Law Commons^™

Equal Protection And Abortion: Brief Of Equal Protection Constitutional Law Scholars Serena Mayeri, Melissa Murray, And Reva Siegel As Amici Curiae In Support Of Respondents In Dobbs V. Jackson Women's Health Organization, Reva Siegel, Melissa Murray, Serena Mayeri

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Equal Protection changes the questions we ask about abortion restrictions. In Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, an amicus brief filed on our behalf demonstrated that Mississippi’s ban on abortions after 15 weeks violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. The brief continues a tradition of equality arguments that preceded Roe v. Wade and will continue, in new forms, after Dobbs. Our brief shows how the canonical equal protection cases United States v. Virginia and Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs extend to the regulation of pregnancy, hence provide an independent constitutional basis for abortion rights.

Under equal …

Mirror, Mirror, On The Wall: Disney Princesses’ Reflections Of Equal Protection, Kermit Roosevelt Iii, Abigail Tootell

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Constitutional doctrine and public opinion often move in tandem, particularly in the area of equal protection decisions. The Supreme Court tends to use the clause to invalidate unreasonable or oppressive discrimination, where what is unreasonable or oppressive is determined not by the values of 1868 but by those of contemporary America. This Article offers a microstudy in applied constitutional theory by juxtaposing the development of the Supreme Court's sex discrimination jurisprudence and the evolution of Disney Princesses. The analysis expands beyond confirming that prevailing cultural norms inform Supreme Court decisions; it also offers insight into the limitations of constitutional sex …

Intersectionality And The Constitution Of Family Status, Serena Mayeri

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Marital supremacy—the legal privileging of marriage—is, and always has been, deeply intertwined with inequalities of race, class, gender, and region. Many if not most of the plaintiffs who challenged legal discrimination based on family status in the 1960s and 1970s were impoverished women, men, and children of color who made constitutional equality claims. Yet the constitutional law of the family is largely silent about the status-based impact of laws that prefer marriage and disadvantage non-marital families. While some lower courts engaged with race-, sex-, and wealth-based discrimination arguments in family status cases, the Supreme Court largely avoided recognizing, much less …

The Ironies Of Affirmative Action, Kermit Roosevelt Iii

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The Supreme Court’s most recent confrontation with race-based affirmative action, Fisher v. University of Texas, did not live up to people’s expectations—or their fears. The Court did not explicitly change the current approach in any substantial way. It did, however, signal that it wants race-based affirmative action to be subject to real strict scrutiny, not the watered-down version featured in Grutter v. Bollinger. That is a significant signal, because under real strict scrutiny, almost all race-based affirmative action programs are likely unconstitutional. This is especially true given the conceptual framework the Court has created for such programs—the way …

A Visual Guide To United States V. Windsor: Doctrinal Origins Of Justice Kennedy’S Majority Opinion, Colin Starger

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After finding the Court had jurisdiction, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in United States v. Windsor reached the merits and concluded that the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) was in violation of the Fifth Amendment. In his dissent, Justice Scalia attacked the majority’s doctrinal reasoning on the merits as “nonspecific handwaving” that invalidated DOMA “maybe on equal-protection grounds, maybe on substantive due process grounds, and perhaps with some amorphous federalism component playing a role.”

This Visual Guide is a “doctrinal map” that responds to Scalia’s accusation by charting the doctrinal origins of Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion. Specifically, the map shows how …

The Virtue Of Obscurity, Colin Starger

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The critics have panned Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in United States v. Windsor. Supporters and opponents of same-sex marriage have together bemoaned what may be called Kennedy’s “doctrinal obscurity” in Windsor. Doctrinal obscurity describes the opinion’s failure to justify striking down Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) using any discernable accepted test for substantive due process or equal protection. Specifically, Kennedy does not ask whether DOMA burdens a right “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,” nor does he identify sexual orientation as a suspect or semi-suspect classification, nor does he subject DOMA to explicit rational …

Survey Of Criminal Procedure — Alternative Dispositions Of Defendants, Charles Shafer

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The criminal justice system provides various alternatives for the disposition of criminal defendants. Three of these alternatives, pretrial intervention, drug treatment, and probation, were dealt with in recent New Jersey Supreme Court decisions. The court examined the substantive criteria and procedures used in assigning each disposition and focused primarily on the desire to provide rehabilitative opportunities for each defendant. This note will examine those decisions and the implications of the court's concentration on the goal of rehabilitation.