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Full-Text Articles in Law

Who Cares About Director Independence? Presentation (Pdf Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Giulia Paone Sep 2007

Who Cares About Director Independence? Presentation (Pdf Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Giulia Paone

Paolo Santella

No abstract provided.


Who Cares About Director Independence? Presentation (Pdf Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Giulia Paone Sep 2007

Who Cares About Director Independence? Presentation (Pdf Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Giulia Paone

Carlo Drago

No abstract provided.


Who Cares About Director Independence? Presentation (Pdf Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Giulia Paone May 2007

Who Cares About Director Independence? Presentation (Pdf Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Giulia Paone

Paolo Santella

No abstract provided.


Who Cares About Director Independence? Presentation (Pdf Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Giulia Paone May 2007

Who Cares About Director Independence? Presentation (Pdf Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Giulia Paone

Carlo Drago

No abstract provided.


Hedge Funds In Corporate Governance And Corporate Control, Marcel Kahan, Edward B. Rock May 2007

Hedge Funds In Corporate Governance And Corporate Control, Marcel Kahan, Edward B. Rock

All Faculty Scholarship

Hedge funds have become critical players in both corporate governance and corporate control. In this article, we document and examine the nature of hedge fund activism, how and why it differs from activism by traditional institutional investors, and its implications for corporate governance and regulatory reform. We argue that hedge fund activism differs from activism by traditional institutions in several ways: it is directed at significant changes in individual companies (rather than small, systemic changes), it entails higher costs, and it is strategic and ex ante (rather than intermittent and ex post). The reasons for these differences may lie in …


Who Cares About Director Independence? Presentation (Pdf Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Giulia Paone Apr 2007

Who Cares About Director Independence? Presentation (Pdf Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Giulia Paone

Paolo Santella

No abstract provided.


Who Cares About Director Independence? Presentation (Pdf Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Giulia Paone Apr 2007

Who Cares About Director Independence? Presentation (Pdf Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Giulia Paone

Carlo Drago

No abstract provided.


Classified Boards And Firm Value, Michael D. Frakes Jan 2007

Classified Boards And Firm Value, Michael D. Frakes

Faculty Scholarship

Classified boards constitute one of the most potent takeover defenses for U.S. firms today. However, as with takeover defenses more generally, economic theory offers an ambiguous prediction as to the effect that classified boards have on bottom-line firm value. A resolution of this ambiguity will require sound and convincing empirical methodology. In an effort to address limitations in the existing empirical literature, this article approaches the relationship between corporate governance and firm value while taking various measures to account for unobserved sources of heterogeneity across firms. Using the instrumental variables model developed by Hausman and Taylor, I find evidence of …


Self-Handicapping And Managers’ Duty Of Care, David A. Hoffman Jan 2007

Self-Handicapping And Managers’ Duty Of Care, David A. Hoffman

All Faculty Scholarship

This symposium essay focuses on the relationship between managers' duty of care and self-handicapping, or constructing obstacles to performance with the goal of influencing subsequent explanations about outcomes. Conventional explanations for failures of caretaking by managers have focused on motives (greed) and incentives (agency costs). This account of manager behavior has led some modern jurists, concerned about recent corporate scandals, to advocate for stronger deterrent measures to realign manager and shareholder incentives. * Self-handicapping theory, by contrast, teaches that bad manager behavior may occur even when incentives are well-aligned. Highly successful individuals in particular come to fear the pressure of …