of government were unconstitutional. Such decisions became much more prevalent during President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s first term, from 1933 through 1936. In those years, the Court struck down, often by narrow margins, both federal “New Deal” laws and state law counterparts that sought to combat the devastation of the Great Depression.

Then, in early 1937, President Roosevelt proposed to “pack”—to enlarge—the Court, so that it would …