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Articles 1 - 30 of 31
Full-Text Articles in Law
Arbitrating Security Class Actions: The Limits Of Forum Selection Bylaws, Paul Schochet
Arbitrating Security Class Actions: The Limits Of Forum Selection Bylaws, Paul Schochet
St. John's Law Review
No abstract provided.
Delaware's Global Competitiveness, William J. Moon
Delaware's Global Competitiveness, William J. Moon
Faculty Scholarship
For about a hundred years, Delaware has been the leading jurisdiction for corporate law in the United States. The state, which deliberately embarked on a mission to build a haven for corporate law in the early twentieth century, now supplies corporate charters to over two thirds of Fortune 500 companies and a growing share of closely held companies. But Delaware’s domestic dominance masks the important and yet underexamined issue of whether Delaware maintains its competitive edge globally.
This Article examines Delaware’s global competitiveness, documenting Delaware’s surprising weakness competing in the emerging international market for corporate charters. It does so principally …
Federal Forum Provisions And The Internal Affairs Doctrine, Dhruv Aggarwal, Albert H. Choi
Federal Forum Provisions And The Internal Affairs Doctrine, Dhruv Aggarwal, Albert H. Choi
Law & Economics Working Papers
A key question at the intersection of state and federal law is whether corporations can use their charters or bylaws to restrict securities litigation to federal court. In December 2018, the Delaware Chancery Court answered this question in the negative in the landmark decision Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg. The court invalidated “federal forum provisions” (“FFPs”) that allow companies to select federal district courts as the exclusive venue for claims brought under the Securities Act of 1933 (“1933 Act”). The decision held that the internal affairs doctrine, which is the bedrock of U.S. corporate law, does not permit charter and bylaw provisions …
Chancery’S Greatest Decision: Historical Insights On Civil Rights And The Future Of Shareholder Activism, Omari Scott Simmons
Chancery’S Greatest Decision: Historical Insights On Civil Rights And The Future Of Shareholder Activism, Omari Scott Simmons
Washington and Lee Law Review
This article builds upon the author's remarks at the 2018-2019 Lara D. Gass Annual Symposium: Civil Rights and Shareholder Activism at Washington and Lee University School of Law, February 15, 2019.
Shareholder activism—using an equity stake in a corporation to influence management—has become a popular tool to effectuate social change in the twenty-first century. Increasingly, activists are looking beyond financial performance to demand better corporate performance in such areas as economic inequality, civil rights, human rights, discrimination, and diversity. These efforts take many forms: publicity campaigns, litigation, proxy battles, shareholder resolutions, and negotiations with corporate management. However, a consensus on …
The Elephant In The Room: Helping Delaware Courts Develop Law To End Systemic Short-Term Bias In Corporate Decision-Making, Kenneth Mcneil, Keith Johnson
The Elephant In The Room: Helping Delaware Courts Develop Law To End Systemic Short-Term Bias In Corporate Decision-Making, Kenneth Mcneil, Keith Johnson
Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review
Short-termism in corporate decision-making is as problematic for long-term investors as relying on a three-mile radar on a supertanker. It is totally inadequate for handling the long-term risks and opportunities faced by the modern corporation. Yet recent empirical research shows that up to 85% of the S&P 1500 have no long-term planning. This is costing pension funds and other long-term investors dearly. For instance, the small minority of companies that do long-term planning and risk management had a long-term profitability that was 81% higher than their peers during the 2001–2014 period—with less stock volatility that costs investors dearly as well. …
The Death Of Appraisal Arbitrage: Ending Windfalls For Deal Dissenters, William J. Carney, Keith Sharfman
The Death Of Appraisal Arbitrage: Ending Windfalls For Deal Dissenters, William J. Carney, Keith Sharfman
Faculty Publications
In this article, we take note of a new and positive development in Delaware's law of appraisal: more robust enforcement of Section 262(h), which expressly excludes from fair value in appraisal litigation the value that is uniquely associated with the deal from which the shareholders seeking appraisal are dissenting. For public firms, this implies that deal dissenters are entitled to no more than the price that prevailed prior to the deal's announcement.
In a salutary development, the Delaware Chancery Court took this approach in its recent appraisal decision in Verition Master Fund Partners, Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., awarding …
Caremark's Hidden Promise, Ezra Wasserman Mitchell
Caremark's Hidden Promise, Ezra Wasserman Mitchell
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review
In re Caremark, decided in 1996, established for the first time a director’s duty to monitor under Delaware law. A significant amount of jurisprudence and commentary has developed. Almost all of this literature parses the language of the case and those following, and disregards the underlying claims for damages. As a result of this linguistic focus, many have concluded that the duty to monitor largely is toothless and, importantly, deals only with claims of failure to monitor legal risk. A duty to monitor business risk has been disavowed.
