Law Commons^™

The Wreck Of Regulation D: The Unintended (And Bad) Outcomes For The Sec’S Crown Jewel Exemptions, Rutheford B. Campbell Jr.

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

Regulation D is—or at least should be—the crown jewel of the Securities and Exchange Commission's regulatory exemptions from the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933. It offers businesses—especially businesses with relatively small capital requirements—fair and efficient access to vital, external capital.

In this article, I present data derived from deep samples of recent Form Ds filed with the Commission. The data show that Regulation D is not working in the way the Commission intended or in a way that benefits society The data reveal that companies attempting to raise relatively small amounts of capital under Regulation D overwhelmingly …

Securities Law In The Roberts Court: Agenda Or Indifference?, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

To outsiders, securities law is not all that interesting. The body of the law consists of an interconnecting web of statutes and regulations that fit together in ways that are decidedly counter-intuitive. Securities law rivals tax law in its reputation for complexity and dreariness. Worse yet, the subject regulated-capital markets-can be mystifying to those uninitiated in modem finance. Moreover, those markets rapidly evolve, continually increasing their complexity. If you do not understand how the financial markets work, it is hard to understand how securities law affects those markets.

The Price Of Pay To Play In Securities Class Actions, Adam C. Pritchard, Stephen J. Choi, Drew T. Johnson-Skinner

Articles

We study the effect of campaign contributions to lead plaintiffs—“pay to play”—on the level of attorney fees in securities class actions. We find that state pension funds generally pay lower attorney fees when they serve as lead plaintiffs in securities class actions than do individual investors serving in that capacity, and larger funds negotiate for lower fees. This differential disappears, however, when we control for campaign contributions made to offcials with infuence over state pension funds. This effect is most pronounced when we focus on state pension funds that receive the largest campaign contributions and that associate repeatedly as lead …