Paper Dragon Thieves, J.S. Nelson
Dec 2016
Paper Dragon Thieves, J.S. Nelson
J.S. Nelson
Developments in the law are making the corporate form more opaque and allowing the agents who animate it to escape individual accountability for their actions. The law now provides protection for agents to engage in widespread frauds that inflict massive harm on the public. This article challenges the academic orthodoxy that shareholder and director liability are enough to control agent behavior by developing a paper dragon analogy to focus on the importance of agents in corporate animation. Lack of agent accountability encourages the patterns of fraud that caused the financial crisis in which forty-five percent of the world’s wealth disappeared, …
Aom Aat Law Symposium Proposal (Final).Pdf, Adam J. Sulkowski, Constance E. Bagley, J.S. Nelson, Waddock S., Paul Shrivastava, Inara K. Scott
Dec 2016
Aom Aat Law Symposium Proposal (Final).Pdf, Adam J. Sulkowski, Constance E. Bagley, J.S. Nelson, Waddock S., Paul Shrivastava, Inara K. Scott
J.S. Nelson
Law undergirds the capitalist system and is “at the interface” of business and social relationships
but remains largely walled off from many traditional approaches to management education,
scholarship, and practice. Although a simple definition of law is “enforceable rules between
individuals and individuals and society,” law is also amedium bywhich relationships among and
obligations between management and internal and external stakeholders are negotiated and
formalized. Law can also drive (or impede) innovation by creating new rights (or burdening new
business models with undue regulation) and promote (or prevent) social change by setting the
boundaries for acceptable corporate actions. Legal rules …
Josephine Sandler Nelson On Volkswagen, J.S. Nelson
May 2016
Josephine Sandler Nelson On Volkswagen, J.S. Nelson
J.S. Nelson
No abstract provided.
Fumigating The Criminal Bug: New Research On The Insulation Of Volkswagen’S Middle Management, J.S. Nelson
May 2016
Fumigating The Criminal Bug: New Research On The Insulation Of Volkswagen’S Middle Management, J.S. Nelson
J.S. Nelson
The Criminal Bug: Volkswagen's Middle Management, J.S. Nelson
Dec 2015
The Criminal Bug: Volkswagen's Middle Management, J.S. Nelson
J.S. Nelson
Not only does the 2015-16 Volkswagen emissions cheating scandal have the potential to destroy a $227 billion-dollar multinational company, but it contains eerie echoes of other recent white collar scandals that have claimed lives and cost the public trillions of dollars. Through a case study of Volkswagen, this Essay pioneers a new way to look at these scandals by focusing on their common element: the growing insulation and entrenchment of middle management to coordinate such large-scale wrongdoing.
The Corporate Shell Game, J.S. Nelson
Dec 2015
The Corporate Shell Game, J.S. Nelson
J.S. Nelson
This Article identifies for the first time the hardening of the corporate shell. It provides compelling evidence that shell-hardening pushes and disguises the way that corporations and agents commit large-scale wrongdoing, and it traces the contributing legal streams that protect the agents who engage in this behavior. The only way to combat widespread frauds that inflict damage on the public is for the corporate shell to be-come less opaque.
The Intracorporate Conspiracy Trap (Formerly "Perverse Incentives And Corporate Conspiracy: Why We Are Asking The Wrong Basic Question In Assessing Liability For Corporations And Their Agents"), J.S. Nelson
Jan 2015
The Intracorporate Conspiracy Trap (Formerly "Perverse Incentives And Corporate Conspiracy: Why We Are Asking The Wrong Basic Question In Assessing Liability For Corporations And Their Agents"), J.S. Nelson
J.S. Nelson
In the recent case of Commonwealth v. Lynn, Pennsylvania prosecuted a Roman Catholic priest who had not abused children himself but who, to protect the archdiocese that employed him, covered up information about priests who had abused children and reassigned the priests to new parishes. This case was the first of its kind to bring criminal charges against an official of the Church solely for how he supervised the careers of priests to protect his employer.
Because the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine prohibits it, the state—as is now typical of both state and federal jurisdictions around the country—was unable to prosecute …
Protecting Employee Rights And Prosecuting Corporate Crimes: A Proposal For Criminal Cumis Counsel, Josephine Sandler Nelson
Dec 2012
Protecting Employee Rights And Prosecuting Corporate Crimes: A Proposal For Criminal Cumis Counsel, Josephine Sandler Nelson
J.S. Nelson
To address multi-dimensional conflict of interest problems in directors and officers (D&O) indemnification cases, we propose a solution that was originally developed for civil insurance cases in California, but that has an even more powerful and appropriate application in the context of criminal employee defendants.
Corporate crime costs the United States a staggering $600 billion a year. By contrast, the total cost of all non-corporate crime in 2001 from robbery, burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft combined was $17.2 billion; less than one-third of what fraudulent activities at the single company of Enron cost investors, pensioners, and employees in the …