Law Commons^™

Hunting Unicorns, Aaron Edlin

Aaron Edlin

Activating Actavis, Aaron Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro

Aaron Edlin

In Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc., the Supreme Court provided fundamental guidance about how courts should handle antitrust challenges to reverse payment patent settlements. The Court came down strongly in favor of an antitrust solution to the problem, concluding that “an antitrust action is likely to prove more feasible administratively than the Eleventh Circuit believed.” At the same time, Justice Breyer’s majority opinion acknowledged that the Court did not answer every relevant question. The opinion closed by “leav[ing] to the lower courts the structuring of the present rule-of-reason antitrust litigation.”This article is an effort to help courts and counsel …

Actavis And Error Costs: A Reply To Critics, Aaron S. Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro

Aaron Edlin

The Supreme Court’s opinion in Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc. provided fundamental guidance about how courts should handle antitrust challenges to reverse payment patent settlements. In our previous article, Activating Actavis, we identified and operationalized the essential features of the Court’s analysis. Our analysis has been challenged by four economists, who argue that our approach might condemn procompetitive settlements.As we explain in this reply, such settlements are feasible, however, only under special circumstances. Moreover, even where feasible, the parties would not actually choose such a settlement in equilibrium. These considerations, and others discussed in the reply, serve to confirm …

Conservatism And Switcher's Curse, Aaron Edlin

Aaron Edlin

Freedom To Trade And The Competitive Process, Aaron S. Edlin, Joseph Farrell

Aaron Edlin

Although antitrust courts sometimes stress the competitive process, they have not deeply explored what that process is. Inspired by the theory of the core, we explore the idea that the competitive process is the process of sellers and buyers forming improving coalitions. Much of antitrust can be seen as prohibiting firms’ attempts to restrain improving trade between their rivals and customers. In this way, antitrust protects firms’ and customers’ freedom to trade to their mutual betterment.

The Role Of Switching Costs In Antitrust Analysis: A Comparison Of Microsoft And Google, Aaron Edlin, Robert Harris

Aaron Edlin

No abstract provided.

Predatory Pricing, Aaron S. Edlin

Aaron Edlin

Judge Breyer famously worried that aggressive prohibitions of predatory pricing throw away a bird in hand (low prices during the alleged predatory period) for a speculative bird in the bush (preventing higher prices thereafter). Here, I argue that there is no bird in hand because entry cannot be presumed. Moreover, it is plausibly commonplace that low prices or the threat of low prices produce anticompetitive results by reducing entry, inducing exit, and keeping prices high. I analyze three potential standards for identifying predatory pricing. Two are traditional but have been tangled together and must be distinguished. First, a price-cost test …

Don't Tax The Rich, Tax Inequality, Aaron S. Edlin

Aaron Edlin

A Brandeis tax can stop inequality in its tracks.

Clearings And Thickets, Robert D. Cooter, Aaron Edlin

Aaron Edlin

Abstract: Intellectual property rights create temporary monopoly power for innovators. Monopoly pricing transfers wealth to the innovator from the innovations buyers -- consumers, producers, and other innovators. For innovations mostly used in consumption and production, the transfer from consumers and producers to innovators increases the profitability of innovating and causes more of it. The welfare gains from faster growth quickly overtake the temporary losses from monopoly’s dead weight loss. Thus intellectual property rights should be strong for innovations mostly used by consumers and producers. In contrast, for innovations mostly used by other innovators, the transfer of wealth from one innovator …

2011 Professor's Update To Antitrust Analysis, Problems, Text, And Cases, Philip Areeda, Louis Kaplow, Aaron S. Edlin

Aaron Edlin

No abstract provided.

Proposed Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Economists’ Comment, Michael R. Baye, Aaron S. Edlin, Richard J. Gilbert, Jerry A. Hausman, Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Steven C. Salop, Richard L. Schmalensee, Joshua D. Wright

Aaron Edlin

No abstract provided.

It Works For Mergers, Why Not Finance, Aaron S. Edlin, Richard J. Gilbert

Aaron Edlin

No abstract provided.

Professor's Update To Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Text And Cases, Phillip Areeda, Louis Kaplow, Aaron S. Edlin

Aaron Edlin

No abstract provided.

Show Me The Money, Aaron S. Edlin, Dwight Jaffee

Aaron Edlin

Where did TARP go?

What Is The Probability Your Vote Will Make A Difference?, Andrew Gelman, Nate Silver, Aaron S. Edlin

Aaron Edlin

Vote For Charity's Sake, Aaron S. Edlin, Andrew Gelman, Noah Kaplan

Aaron Edlin

In a battleground state like Colorado or New Mexico, voting in the presidential election may be equivalent to giving $30,000 - $50,000 to others in expected value, and as such is an extremely efficient form of charity.

Quashing The Financial Firestorm, Aaron S. Edlin

Aaron Edlin

Start the financial rescue with containment, establish unlimited deposit insurance and continuous access to funds, then move to a well thought-out plan to quash the financial flames.

Academic Testimony On Unilateral Conduct Before The U.S. Dept. Of Justice & Federal Trade Commission Hearings, Aaron S. Edlin

Aaron Edlin

No abstract provided.

The Accident Externality From Driving, Aaron S. Edlin, Pinar Karaca Mandic

Aaron Edlin

The Bundling Of Academic Journals, Aaron S. Edlin, Daniel L. Rubinfeld

Aaron Edlin

No abstract provided.

Exclusion Or Efficient Pricing: The "Big Deal" Bundling Of Academic Journals, Aaron S. Edlin, Daniel L. Rubinfeld

Aaron Edlin

Prices of academic journals have climbed enormously in the past two decades. This article explains the substantial barriers to entry that established journals enjoy. It points out that the Big Deal bundling that the large commercial publishers have adopted in the past few years creates a substantial additional strategic barrier to entry. We consider whether these bundling offers violate the antitrust laws and conclude that they may.

The American Airlines Case: A Chance To Clarify Predation Policy, Aaron S. Edlin, Joseph Farrell

Aaron Edlin

No abstract provided.

Stopping Above-Cost Predatory Pricing, Aaron S. Edlin

Aaron Edlin

Market-Based Transfer Prices And Intracompany Discounts, Aaron S. Edlin, Tim Baldenius, Stefan Reichelstein

Aaron Edlin

No abstract provided.

Recent Initiatives In Antitrust Enforcement, Aaron S. Edlin

Aaron Edlin

No abstract provided.

Do Guaranteed-Low-Price Policies Guarantee High Prices, And Can Antitrust Rise To The Challenge?, Aaron S. Edlin

Aaron Edlin

Price-matching policies can be highly anticompetitive. They allow firms to raise their prices above competition levels by discriminating in price between informed and uninformed customers. The resulting high prices can persist even when new firms enter the industry, a fact that gives price matching the potential to be much more socially costly than an ordinary monopoly or cartel. At the same time, widespread entry implies that the agreement among sellers that is typical of a Sherman Act price-fixing case may be absent. In this article, Professor Edlin argues that there is nonetheless an analogy between a seller offering (and agreeing) …

Cadillac Contracts And Up-Front Payments: Efficient Investment Under Expectation Damages, Aaron S. Edlin

Aaron Edlin

Two-Part Marginal Cost Pricing Equilibria With N Firms: Sufficient Conditions For Existence And Optimality, Aaron S. Edlin, Mario Epelbaum

Aaron Edlin

Is College Financial Aid Equitable And Efficient?, Aaron S. Edlin

Aaron Edlin

No abstract provided.