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Articles 1 - 4 of 4
Full-Text Articles in Law
Crashing The Party- The Supreme Court Subjects Political Parties To Preclearance Under Section 5 Of The Voting Rights Act Of 1965 In Morse V. Republican Party Of Virginia, Matthew M. Farley
Crashing The Party- The Supreme Court Subjects Political Parties To Preclearance Under Section 5 Of The Voting Rights Act Of 1965 In Morse V. Republican Party Of Virginia, Matthew M. Farley
University of Richmond Law Review
If someone told you that whenever a particular "State or political subdivision" attempts to change its voting laws or regulations, they must first receive approval from the Department of Justice or a federal court in the District of Columbia, would you consider this requirement applicable to political parties? Asked in isolation, the question appears too obvious to warrant serious consideration. An understanding of the history of discrimination denying America's blacks full and complete franchise and an understanding of the adoption and evolution of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, however, may give you pause before answering.
Robinson V. Shell Oil Co.: Policy-Not Ambiguity-Drives The Supreme Court's Decision To Broaden Title Vii's Retaliation Coverage, Barry T. Meek
Robinson V. Shell Oil Co.: Policy-Not Ambiguity-Drives The Supreme Court's Decision To Broaden Title Vii's Retaliation Coverage, Barry T. Meek
University of Richmond Law Review
Before the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., a majority of the circuit courts were blurring seemingly unambiguous language to expand Title VII's coverage to comport with amiable policy goals. Only policy justifications could explain the courts' willingness to cover postemployment retaliation based on language that prohibits an employer from discriminating "against his employees" and that further defines employees as those persons "employed by an employer." Clearly, the plain meaning of such language envisions that persons protected under Title VII have an existing employment relationship with the covered employer at the time of the alleged retaliatory conduct. …
The Supreme Court's Rejection Of Government Indemnification To Agent Orange Manufacturers In Hercules, Inc. V. United States: Distinguishing The Forest From The Trees?, Kacey Reed
University of Richmond Law Review
In recent years, the Supreme Court clarified the scope of immunity afforded to contractors for damages resulting from the performance of a government contract. However, the extent of the government's responsibility to indemnify third party claims resulting from a government contract has remained relatively obscure. Without clear direction, courts rejected government indemnification, relying upon a variety of detailed points of contract law which often concealed larger issues. In an appellate court dissent, Judge Plager criticized this result, warning that "undue attention to trees . . . often hides the forest."' Recently, in Hercules, Inc. v. United States, the Supreme Court …
The Supreme Court's "Exceedingly [Un]Persuasive" Application Of Intermediate Scrutiny In United States V. Virginia, Jeffrey A. Barnes
The Supreme Court's "Exceedingly [Un]Persuasive" Application Of Intermediate Scrutiny In United States V. Virginia, Jeffrey A. Barnes
University of Richmond Law Review
The Supreme Court's decision in the case of United States v. Virginia in June of 1996 was a landmark decision that could change how future courts approach and resolve gender-based equal protection claims. The Supreme Court held that the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) could no longer continue its male-only admissions policy as a state-funded institution of higher education. The Court's apparent heightening of the level of scrutiny applied to gender-based classifications from the previously used intermediate scrutiny to an ambiguous standard either somewhere between the traditional intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny, or, in effect, a standard equivalent to strict scrutiny, …