Following the money reveals a different story. Classifying the cases according to …
Cost-Based And Rules-Based Regulatory Competition: Markets For Corporate Charters In The U.S. And The E.U., Marco Ventoruzzo
Cost-Based And Rules-Based Regulatory Competition: Markets For Corporate Charters In The U.S. And The E.U., Marco Ventoruzzo
Marco Ventoruzzo
Regulatory competition in corporate law is increasing in Europe and, not differently from what happens in the US, a market for corporate charters is developing in Europe. This article examines the differences between the US corporate law market, and the European one - to the extent that one exists. The basic idea is that, in Europe, there is a stronger competition for the (first) incorporation of rather small, closely-held corporations; while in the US a small closely-held corporation usually incorporates locally, where its shareholders and directors are located, and reincorporates - often in Delaware - when it is growing and, …
Cost-Based And Rules-Based Regulatory Competition: Markets For Corporate Charters In The U.S. And The E.U., Marco Ventoruzzo
Cost-Based And Rules-Based Regulatory Competition: Markets For Corporate Charters In The U.S. And The E.U., Marco Ventoruzzo
Marco Ventoruzzo
Regulatory competition in corporate law is increasing in Europe and, not differently from what happens in the US, a market for corporate charters is developing in Europe. This article examines the differences between the US corporate law market, and the European one - to the extent that one exists. The basic idea is that, in Europe, there is a stronger competition for the (first) incorporation of rather small, closely-held corporations; while in the US a small closely-held corporation usually incorporates locally, where its shareholders and directors are located, and reincorporates - often in Delaware - when it is growing and, …
Delaware Corporate Law Recognizes The Fundamental Validity Of The Forum Selection Bylaw: A Survey Of The Boilermakers Litigation, Zachary R. Cormier
Delaware Corporate Law Recognizes The Fundamental Validity Of The Forum Selection Bylaw: A Survey Of The Boilermakers Litigation, Zachary R. Cormier
The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law
Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp. represents a new and important chapter in the relationship between the forum selection clause and modern business relations. A forum selection clause is “[a] contractual provision in which the parties establish the place (such as the country, state, or type of court) for specified litigation between them.” Forum selection clauses have most often been analyzed by courts within contractual relationships between businesses, or a business and its customers. The Boilermakers case sets important precedent for forum selection in an equally fundamental business relationship--the corporation and its stockholders. This article will survey the …
Unilateral Forum Selection Clauses In Corporate Bylaws: A Synopsis Of The Debate, Bryce Cullinane
Unilateral Forum Selection Clauses In Corporate Bylaws: A Synopsis Of The Debate, Bryce Cullinane
The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law
No abstract provided.
Lessons Of 2013: The Perils Of "Ready, Fire, Aim" And The Importance Of An Integrated Litigation Strategy In Corporate Governance Matters, Thad A. Davis, Leslie A. Wulff
Lessons Of 2013: The Perils Of "Ready, Fire, Aim" And The Importance Of An Integrated Litigation Strategy In Corporate Governance Matters, Thad A. Davis, Leslie A. Wulff
The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law
No abstract provided.
Fall 2013 Symposium: Contemporary Trends In Corporate Litigation, Robert Anderson Iv, Myron T. Steele, Katherine J. Blair, Thad A. Davis, James R. Griffin, James J. Moloney
Fall 2013 Symposium: Contemporary Trends In Corporate Litigation, Robert Anderson Iv, Myron T. Steele, Katherine J. Blair, Thad A. Davis, James R. Griffin, James J. Moloney
The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law
No abstract provided.
A Blended Approach To Reducing The Costs Of Shareholder Litigation, Valian A. Afshar
A Blended Approach To Reducing The Costs Of Shareholder Litigation, Valian A. Afshar
Michigan Law Review
Multiforum litigation and federal securities law class actions impose heavy costs on corporations and their shareholders without producing proportionate benefits. Both are largely the result of the agency problem between shareholders and their attorneys, driven more by the attorneys’ interests in generating fees than by the interests of their clients. In response to each of these problems, commentators have recommended a number of solutions. Chief among them are forum selection and mandatory arbitration provisions in a corporation’s charter or bylaws. This Note recommends that corporations unilaterally adopt both forum selection and mandatory arbitration bylaws to address shareholder lawsuits under state …
How To Sufficiently Consider Efficiency, Competition, And Capital Formation In The Wake Of Business Roundtable, Ian D. Ghrist
How To Sufficiently Consider Efficiency, Competition, And Capital Formation In The Wake Of Business Roundtable, Ian D. Ghrist
Ian D. Ghrist
This article applies ideas from the Law and Economics movement to the D.C. Circuit's 2011 decision in Business Roundtable v. Securities and Exchange Commission. The article lays out a framework for cost-benefit analysis that, if followed, should increase new rules' chances of surviving the heightened arbitrary and capricious review standard imposed by the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996.
