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Articles 1 - 4 of 4
Full-Text Articles in Law
Payment For Order Flow And The Great Missed Opportunity, Joel Seligman
Payment For Order Flow And The Great Missed Opportunity, Joel Seligman
Scholarship@WashULaw
In late January and early February 2021, an astounding story of stock market price volatility captivated the nation. GameStop, a corporation that in recent years had prodigiously lost money – $492 million two years earlier, $296 million the last year for which it reported data – rose from a low of $2.57 to a high of $483. In January 2021 alone, GameStop had risen from a closing price of $17.25 on January 4 to a close of $347.61 on January 27 before falling 44 percent to a close of $193.60 on January 28, rising 68 percent to a close of …
A General Defense Of Information Fiduciaries, Andrew F. Tuch
A General Defense Of Information Fiduciaries, Andrew F. Tuch
Scholarship@WashULaw
Countless high-profile abuses of user data by leading technology companies have raised a basic question: should firms that traffic in user data be held legally responsible to their users as “information fiduciaries”? Privacy legislation to impose fiduciary-like duties of care, confidentiality, and loyalty on data collectors enjoys bipartisan support but faces strong opposition from scholars. First, critics argue that the information fiduciary concept flies in the face of fundamental corporate law principles that require firms to prioritize shareholder interests over those of users. Second, it is said that the overwhelming self-interest of digital companies makes fiduciary loyalty impossible as a …
M&A Advisor Misconduct: A Wrong Without A Remedy?, Andrew F. Tuch
M&A Advisor Misconduct: A Wrong Without A Remedy?, Andrew F. Tuch
Scholarship@WashULaw
Merger and acquisition ("M&A") transactions are among the most high profile of corporate transactions. They are also among the most contentious, with around eighty percent of all completed deals litigated in recent years. And yet investment banks—essential advisors on these deals—have generally succeeded spectacularly in avoiding liability, an anomaly considering the routine nature of deal litigation and the frequency with which they face lawsuits in their other activities. This article examines this anomaly, explaining the doctrinal and practical reasons why it arises. In doing so, it puts in context aiding and abetting liability, a recently-successful shareholder strategy to bring M&A …
Managing Management Buyouts: A Us-Uk Comparative Analysis, Andrew F. Tuch
Managing Management Buyouts: A Us-Uk Comparative Analysis, Andrew F. Tuch
Scholarship@WashULaw
This chapter comparatively assesses U.S. and U.K. law governing management buyouts (MBOs), focusing on the duties of directors and officers in these systems. The analysis casts doubt on persistent but mistaken perceptions about U.S. and U.K. corporate fiduciary duties for self-dealing. The U.K. no-conflict rule is seen as strict, the U.S. fairness rule as flexible and pragmatic. As the analysis for MBOs demonstrates, these fiduciary rules operate similarly, tasking neutral or disinterested directors with policing self-dealing, enabling commercially sensitive responses to conflicts of interest. The analysis also reveals stronger formal private enforcement of corporate law and more robust disclosure rules …