Law Commons^™

State Amici, Collective Action, And The Development Of Federalism Doctrine, Michael E. Solimine

Georgia Law Review

State attorneys general (SAGs) have been individually
and collectively active on many legal and regulatory fronts
in recent years. One of those activities has been the filing
of amicus curiae briefs in the United States Supreme

Court, especially in cases impacting the states and
federalism doctrine. Frequently SAGs will join in one
amicus brief, and briefs signed by forty or more states are
not uncommon. This phenomenon has been the subject of
attention by legal scholars and political scientists, but the
normative jurisprudential significance of such briefs has
not. In their opinions, the Justices vary in how much legal
weight, …

Rhetorical Federalism: The Value Of State-Based Dissent To Federal Health Reform, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard

Scholarly Works

This Article makes the affirmative case for the widespread trend of state resistance to the recently enacted, comprehensive federal health reform law, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, or ACA. A significant number of states have engaged in various forms of objection to the new federal laws, including filing lawsuits against the federal government, enacting laws providing that ACA will not apply to residents of the state, and refusing to cooperate with implementing the new laws. This Article identifies reasons why those actions should not be disregarded simply as Tea Party antics or election-year gamesmanship but instead …

Federalism And Accountability: State Attorneys General, Regulatory Litigation, And The New Federalism, Timothy L. Meyer

Scholarly Works

This Comment will examine how one particular state institution, state attorneys general (SAGs), has operated within a unique set of institutional and political constraints to create state-based regulation with nationwide impact in policy areas including consumer protection, antitrust, environmental regulation, and securities regulation. This state-based regulation casts doubt on one of the principle rationales advanced in the Supreme Court's anticommandeering line of cases for limiting federal power; namely, that such a move enhances electoral accountability, a concept central to our democracy. If in the absence of federal regulation a series of narrowly accountable state-based actors can create nationwide regulation in …

Cooperative Federalism And Healthcare Reform: The Medicare Part D 'Clawback' Example, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard

Scholarly Works

This symposium article recounts recent litigation by several states over a provision of the Medicare Modernization Act Part D prescription drug benefit: The clawback, which requires states to pay the a potentially substantial portion of new federal program. I then examine the unique federalism implications of the clawback for ongoing state and federal health reform initiatives.

In spring 2006, several states petitioned the United States Supreme Court for original jurisdiction to hear a challenge to one provision of the new Medicare Part D prescription drug law. The federal government, while taking over prescription drug coverage for dually eligible beneficiaries, required …

Commerce Clause Restraints On State Tax Incentives, Walter Hellerstein

Scholarly Works

The states' provision of tax incentives designed to encourage economic development within their borders has long been a feature of the American legislative landscape. Today every state provides tax incentives as an inducement to local industrial location and expansion. Indeed, scarcely a day goes by without some state offering yet another tax incentive to spur economic development, often in an effort to attract a particular enterprise to the state.

The debate over the efficacy and wisdom of state tax and other business incentives is intense and important, as other articles in this Symposium plainly reveal. My purpose here, however, is …

Testing Two Assumptions About Federalism And Tort Reform, Thomas A. Eaton, Susette M. Talarico

Scholarly Works

In, 1996 both the United States House of Representatives and Senate passed legislation that, if enacted, would preempt state tort laws in significant ways. Why would a Congress otherwise apparently committed to vesting states with greater policymaking autonomy call for federal control of tort law?

Tort policymaking has traditionally been done at the state level. One assumption underlying this distribution of power is that states are better able than the national government to fashion tort rules appropriate for local conditions and circumstances. In other words, states are thought to have a special competence in crafting tort rules responsive to local …

A Commerce Power Seesaw: Balancing National League Of Cities, J. Ralph Beaird, C. Ronald Ellington

Scholarly Works

This Article seeks to explore the developing principles of state sovereignty limitations on Congress’ exercise of its granted powers and the potential conflicts in reconciling the enforcement of strong federal policy interests with the allowance to the states of primary control over certain governmental functions. Since both tenth and eleventh amendment questions were raised by the application of the Fair Labor Standards Act’s ever broadening coverage to state employees and its grant of federal court jurisdiction over enforcement suits, and since the Act precipitated the League of Cities decision, the Court’s treatment of the Act will serve as the primary …