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Pleas Of Guilty And The Loss Of Constitutional Rights: The Current Price Of Pleading Guilty, Stephen A. Saltzburg
Pleas Of Guilty And The Loss Of Constitutional Rights: The Current Price Of Pleading Guilty, Stephen A. Saltzburg
Michigan Law Review
This Article proposes the same basic rule as Westen's to explain the Supreme Court's decisions, but for very different reasons which require several modifications of the Westen rule. I argue that all the guilty-plea cases, properly viewed, are consistent with, and therefore can be read as evidence of, a theory more easily applied than articulated by the Court: that some constitutional rights are largely premised on notions of litigation avoidance, that their "avoidance" rationales must be respected, and that these rights therefore prevent governments from establishing procedural rules that force criminal defendants to go to trial-to choose more rather than …
Forfeiture By Guilty Plea--A Reply, Peter Westen
Forfeiture By Guilty Plea--A Reply, Peter Westen
Michigan Law Review
I will begin by describing what I think Professor Saltzburg and I both mean by a ''legal theory." I then apply that standard to test the validity of the two theories at issue here, first Professor Saltzburg's, then mine. I next discuss a third theory that is independent of both Professor Saltzburg's and mine, viz., that whether a constitutional claim survives a guilty plea depends on whether it is ''jurisdictional." Finally, I comment generally on the concept of forfeiture and its influence on the way one conceives of constitutional rights.
The Eighteenth-Century Background Of John Marshall's Constitutional Jurisprudence, William E. Nelson
The Eighteenth-Century Background Of John Marshall's Constitutional Jurisprudence, William E. Nelson
Michigan Law Review
This analysis of Marshall's constitutional jurisprudence avoids the pitfalls of previous theories. It does not see the Federalist political program as the source of Marshall's constitutional doctrines and thus does not need to explain how Marshall qualified his political principles or how he convinced non-Federalist judges to accept them. Instead, this essay argues that legal, not political, principles underlay Marshall's jurisprudence, but it attempts to understand those principles in a manner consistent with the unavoidable twentieth-century assumption that law is a body of flexible rules responsive to social reality rather than a series of immutable, unambiguous doctrines derived from a …