Law Commons^™

The Eu, Democracy And Institutional Structure: Past, Present And Future, Paul Craig

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.

محاسن دستور مكتوب من وراء ستار الجهل, Ahmed Souaiaia

Ahmed E SOUAIAIA

No abstract provided.

Redesigning Global Trade Institutions, John Linarelli

Scholarly Works

This is a draft of an essay for the symposium, 2021: International Law Ten Years from Now, held by the Southwestern Journal of International Law in cooperation with the International Law Association (American Branch) Weekend West. The essay deals with two questions. First, what is to be of the WTO and world trade institutions generally? It examines the rise of regionalism in international trade agreements and possible roles for variable geometry for the WTO. The essay critiques proposals to move towards (or back to) plurilateralism for the WTO. Second, what should trade agreements do? This question goes to the core …

Slides: Rethinking Western Water Law: Restoring The Public Interest In Western Water Law, Mark Squillace

Western Water Law, Policy and Management: Ripples, Currents, and New Channels for Inquiry (Martz Summer Conference, June 3-5)

Presenter: Mark Squillace, Director, Natural Resources Law Center, University of Colorado Law School

20 slides

Does The Constitutional Process Matter?, Zachary Elkins

Zachary Elkins

Constitution-making is a ubiquitous but poorly understood phenomenon. There is much speculation but relatively little evidence about the impact of different design processes on constitutional outcomes. Much of the debate reduces to the question of who is involved in the process and when. We consider two central issues in this regard. The first is the problem of institutional self-dealing, or whether governmental organs that have something to gain from the constitutional outcome should be involved in the process. The second has to do with the merits of public involvement in the process. Both of these concerns have clear normative implications …

Constitution-Making: A Process Filled With Constraint, Donald L. Horowitz

Faculty Scholarship

Constitutions are generally made by people with no previous experience in constitution making. The assistance they receive from outsiders is often less useful than it may appear. The most pertinent foreign experience may reside in distant countries, whose lessons are unknown or inaccessible. Moreover, although constitutions are intended to endure, they are often products of the particular crisis that forced their creation. Drafters are usually heavily affected by a desire to avoid repeating unpleasant historical experiences or to emulate what seem to be successful constitutional models. Theirs is a heavily constrained environment, made even more so by distrust and dissensus …

Western Institution Building: The War, Hayek’S Cosmos And The Wto, M. Ulric Killion

ExpressO

Despite the shortcomings of Hayek’s spontaneous order, there is a positive side, perhaps even a positive feedback. Hayek left us with a “what if” question and returns us to that initial opening of Pandora’s Box, or perhaps the initial onset of neo-realism, neo-liberalism, developmentalism, globalism, transnationalism and other concepts, precepts and adjectives justifying institution building by bargaining and military force. In terms of new world order, institution building by necessity requires fundamental changes in governmental structures in non-western cultures and nation-states such as China, Afghanistan and Iraq. Such changes are being prompted by means of political, economic and military powers …

Constitutional Design And Law: The Political Economy Of Cabinet And Congressional Government, Matthew S. R. Palmer

The Hon Justice Matthew Palmer

The dissertation takes a political economy approach to constitutional design and legislation in the Westminster (Cabinet) and US (Congressional) models of government. Part I develops the economics of comparative political organization by constructing a theoretical framework for analyzing constitutional design. Part II applies the framework to distinguish the essences of the Cabinet and Congressional systems of constitutional design in the contexts of US and Canadian federal government. Part III analyzes the effects of the different constitutional designs on the processes of legislating in each system and on the substantive characteristics of legislation in each system. The analysis is subjected to …