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Full-Text Articles in Law
Talking One's Way Out Of A Debt Crisis, Lee C. Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati
Talking One's Way Out Of A Debt Crisis, Lee C. Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati
Faculty Scholarship
The policy of Euro-area officialdom in the period 2010-2011 was to avoid, at all costs, a default and restructuring of the sovereign debt of a member of the monetary union. This policy was motivated principally, but not exclusively, by a fear that the international capital markets, if forcibly reminded of the precarious position of overindebted, growth-challenged members of a monetary union, might recoil generally from lending to European sovereigns. In short, they feared contagion.
The only alternative to permitting a debt restructuring, of course, was an official sector bailout. The afflicted countries -- Greece (until 2012), Portugal, Ireland and Cyprus …
Can Greece Be Expelled From The Eurozone? Toward A Default Rule On Expulsion From International Organizations, Joseph Blocher, Mitu Gulati, Laurence R. Helfer
Can Greece Be Expelled From The Eurozone? Toward A Default Rule On Expulsion From International Organizations, Joseph Blocher, Mitu Gulati, Laurence R. Helfer
Faculty Scholarship
The ongoing European crisis has raised uncomfortable questions about the conditions under which treaty-based unions of nations like the EU or the EMU can legally expel a member—Greece being the most obvious candidate. The EU, for example, has rules governing the voluntary withdrawal of members, but says nothing about whether a member can be expelled. As a matter of international law, what does the silence mean? Put differently: What is the default rule regarding expulsions when a treaty says nothing about forced withdrawals? Is there an absolute bar on expulsion, as some have suggested? Conversely, is there an implicit right …
The Pricing Of Non-Price Terms In Sovereign Bonds: The Case Of The Greek Guarantees, Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati
The Pricing Of Non-Price Terms In Sovereign Bonds: The Case Of The Greek Guarantees, Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati
Faculty Scholarship
In March 2012, Greece conducted one of the biggest and most brutal sovereign debt restructurings ever, asking holders of Greek government bonds to take net present value haircuts of near 80 percent. Greece forced acquiescence to its terms from a large number of its bonds by using a variety of legal strong-arm tactics. With the vast majority of Greek bonds, the tactics worked. There were, however, thirty-six bonds guaranteed by the Greek state, which, because of the weakness of the underlying companies, were effectively obligations of the Greek state. Yet, on these thirty six bonds, even though Greece desperately needed …
From Pigs To Hogs, Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati
From Pigs To Hogs, Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati
Faculty Scholarship
The question of whether, and to what extent, markets price contract terms in government bond issues has been one of considerable debate in the literature. We use a natural experiment thrown up by the Euro area sovereign debt crisis of 2010-2013 to test whether a particular set of contract terms – ones that gave an advantage to sovereign guaranteed bonds over garden variety sovereign bonds – was priced. These contract terms turned out to be important for the holders of guaranteed bonds during the Greek debt restructuring of 2012, where they helped the holders of guaranteed bonds escape the haircut …
Revisiting Sovereign Bankruptcy, Lee C. Buchheit, Anna Gelpern, Mitu Gulati, Ugo Panizza, Beatrice Weder Di Mauro, Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Revisiting Sovereign Bankruptcy, Lee C. Buchheit, Anna Gelpern, Mitu Gulati, Ugo Panizza, Beatrice Weder Di Mauro, Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Faculty Scholarship
Sovereign debt crises occur regularly and often violently. Yet there is no legally and politically recognized procedure for restructuring the debt of bankrupt sovereigns. Procedures of this type have been periodically debated, but so far been rejected, for two main reasons. First, countries have been reluctant to give up power to supranational rules or institutions, and creditors and debtors have felt that there were sufficient instruments for addressing debt crises at hoc. Second, fears that making debt easier to restructure would raise the costs and reduce the amounts of sovereign borrowing in many countries. This was perceived to be against …