Law Commons^™

Preemption Under The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act: If It Looks Like A Securities Fraud Claim And Acts Like A Securities Fraud Claim, Is It A Securities Fraud Claim?, Jennifer O'Hare

Working Paper Series

This Article addresses the removal and preemption provisions of the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (“SLUSA”). In SLUSA, Congress preempted class actions alleging “an untrue statement or omission of a material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security.” SLUSA clearly applies to preempt the typical state securities fraud action, forcing plaintiffs into federal court where they will be subject to the rigorous procedural requirements of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Preemption of false corporate publicity cases was expected and, in fact, intended by SLUSA. However, many courts have also extended …

Expensing Isn't The Only Option: Alternatives To The Fasb's Stock Option Expensing Proposal, Benjamin A. Templin

ExpressO

This paper reviews the arguments for and against the Financial Accounting Standard Board's (FASB) proposal to require that corporations expense options. It identifies two major goals of the proposed rule -- 1) clarity in financial statements and 2) a reduction of corporate fraud by removing the incentive of options. To address these two goals, I adopt a framework of Information Reforms v. Rules of the Game Reforms. The article starts with a history of FASB Statement No. 123 Accounting for Stock-based Compensation and also analyzes the Congressional legislation that attempts to block the measure, the Stock Option Accounting Reform Act. …

Reconsidering The Prohibition Against General Solicitation During Section 3(C)(7) Offerings, Daniel P. Taub

ExpressO

This paper examines the seventy year history of the general solicitation prohibition during private offerings and then analyzes its continuing relevance as applied to Section 3(c)(7) offerings. The S.E.C. Staff recently issued a report questioning the continuing value of prohibiting general solicitation during private offerings made pursuant to Section 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act. If the S.E.C. were to follow the recommendation in the S.E.C. Staff Report, this would have tremendous implications for a growing number of hedge funds, and other investment companies utilizing the Section 3(c)(7) exemption. By allowing general solicitation, the S.E.C. would be reversing a policy …

Gentleman's Agreement: The Antisemitic Origins Of Restrictions On Stockholder Litigation, Lawrence E. Mitchell

ExpressO

A deeply ingrained, seemingly ineradicable, hostility to plaintiffs’ lawyers and especially to plaintiffs’ lawyers in stockholder suits seems to have existed for most of the past century. This hostility is manifest not only in the tone of judicial opinions but in law review articles, the popular press, and, often, in legislation. This article analyzes the circumstances under which the first security-for-expense statute was adopted in New York in 1944, including the contemporaneous justification for the statute, focusing on the demographics of the New York bar at the time and the ethnic sociology of New York. In so doing, it concludes …

A New Product For The Corporation Law Market: Audit Committee Certifications, Lawrence A. Cunningham

ExpressO

In the swirling corporate governance reforms led by SOX, the SEC, SROs and PCAOB, Delaware and other states are playing minor roles at best. State absence creates a missing arc in the evolving US corporate governance circle. The circle is drawn as follows: state corporation law charges boards of directors with managing corporations and authorizes board committees; SOX charges audit committees with tasks, including supervising external auditors; SROs require audit committee characteristics like independence and compel disclosure; PCAOB requires external auditors to evaluate audit committee effectiveness. This last step could close the circle except that auditors performing this evaluation generate …

Comparisons Among Firms: (When) Do They Justify Mandatory Disclosure?, Sharon Hannes

ExpressO

Comparisons among firms play a major role in securities analysis. This essay asks if this fact justifies the mandatory nature of securities regulation. Once a firm approaches the public securities markets, federal securities regulations compel it to disclose financial information to the public. A seminal theory argues that firms would not otherwise commit to maintain optimal disclosure levels, since a disclosing firm bears all disclosure costs but does not gain all disclosure benefits.

This paper examines the robustness of this argument in relation to disclosure benefits which arise from comparisons among firms. Financial data of peer firms allows shareholders to …

Public Company Shareholders Acting As Owners: Three Reforms--Introducing The "Oversight Shareholder" (With E. Fogel & D. Addis), Edward C. Harris

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The New Federal Regulation Of Corporate Governance, Jill E. Fisch

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Exchanges Of Multiple Stocks And Securities In Corporate Divisions Or Acquisitive Reorganizations, Douglas A. Kahn, Jeffrey S. Lehman

Articles

If specified conditions are satisfied, the Internal Revenue Code provides nonrecognition for gain or loss realized when stocks and securities of one corporation are exchanged for stocks and securities of another corporation. When the exchange is made as part of a corporate division (a split-off or a split-up), the principal nonrecognition provision is section 355; and when the exchange is made as part of an acquisitive reorganization, the principal nonrecognition provision is section 354. Complete nonrecognition is provided only when stock is exchanged solely for stock and securities are exchanged solely for securities of no greater principal amount. If, in …

Should Issuers Be On The Hook For Laddering? An Empirical Analysis Of The Ipo Market Manipulation Litigation, Adam C. Pritchard, Stephen J. Choi

Articles

On December 6, 2000, the Wall Street Journal ran a front-page story exposing abuses in the market for initial public offerings (IPOs). The story revealed "tie-in" agreements between investment banks and initial investors seeking to participate in "hot" offerings. Under those agreements, initial investors would commit to buy additional shares of the offering company's stock in secondary market trading in return for allocations of shares in the IPO. As the Wall Street Journal related, those "[c]ommitments to buy in the after-market lock in demand for additional stock at levels above the IPO price. As such, they provide the rocket fuel …

Rules, Principles, And The Accounting Crisis In The United States, William W. Bratton

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Securities Exchange Commission move too quickly when they prod the Financial Accounting Standards Board, the standard setter for US GAAP, to move immediately to a principles-based system. Priorities respecting reform of corporate reporting in the US need to be ordered more carefully. Incentive problems impairing audit performance should be solved first through institutional reform insulating the audit from the negative impact of rent-seeking and solving adverse selection problems otherwise affecting audit practice. So long as auditor independence and management incentives respecting accounting treatments remain suspect, the US reporting system holds out no actor plausibly positioned …

Rethinking Corporate Federalism In The Era Of Corporate Reform, Renee Jones

Renee Jones

No abstract provided.