Law Commons^™

The Loudest Voice At The Supreme Court: The Solicitor General’S Dominance Of Amicus Oral Argument, Darcy Covert, Annie J. Wang

Vanderbilt Law Review

The Solicitor General (“SG”) is often called the “Tenth Justice,” a title that captures his unique relationship with the Supreme Court and his independence from the executive branch. No phenomenon better reflects this relationship than the Court’s practice of permitting amici to participate in oral argument. Although amicus oral argument is nominally available to all litigants, the modern Court grants this privilege almost exclusively to the SG. Scholars and Court watchers have long argued that this practice is justified because the SG uses it to pursue the rule of law and an objective sense of “justice.”

This Article challenges that …

Supreme Court Reform And American Democracy, Ganesh Sitaraman, D. Epps

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

In How to Save the Supreme Court, we identified the legitimacy challenge facing the Court, traced it to a set of structural flaws, and proposed novel reforms. Little more than a year later, the conversation around Supreme Court reform has only grown louder and more urgent. In this Essay, we continue that conversation by engaging with critics of our approach. The current crisis of the Supreme Court is, we argue, inextricable from the question of the Supreme Court’s proper role in our democracy. For those interested in reform, there are three distinct strategies for ensuring the Supreme Court maintains its …

The Future Of Supreme Court Reform, Ganesh Sitaraman, Daniel Epps

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

For a brief moment in the fall of 2020, structural reform of the Supreme Court seemed like a tangible possibility. After the death of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg in September, some prominent Democratic politicians and liberal commentators warmed to the idea of expanding the Court to respond to Republicans’ rush to confirm a nominee before the election, despite their refusal four years prior to confirm Judge Merrick Garland on the ground that it was an election year. Though Democratic candidate Joe Biden won the Presidency in November, Democrats lost seats in the House and have a majority in the Senate …

What Seila Law Says About Chief Justice Roberts' View Of The Administrative State, Lisa Bressman

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

In "Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Board", the Supreme Court invalidated a statutory provision that protected the director of the Consumer Finance Protection Board (CFPB) from removal by the president except for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office." Writing for the Court, Chief Justice John Roberts announced a new test for evaluating the constitutionality of "for cause" restrictions on presidential removal of high-level agency officials. Under this test, the Court asks whether the removal restriction applies to an official who is the head of a "single-head agency" or to the officials who collectively lead a "multimember …

(What We Talk About When We Talk About) Judicial Temperament, Terry A. Maroney

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Judicial temperament is simultaneously the thing we think all judges must have and the thing that no one can quite put a finger on. Extant accounts are scattered and thin, and either present a laundry list of desirable judicial qualities without articulating what (if anything) unifies the list or treat temperament as a fundamentally mysterious quality that a judge either does or does not have. Resting so much—selection, evaluation, discipline, even removal—on such an indeterminate concept is intellectually and practically intolerable. Polarized debates over Justice Kavanaugh’s fitness to sit on the Supreme Court made clear just how badly we need …

Our Kardashian Court (And How To Fix It), Suzanna Sherry

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

The Supreme Court is broken. After cataloging its dysfunctions, this Article suggests a contributing cause and proposes a solution. The contributing cause is that Justices have become celebrities, and, like other celebrities, play to their fan base. The solution is to limit their opportunities to use their official status to do so: Congress should pass a law prohibiting concurring or dissenting opinions and requiring each case to be decided by an unsigned opinion that does not disclose the number of Justices who join it. The Article outlines the advantages of such a law and considers possible objections to it, including …

Term Limits And Turmoil: Roe V. Wade's Whiplash, Suzanna Sherry, Christopher Sundby

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

A fixed eighteen-year term for Supreme Court Justices has become a popular proposal with both academics and the general public as a possible solution to the countermajoritarian difficulty and as a means for depoliticizing the confirmation process. While scholars have extensively examined the potential benefits of term limits, the potential costs have been underexplored. We focus on one cost: the possible effects of term limits on doctrinal stability. Using seven statistical models that measure potential fluctuation in Supreme Court support for Roe v. Wade had the Court been operating under term limits since 1973, we explore the level of constitutional …

The Risks Of Supreme Court Term Limits, Suzanna Sherry, Christopher Sundby

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Should we impose term limits on Supreme Court justices? Many people, of varying political views, have suggested that we should. They argue that requiring justices to step down after a fixed term – the most common suggestion is 18 years – would give all presidents an equal opportunity to nominate justices, depoliticize the confirmation process and ensure that the Supreme Court is never too far out of step with the views of the American public.