The Dodd-Frank Act comprises the broadest financial reforms since the 1930s. The Act, however, makes surprisingly few important decisions and instead, almost exclusively defers to agency rulemaking or the creation of a new organization. The Act mandates the promulgation of …
Selectica Resets The Trigger On The Poison Pill: Where Should The Delaware Courts Go Next?, Paul H. Edelman, Randall S. Thomas
Selectica Resets The Trigger On The Poison Pill: Where Should The Delaware Courts Go Next?, Paul H. Edelman, Randall S. Thomas
Indiana Law Journal
No abstract provided.
Managing Corporate Federalism: The Least-Bad Approach To The Shareholder Bylaw Debate, Christopher M. Bruner
Managing Corporate Federalism: The Least-Bad Approach To The Shareholder Bylaw Debate, Christopher M. Bruner
Scholarly Works
Over recent decades, shareholders in public corporations have increasingly sought to augment their own power - and, correlatively, to limit the power of boards - through creative use of corporate bylaws. The bylaws lend themselves to such efforts because enacting, amending, and repealing bylaws are essentially the only corporate governance actions that shareholders can undertake unilaterally. In this Article I examine thecontested nature of bylaws, the fundamental issues of corporate power and purpose that they implicate, and the differing ways in which state and federal lawmakers and regulators may impact the debate regarding thescope of the shareholders' bylaw authority.
The …
London As Delaware?, Adam C. Pritchard
London As Delaware?, Adam C. Pritchard
Articles
Jurisdictional competition in corporate law has long been a staple of academic-and sometimes, political-debate in the United States. State corporate law, by long-standing tradition in the United States, determines most questions of internal corporate governance-the role of boards of directors, the allocation of authority between directors, managers and shareholders, etc.-while federal law governs questions of disclosure to shareholders-annual reports, proxy statements, and periodic filings. Despite substantial incursions by Congress, most recently in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, this dividing line between state and federal law persists, so state law arguably has the most immediate impact on corporate governance outcomes.
London As Delaware?, Adam C. Pritchard
London As Delaware?, Adam C. Pritchard
Articles
In the United States, state corporate law determines most questions of internal corporate governance - the role of directors; the allocation of authority between directors, managers, and shareholders; etc. - while federal law governs questions of disclosure to shareholders - annual reports, proxy statements, and periodic filings. Despite substantial incursions by Congress, most recently with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, this dividing line between state and federal law persists, so state law arguably has the most immediate effect on corporate governance outcomes.
Cost-Based And Rules-Based Regulatory Competition: Markets For Corporate Charters In The U.S. And The E.U., Marco Ventoruzzo
Cost-Based And Rules-Based Regulatory Competition: Markets For Corporate Charters In The U.S. And The E.U., Marco Ventoruzzo
Journal Articles
Regulatory competition in corporate law is increasing in Europe and, not differently from what happens in the US, a market for corporate charters is developing in Europe. This article examines the differences between the US corporate law market, and the European one - to the extent that one exists. The basic idea is that, in Europe, there is a stronger competition for the (first) incorporation of rather small, closely-held corporations; while in the US a small closely-held corporation usually incorporates locally, where its shareholders and directors are located, and reincorporates - often in Delaware - when it is growing and, …
Sarbanes-Oxley: The Delaware Perspective, Chief Justice Myron T. Steele
Sarbanes-Oxley: The Delaware Perspective, Chief Justice Myron T. Steele
NYLS Law Review
No abstract provided.
