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Supreme Court of the United States
University of Michigan Law School
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Full-Text Articles in Law
The Frame Of Reference And Other Problems, Richard D. Friedman, Jeffrey L. Fisher
The Frame Of Reference And Other Problems, Richard D. Friedman, Jeffrey L. Fisher
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
George argues that, centuries ago, jurists did not distinguish between testimonial and nontestimonial hearsay, and so the distinction cannot be a historically well-grounded basis for modern confrontation doctrine. The argument proceeds from an inaccurate frame of reference. When the confrontation right developed, principally in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and English defendants—Raleigh among them—demanded that adverse witnesses be brought face to face with them, they were making a procedural assertion as to how witnesses must give their testimony. (Giving testimony is what witnesses in litigation do.) Rarely did they phrase this claim in terms of hearsay, for the simple reason …
Crawford V. Washington: The Next Ten Years, Jeffrey L. Fisher
Crawford V. Washington: The Next Ten Years, Jeffrey L. Fisher
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
Imagine a world . . . in which the Supreme Court got it right the first time. That is, imagine that when the Supreme Court first incorporated the Confrontation Clause against the states, the Court did so by way of the testimonial approach. It’s not that hard to envision. In Douglas v. Alabama—issued in 1965, on the same day the Court ruled that the Confrontation Clause applies to the states—the Court held that a nontestifying witness’s custodial confession could not be introduced against the defendant because, while “not technically testimony,” the confession was “the equivalent in the jury’s mind …