Whether adopting term limits would accomplish all of these goals is, of course, disputed. But is there any reason not to try it? In “Term …

The Enacted Purposes Canon, Kevin M. Stack

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

This Article argues that the principle relied upon in King v. Burwell that courts "cannot interpret statutes to negate their stated purposes"-the enacted purposes canon-is and should be viewed as a bedrock element of statutory interpretation. The Supreme Court has relied upon this principle for decades, but it has done so in ways that do not call attention to this interpretive choice. As a result, the scope and patterns of the Court's reliance are easy to miss. After reconstructing the Court's practice, this Article defends this principle of interpretation on analytic, normative, and pragmatic grounds. Building on jurisprudence showing that …

How To Save The Supreme Court, Ganesh Sitaraman, Daniel Epps

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

The consequences of Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s Supreme Court confirmation are seismic. Justice Kavanaugh, replacing Justice Anthony Kennedy, completes a new conservative majority and represents a stunning Republican victory after decades of increasingly partisan battles over control of the Court. The result is a Supreme Court whose Justices are likely to vote along party lines more consistently than ever before in American history. That development gravely threatens the Court’s legitimacy. If in the future roughly half of Americans lack confidence in the Supreme Court’s ability to render impartial justice, the Court’s power to settle important questions of law will be in …

Consenting To Adjudication Outside The Article Iii Courts, F. Andrew Hessick

Vanderbilt Law Review

Article III confers the judicial power on the federal courts, and it provides the judges of those courts with life tenure and salary guarantees to ensure that they decide disputes according to law instead of popular pressure. Despite this careful arrangement, the Supreme Court has not restricted the judicial power to the Article III courts. Instead, it has held that Article I tribunals-whose judges do not enjoy the salary and tenure guarantees provided by Article III-may adjudicate disputes if the parties consent to the tribunals' jurisdiction. This consent exception provides the basis for thousands of adjudications by Article I judges …

Can A Court Change The Law By Saying Nothing?, Paul R. Gugliuzza, Mark A. Lemley

Vanderbilt Law Review

Can an appellate court alter substantive law without writing an opinion? We attempt to answer that question by conducting a novel empirical investigation into how the Federal Circuit has implemented the Supreme Court's 2014 ruling in Alice v. CLS Bank, the most recent in a series of Supreme Court decisions strengthening patent law's patentable subject matter requirement. Our dataset includes each one of the Federal Circuit's more than 100 decisions on patentable subject matter in the three years since Alice, including affirmances issued without an opinion under Federal Circuit Rule 36. Including those no-opinion affirmances, the Federal Circuit has found …

The Origins (And Fragility) Of Judicial Independence, Tara L. Grove

Vanderbilt Law Review

We hold certain truths of the federal judiciary to be self-evident. Article III judges are entitled to life tenure and salary protections, and cannot be removed outside the impeachment process.' Political actors must comply with federal court orders. And "packing" the Supreme Court is wrong. These assumptions are so deeply ingrained in our public consciousness that it rarely occurs to anyone to question them. But a closer look reveals that these "truths" are neither self- evident nor necessary implications of our constitutional text, structure, and history. Instead, these rules of our federal judiciary have emerged over time through the rough …

Reciprocal Legitimation In The Federal Courts System, Neil S. Siegel

Vanderbilt Law Review

U.S. Supreme Court to be the "apex" court in the federal judicial system, and so to relate hierarchically to "lower" federal courts. On that top-down view, exemplified by the work of Alexander Bickel and many subsequent scholars, the Court is the principal, and lower federal courts are its faithful agents. Other scholarship takes a bottom-up approach, viewing lower federal courts as faithless agents or analyzing the "percolation" of issues in those courts before the Court decides. This Article identifies circumstances in which the relationship between the Court and other federal courts is best viewed as neither top-down nor bottom-up, but …

Undemocratic Restraint, Fred O. Smith, Jr.

