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Full-Text Articles in Law
The Reverse-Commandeering System: A Better Way To Distribute State And Local Authority, Joseph Zelasko
The Reverse-Commandeering System: A Better Way To Distribute State And Local Authority, Joseph Zelasko
Northwestern University Law Review
Current regimes for distributing state and local authority have two primary flaws: (1) they unnecessarily restrict local authority by preventing local governments from passing private laws, and (2) they often require local ordinances to be enforced in state courts, thereby depriving local governments of the ability to interpret their own laws and requiring states to pay the judicial costs of local policy preferences. This Note suggests a new means of distributing state and local authority designed to address these two deficiencies: the reverse-commandeering system. The reverse-commandeering system would not distinguish between local authority to pass public and private laws. Instead, …
An American Oddity: The Law, History, And Toll Of The School District, Nadav Shoked
An American Oddity: The Law, History, And Toll Of The School District, Nadav Shoked
Northwestern University Law Review
The school district is a staple of American law. As the local government tasked with controlling our public schools, the school district is so well-entrenched that lawmakers and commentators ignore its uniqueness as a legal institution. The school district is peculiar to American law, and it is a peculiarity within American law. General purpose governments—cities and counties—are the local governments controlling schools outside the United States. In the United States itself, these governments control almost all other major local functions. But they do not control education here. Why? Why does American law rely on a separate local government for the …
Tax Cannibalization And Fiscal Federalism In The United States, David Gamage, Darien Shanske
Tax Cannibalization And Fiscal Federalism In The United States, David Gamage, Darien Shanske
Northwestern University Law Review
We began this project pondering a riddle. Most state governments have adopted what we—and many others—view as clearly suboptimal tax policies, especially in regard to the taxation of corporate income and capital gains. Yet, with the notable exception of those who oppose progressivity and the taxation of capital, state-level tax policymakers have had remarkably little appetite for reform. This Article provides one major explanation for this riddle by identifying and demonstrating a phenomenon that we label as “tax cannibalization.” We argue that flawed state-level tax policies derive in part from perverse incentives inadvertently created by the federal government.