Law Commons^™

Collusion In Convergent Markets, Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

No abstract provided.

The Legal Periphery Of Dominant Firm Conduct, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

This essay explores two different but related problems and how U.S. antitrust law and EU competition law approach them. The first is the offense of attempt to monopolize, which concerns the acts that a firm that is not yet dominant might undertake in order to become dominant. The second is the offense of monopoly or dominant firm leveraging, which occurs when a firm uses its dominant position in one market to cause some kind of harm in a different market where it also does business.

The language of EU and U.S. provisions concerning dominant firms provokes one to think that …

A Control Theory Model Of Pricing For A Firm Facing A Stochastic Environment – A Firm’S Dynamic Pricing Strategy When Faced With The Threat Of Antitrust Action, Manak Gupta, Atin Basu Choudhary

Atin Basu Choudhary

No abstract provided.

Silence Is Golden: Communication, Silence, And Cartel Stability, Atin Basu Choudhary, John Conlon

Atin Basu Choudhary

This paper studies how cartel stability is influenced by asymmetric information and communication about demand. Firms in a cartel face fluctuating demand in a repeated game framework. In each period, one randomly chosen firm knows current demand. In this context we consider two different equilibria -- one where the informed firm communicates its information to its partners and another where it does not. We show that cartels are extremely unstable when the informed firm communicates with the uninformed firms. However, when the informed firm does not communicate with the uninformed firms cartels can be as stable as when there are …

La Convergencia Y El Principio De La Neutralidad Tecnológica, Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

No abstract provided.

Antitrust Governance, Yane Svetiev

ExpressO

In this article, the author argues that antitrust law has entered a new phase of its controversial existence. The role of antitrust in moderating inter-firm relationships depends both on the problems of the underlying market regime and the institutional capacity of antitrust decision-makers to respond to those challenges. For much of the 20th century, the model firm was hierarchical: vertical integration within the business organization was a way of achieving transaction cost efficiencies and delivering higher levels of output at lower prices. Recognition of this fact transformed antitrust from its traditional focus on concentrated power, to a policy focused on …