Vanderbilt Law Review

For almost two hundred years, a basic tenet of American law has been that federal courts must generally exercise jurisdiction when they possess it. And yet, self-imposed prudential limits on judicial power have, at least until recently, roared on despite these pronouncements. The judicial branch's avowedly self-invented doctrines include some (though not all) aspects of standing, ripeness, abstention, and the political question doctrine. The Supreme Court recently, and unanimously, concluded that prudential limits are in severe tension with our system of representative democracy because they invite policy determinations from unelected judges. Even with these pronouncements, however, the Court has not …

Minor Courts, Major Questions, Michael Coenen, Seth Davis

Vanderbilt Law Review

In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Supreme Court deferred to an agency's controversial interpretation of a key provision of a regulatory statute. Lower courts now apply "Chevron deference" as a matter of course, upholding agencies' reasonable interpretations of ambiguous provisions within the statutes they administer. Recently, however, the Court refused in King v. Burwell to defer to an agency's answer to a statutory question, citing the "deep economic and political significance" of the question itself. The Court in King offered barebones guidance regarding the scope of and rationales for embracing this so-called "major questions exception" …

Scalia In The Casebooks, Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Paulson K. Varghese

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

In the time since Justice Antonin Scalia’s untimely death, much has been written about what his influence has been and what his influence will be. In this Essay, we try to quantify Scalia’s influence in law school constitutional-law curricula by studying how often his ideas are explored in constitutional-law casebooks. In particular, relative to other justices, we look at how often Scalia’s opinions (for the Court, or his separate opinions) are excerpted in the principal cases and how often he is referred to by name in the notes preceding and following the principal cases. We find that Scalia is at …

Supreme Court Repeaters, Jason Iuliano, Ya Sheng Lin

Vanderbilt Law Review

A case that receives cert once is special. A case that receives cert twice is truly exceptional. This Article is the first to examine the phenomenon of "Supreme Court Repeaters." Although Repeaters may seem like mere curiosities, they are actually a valuable part of the Supreme Court's docket. Our analysis reveals that the Justices use Repeaters in three ways: (1) to set up important substantive questions that could not be addressed on the first pass, (2) to supervise lower courts, and (3) to address different substantive issues that arise at distinct points in litigation. In this Article, we investigate Supreme …

Normalizing "Erie", Suzanna Sherry

Vanderbilt Law Review

This Article argues that the Erie doctrine should be normalized by bringing it into line with ordinary doctrines of federalism. Under ordinary federalism doctrines-such as the dormant commerce clause, implied preemption, federal preclusion law, and certain special "enclaves" of federal common law courts will displace state law to protect federal interests even when neither Congress nor the Constitution clearly articulates those interests. But under the Eric doctrine, the Supreme Court has mandated exactly the opposite approach: state law trumps federal interests unless those interests have been legislatively codified. This striking anomaly has not been noticed, in part because the voluminous …

Rethinking Judicial Minimalism: Abortion Politics, Party Polarization, And The Consequences Of Returning The Constitution To Elected Government, Neal Devins

Vanderbilt Law Review

This Article will argue that now is the time for the Court to decisively intervene in the abortion controversy by issuing a maximalist Roe-like decision; today's politics do not support an indeterminate standard like Casey's undue burden test. In other words, assuming that there is a constitutional right to abortion, today's Court should assume the heroic role Erwin Chemerinsky embraces in The Case Against the Supreme Court and other writings; specifically, the Court should "protect the rights of minorities who cannot rely on the political process." For Chemerinsky, protecting the rights of minorities is the "primary reason for having a …

The Broken-Hearted Lover: Erwin Chemerinsky's Romantic Longings For A Mythical Court, Gerald N. Rosenberg

Vanderbilt Law Review

Erwin Chemerinsky is broken hearted. "Almost forty years ago," he writes, "I decided to go to law school because I believed that law was the most powerful tool for social change and that the Supreme Court was the primary institution in society that existed to stop discrimination and to protect people's rights.' Smitten by the Court, Chemerinsky was blind to its historical role as a protector of privilege, and its structural limitations as an agent of progressive social change. Placing the Court on a pedestal, he abstracted it from the culture and the society in which it operates. For decades …

The Supreme Court In Context: Conceptual, Pragmatic, And Institutional, Edward L. Rubin

Vanderbilt Law Review

Is it possible to decide whether a constitutional decision is right or wrong? Legal scholars respond with an enthusiastic 'Yes!" but their reasons for this answer are generally based on what philosophers call formal arguments. These arguments, as opposed to substantive arguments, focus on internal coherence, rather than external standards. Originalism, textualism, structural analysis, and evolving meaning are all formal arguments. Their appeal lies precisely in their independence from external issues-that is, from the sort of issues that generate political and social controversy. If one can demonstrate by formal argument that a particular constitutional decision is correct, then one can …

Introduction: Is The Supreme Court Failing At Its Job, Or Are We Failing At Ours?, Suzanna Sherry

