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Full-Text Articles in Law
Solving The Bargaining Democracy Problem Using A Constitutional Hierarchy Of Law, Clas Wihlborg
Solving The Bargaining Democracy Problem Using A Constitutional Hierarchy Of Law, Clas Wihlborg
Business Faculty Articles and Research
In the “bargaining democracy” groups form coalitions that are able to grant benefits to themselves through legislation. These benefits may lack popular support. A constitutional hierarchy of conflicting laws is proposed to resolve this democratic problem. In the hierarchy more “rule-oriented” legislation dominate. The hierarchy would create a momentum of the political process towards more rule-oriented legislation and policy debate. The difficulty of defining a rule operationally is overcome by limiting the task of a constitutional court to simply rank conflicting policy actions in terms of criteria for rules.
Comparative Analysis Of Litigation Systems: An Auction‐Theoretic Approach, Michael R. Baye, Dan Kovenock, Casper G. De Vries
Comparative Analysis Of Litigation Systems: An Auction‐Theoretic Approach, Michael R. Baye, Dan Kovenock, Casper G. De Vries
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
A simple auction-theoretic framework is used to examine symmetric litigation environments where the legal ownership of a disputed asset is unknown to the court. The court observes only the quality of the case presented by each party, and awards the asset to the party presenting the best case. Rational litigants influence the quality of their cases by hiring skilful attorneys. This framework permits us to compare the equilibrium legal expenditures that arise under a continuum of legal systems. The British rule, Continental rule, American rule, and some recently proposed legal reforms are special cases of our model.