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Full-Text Articles in Law
The Market For Deadbeats, Margaret F. Brinig, F. H. Buckley
The Market For Deadbeats, Margaret F. Brinig, F. H. Buckley
Margaret F Brinig
This article outlines three explanations for why states seek migrants and tests them by references to 1985-90 interstate migration flows. On race-for-the-top theories, states compete for value-increasing migrants by offering them healthy economies and efficient laws. On vote-seeking theories, states compete for clienteles of voters, with some states seeking to attract and some to deter welfare- or tax-loving migrants. On deadbeat theories, states compete for high human capital debtors by offering them a fresh start from out-of-state creditors. Our findings support vote-seeking and deadbeat theories.
Welfare Magnets: The Race For The Top, F. H. Buckley, Margaret F. Brinig
Welfare Magnets: The Race For The Top, F. H. Buckley, Margaret F. Brinig
Margaret F Brinig
Race to the bottom explanations of welfare policies suggest that the power to set welfare payouts should be assigned to the federal government. Such theories predict that states cut benefits levels when faced with an increased demand for welfare from welfare migrants. This Article's econometric study of the determinants of AFDC payouts finds no evidence that states react in this way. This suggests that states should be accorded the power to curtail welfare payments to new arrivals through residency requirements, an issue left as moot in Anderson v. Green.