Vanderbilt Law Review

It is a pleasure and a privilege to write an introduction to this Symposium celebrating Dean Erwin Chemerinsky's important new book, The Case Against the Supreme Court. Chemerinsky is one of the leading constitutional scholars of our time and a frequent advocate before the U.S. Supreme Court. If he thinks there is a case to be made against the Court, we should all take it very seriously indeed. Chemerinsky's thesis may be stated in a few sentences. The primary role of the Supreme Court, in his view, is to "protect the rights of minorities who cannot rely on the political …

Thinking About The Supreme Court's Successes And Failures, Erwin Chemerinsky

Vanderbilt Law Review

The Supreme Court often has failed at its most important tasks and at the most important times. I set out this thesis at the beginning the book:

To be clear, I am not saying that the Supreme Court has failed at these crucial tasks every time. Making a case against the Supreme Court does not require taking such an extreme position. I also will talk about areas where the Court has succeeded in protecting minorities and in enforcing the limits of the Constitution. My claim is that the Court has often failed where and when it has been most needed. …

Three Supreme Court "Failures" And A Story Of Supreme Court Success, Corinna B. Lain

Vanderbilt Law Review

The Supreme Court is not the institution that I once revered," writes Erwin Chemerinsky in The Case Against the Supreme Court-a provocative, important work that also happens to be a great read. Chemerinsky's claim is that the Supreme Court ought to be protecting vulnerable minorities from repressive majorities, but it has not done so. "The Court has frequently failed, throughout American history, at its most important tasks, at its most important moments," he argues.' This is Chemerinsky's case against the Supreme Court, and it is a sweeping indictment. Of the cases Chemerinsky cites to prove his point, three stand out …

Letter To Supreme Court (Erwin Chemerinsky Is Mad. Why You Should Care), Barry Friedman

Vanderbilt Law Review

Whatever else you want to say about Erwin Chemerinsky, he's sincere. Chemerinsky is nothing if not sincere. As anyone who knows him will tell you so. And Chemerinsky is in pain. He informs us: "This book was far harder to write than I could have imagined." The question is why Chemerinsky is in pain? You'd think this would be the easiest thing in the world for him, going after a Court he sees as overly conservative. Like shooting fish in a barrel. The reason is because deep in his heart-despite his beefs with the outcomes of cases-Chemerinsky has always been …

The Supreme Court And The New Equity, Samuel L. Bray

Vanderbilt Law Review

The line between law and equity has largely faded away. Even in remedies, where the line persists, the conventional scholarly wisdom favors erasing it. Yet something surprising has happened. In a series of cases over the last decade and a half, the U.S. Supreme Court has acted directly contrary to this conventional wisdom. These cases range across many areas of substantive law-from commercial contracts and employee benefits to habeas and immigration, from patents and copyright to environmental law and national security. Throughout these disparate areas, the Court has consistently reinforced the line between legal and equitable remedies, and it has …

The Interpretive Dimension Of Seminole Rock, Kevin M. Stack

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

A lively debate has emerged over the deferential standard of review courts apply when reviewing an agency's interpretation of its own regulations. That standard, traditionally associated with Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co. and now more frequently attributed to Auer v. Robbins, states that a court must accept an agency's interpretation of its own regulations unless the interpretation is "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation." This Article argues that a court's choice of method for interpreting regulations” including how it determines which agency interpretations are inconsistent with the regulation ” may be just as important, if not more …

The End Of Class Actions?, Brian T. Fitzpatrick

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

In this Article, I give a status report on the life expectancy of class action litigation following the Supreme Court's decisions in Concepcion and American Express. These decisions permitted corporations to opt out of class action liability through the use of arbitration clauses, and many commentators, myself included, predicted that they would eventually lead us down a road where class actions against businesses would be all but eliminated. Enough time has now passed to make an assessment of whether these predictions are coming to fruition. I find that, although there is not yet solid evidence that businesses have flocked to …

Statutory Interpretations And The Therapy Of The Obvious, Edward L. Rubin

Vanderbilt Law Review

Arthur Koestler wrote that "the more original a discovery the more obvious it seems afterward."' The same may be said about theories of law, and specifically about Robert Katzmann's new book, Judging Statutes. Judge Katzmann's approach to statutory interpretation seems so plausible and balanced that it is hard to believe that anyone ever believed anything else. In this particular case, however, there is in fact an "anything else." It is, of course, Justice Antonin Scalia's campaign to displace intentionalist or purposivist approaches to interpretation with what has come to be called "textualism," and his related effort to rule out reliance …