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Jurisdictional Sequencing, Alan M. Trammell

Georgia Law Review

The Supreme Court has begun to grapple with the
problems presented by the doctrine of jurisdictional
sequencing-the decision of certain issues, and even the
dismissal of cases, before a federal court has verified its
subject matter jurisdiction. Recent jurisprudence has
created confusion as to what, if anything, a federal court
may do before it verifies subject matter jurisdiction.
Moreover, scholars and courts have struggled to discern
an underlying rationale for jurisdictional sequencing, and
no theory has been able to explain the case law fully or
offer a satisfying normative defense of the doctrine.

This Article develops a theory of jurisdictional …

Safe Haven No Longer: The Role Of Georgia Courts And Private Probation Companies In Sustaining A De Facto Debtors' Prison System, Sarah D. Bellacicco

Georgia Law Review

Georgia was specifically established as a colony for debtors-a haven where they could be safe from imprisonment. It is a haven no longer. Georgia courts are regularly imprisoning people for failing to pay debts, often through probation revocation of probationers who have failed to pay a fine or fee imposed as a condition of probation. Some of these probationers are on probation solely because they could not pay a fine on the day of sentencing, a practice which greatly increases the amount they owe due to the additional probation fees imposed. In Bearden v. Georgia, the Supreme Court held that …

Textualism And Obstacle Preemption, John D. Ohlendorf

Georgia Law Review

Commentators, both on the bench and in the academy,
have perceived an inconsistency between the Supreme
Court's trend, in recent decades, towards an increasingly
formalist approach to statutory interpretation and the
Court's continued willingness to find state laws preempted
as "obstacles to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress'"--so-called
"obstacle preemption." This Article argues that by giving
the meaning contextually implied in a statutory text
ordinary, operative legal force, we can justify most of the
current scope of obstacle preemption based solely on
theoretical moves textualism already is committed to
making.
The Article first sketches …