Megasubsidiaries And Asset Sales Under Section 271: Which Shareholders Must Approve Subsidiary Asset Sales, Yaman Shukairy
Megasubsidiaries And Asset Sales Under Section 271: Which Shareholders Must Approve Subsidiary Asset Sales, Yaman Shukairy
Michigan Law Review
Corporate law statutes determine the nature of the relationship between shareholders, the principal owners of the corporation, and the board of directors, those w ho run and operate the corporation. Under the Delaware General Corporation Law ("DGCL"), many of the powers are delegated to the board of directors. More specifically, under section 141, "the business and affairs of every corporation . . . [are] managed by or under the direction of a board of directors . . . ." The Delaware courts have interpreted this provision by deferring to decisions by directors and their designated management under the business judgment …
The Corporation As Insider Trader, Mark J. Loewenstein, William K.S. Wang
The Corporation As Insider Trader, Mark J. Loewenstein, William K.S. Wang
Publications
With regard to issuer purchases, some of the traditional policy rationales against insider trading do not apply or apply with less force. Nevertheless, courts, commentators, and the SEC have all stated or assumed that a public corporation violates rule 10b-5 by buying its own shares in the market based on material, nonpublic information. In rule 10b-5 cases involving face-to-face transactions, several circuit courts have ruled that the company may not purchase its own stock based on material information not known to the seller. No good reason exists not to apply these precedents to stock market trades by issuers, especially because …
Venture Capital On The Downside: Preferred Stock And Corporate Control, William W. Bratton
Venture Capital On The Downside: Preferred Stock And Corporate Control, William W. Bratton
Michigan Law Review
When stock indices drop precipitously, when the startup companies fizzle out, and when it stops raining money on places like Wall Street and Silicon Valley, attention turns to downside contracting. Law and business lawyers, sitting in the back seat as mere facilitators on the upside, move up to the front and sometimes even take the wheel. The job is the same on both the upside and downside: to maximize the value of going concern assets. But what comes easily on the upside can be dirty work on the down, where assets need to be separated from dysfunctional teams of business …
Theories Of The Corporation And The Limited Liability Company: How Should Courts And Legislatures Articulate Rules For Piercing The Veil, Fiduciary Responsibility And Securities Regulation For The Limited Liability Company, David L. Cohen
Oklahoma Law Review
No abstract provided.
Fiduciary Ideology In Transactions Affecting Corporate Control, Victor Brudney
Fiduciary Ideology In Transactions Affecting Corporate Control, Victor Brudney
Michigan Law Review
The fiduciary role in which corporate insiders are cast in their dealings with, or affecting, their corporations embraces a multitude of parts. Hence the range of restrictions on their conduct varies from inhibitions as rigorous as those imposed on express trustees to limitations almost as flexible as those governing arm's length dealings among strangers. As has often been pointed out, the characterization of a corporate officer, a director, or a person controlling the corporation as a "fiduciary" does not define his status with precision; rather, it sets a tone to his role and suggests the existence of obligations and of …
Corporations - Appraisal Statutes - Elements In Valuation Of Corporate Stock, John C. Baity
Corporations - Appraisal Statutes - Elements In Valuation Of Corporate Stock, John C. Baity
Michigan Law Review
The purpose of this comment is to consider the elements of stock valuation generally applicable under the statutory appraisal remedies, and to analyze in some detail the interpretation of such a statute in one jurisdiction-Delaware.
Corporations - Stock Options - Requirements Of Consideration For Employee Options, George D. Miller, Jr. S.Ed.
Corporations - Stock Options - Requirements Of Consideration For Employee Options, George D. Miller, Jr. S.Ed.
Michigan Law Review
The Delaware court, in two recent decisions, has indicated what may be an increasingly strict attitude toward employee stock options, particularly when granted to executive officers or directors. It will be the purpose of this comment to examine the significance of these decisions, and to attempt to determine the extent of the change wrought by them.
Corporations--Shareholders-Effect On Voting Trust Agreement Of Inability To Transfer Shares To The Voting Trustees, Peter Van Domelen
Corporations--Shareholders-Effect On Voting Trust Agreement Of Inability To Transfer Shares To The Voting Trustees, Peter Van Domelen
Michigan Law Review
Plaintiff filed a petition in equity attacking his removal as a director and president of the defendant corporation on the grounds that such removal was brought about through the exercise of an alleged invalid voting trust agreement The plaintiff and another shareholder, each owning fifty per cent of the stock in the defendant corporation, had entered into a voting trust agreement by which they appointed themselves and a third party as voting trustees. At the time the trust agreement was executed, all of the stock was on deposit with an escrow agent subject to an existing escrow contract. Plaintiff challenged …
Alterations Of Accrued Dividends: Ii, Arno C. Becht
Alterations Of Accrued Dividends: Ii, Arno C. Becht
Michigan Law Review
If the present course of decisions is continued, it is a serious question whether investors can safely purchase preferred stock at a price above the common stock of the same corporation. In all frankness, such certificates should now bear on their faces a statement that they are subject to alteration in a great variety of ways, all to their detriment, and that if business is bad, losses will be visited upon them, regardless of the liquidation and other preferences which they have on paper. It seems not unlikely that corporations will find that the temporary expedients which they have adopted …