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Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Law
The Conviction Of Andrea Yates: A Narrative Of Denial, Sherry F. Colb
The Conviction Of Andrea Yates: A Narrative Of Denial, Sherry F. Colb
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
Financing Chinese Capitalism: Principal Banks, Economic Crisis, And Chinese Family Firms In Singapore, Henry W. Yeung
Financing Chinese Capitalism: Principal Banks, Economic Crisis, And Chinese Family Firms In Singapore, Henry W. Yeung
Cultural Approaches to Asian Financial Markets
It is a widely circulated myth that Chinese family firms rely exclusively on kinship ties and network capital to finance their domestic and international operations. In this empirical paper, I argue that large Chinese family firms are increasingly engaging with financial markets on a global scale. In order to finance their transnational business activities, these firms require financial services from banks beyond their domestic economies, resulting in a growing number and geographical spread of their principal banks. Second, I contend that as these Chinese family firms are diversifying their principal banks beyond a narrow confinement to other Chinese family-owned banks …
The Uncertain Psychological Case For Paternalism, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski
The Uncertain Psychological Case For Paternalism, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
On The Proper Motives Of Corporate Directors (Or, Why You Don't Want To Invite Homo Economicus To Join Your Board), Lynn A. Stout
On The Proper Motives Of Corporate Directors (Or, Why You Don't Want To Invite Homo Economicus To Join Your Board), Lynn A. Stout
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
One of the most important questions in corporate governance is how directors of public corporations can be motivated to serve the interests of the firm. Directors frequently hold only small stakes in the companies they manage. Moreover, a variety of legal rules and contractual arrangements insulate them from liability for business failures. Why then should we expect them to do a good job?
Conventional corporate scholarship has great difficulty wrestling with this question, in large part because conventional scholarship usually adopts the economist's assumption that directors are rational actors motivated purely by self-interest. This homo economicus model of behavior may …
The Cognitive Components Of Punishment, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Forest Jourden
The Cognitive Components Of Punishment, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Forest Jourden
Cornell Law Faculty Publications