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Articles 1 - 22 of 22
Full-Text Articles in Law
Covid-19 Risk Factors And Boilerplate Disclosure, Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, Xuan Liu, Adam C. Pritchard
Covid-19 Risk Factors And Boilerplate Disclosure, Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, Xuan Liu, Adam C. Pritchard
Law & Economics Working Papers
The SEC mandates that public companies assess new information that changes the risks that they face and disclose these if there has been a “material” change. Does that theory work in practice? Or are companies copying and repeating the same generic disclosures? Using the shock of the COVID-19 pandemic, we explore these questions. Overall, we find considerable rote copying of boilerplate disclosures. Further, the factors that correlate with deviations from the boilerplate seem related more to the resources that companies have (large companies change updated disclosures more) and litigation risks (companies vulnerable to shareholder litigation update more) rather than general …
Retail Investors And Corporate Governance: Evidence From Zero-Commission Trading, Dhruv Aggarwal, Albert H. Choi, Yoon-Ho Alex Lee
Retail Investors And Corporate Governance: Evidence From Zero-Commission Trading, Dhruv Aggarwal, Albert H. Choi, Yoon-Ho Alex Lee
Law & Economics Working Papers
We examine the effects of the sudden abolition of trading commissions by major online brokerages in 2019, which lowered stock market entry costs for retail investors, on corporate governance. Firms already popular with retail investors experienced positive abnormal returns around the abolition of commissions. Firms with positive abnormal returns in response to commission-free trading subsequently saw a decrease in institutional ownership, a decrease in shareholder voting, and a deterioration in environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) metrics. Finally, these firms were more likely to adopt bylaw amendments to reduce the percentage of shares needed for a quorum at shareholder meetings. …
The Business Of Securities Class Action Lawyering, Stephen J. Choi, Jessica Erickson, Adam C. Pritchard
The Business Of Securities Class Action Lawyering, Stephen J. Choi, Jessica Erickson, Adam C. Pritchard
Law & Economics Working Papers
Plaintiffs’ lawyers in the United States play a key role in combating corporate fraud. Shareholders who lose money as a result of fraud can file securities class actions to recover their losses, but most shareholders do not have enough money at stake to justify overseeing the cases filed on their behalf. As a result, plaintiffs’ lawyers control these cases, deciding which cases to file and how to litigate them. Recognizing the agency costs inherent in this model, the legal system relies on lead plaintiffs and judges to monitor these lawyers and protect the best interests of absent class members. Yet …
Meme Corporate Governance, Dhruv Aggarwal, Albert H. Choi, Yoon-Ho Alex Lee
Meme Corporate Governance, Dhruv Aggarwal, Albert H. Choi, Yoon-Ho Alex Lee
Law & Economics Working Papers
Can retail investors revolutionize corporate governance and make public companies more responsive to social concerns? The U.S. stock market offered an unusual experiment to test the impact of retail investors in 2021, when there was a dramatic influx of retail investors into the shareholder base of companies such as GameStop and AMC. The meme surge phenomenon elicited a variety of reactions from scholars and practitioners. While some worried that affected companies’ share prices were becoming disjointed from their financial fundamentals, others predicted that retail shareholders will reduce the power of large institutional investors and democratize corporate governance. This Article presents …
All Stick And No Carrot? Reforming Public Offerings, Stephen J. Choi, Adam C. Pritchard
All Stick And No Carrot? Reforming Public Offerings, Stephen J. Choi, Adam C. Pritchard
Law & Economics Working Papers
The SEC heavily regulates the traditional initial public offering. Those regulatory burdens fuel interest in alternative paths for private companies to go public, “regulatory arbitrage.” The SEC’s response to the emergence of alternatives, most recently SPACs and direct listings, has been to suppress them by imposing heightened liability under Section 11 of the Securities Act. The SEC’s treatment of the traditional IPO regulatory process as a one-size-fits-all regime ignores the weaknesses of this process, in particular the informational inefficiency of the book-building process. In this essay we argue that the agency’s focus in regulating issuers going public should be on …
Initial Public Offering And Optimal Corporate Governance, Albert H. Choi
Initial Public Offering And Optimal Corporate Governance, Albert H. Choi
Law & Economics Working Papers
This paper examines the long-standing debate over whether firms have a market-based incentive to adopt optimal governance provisions at their initial public offering (IPO). Various scholars and practitioners have argued that firms that offer stock to the public with suboptimal governance structure will be penalized by the market through a lower IPO price. At the same time, others have documented empirical evidence that many IPO firms have putatively suboptimal governance provisions, such as anti-takeover provisions and dual class structure, and many, especially those with dual-class structure, enjoy a market premium at their IPO. This paper attempts to bridge this gap. …
The New Public/Private Equilibrium And The Regulation Of Public Companies, Elisabeth De Fontenay, Gabriel V. Rauterberg
The New Public/Private Equilibrium And The Regulation Of Public Companies, Elisabeth De Fontenay, Gabriel V. Rauterberg
Law & Economics Working Papers
This Symposium Article examines how the public/private divide works today and maps out some of the potential implications for major issues in securities law. Classic debates in securities law were often predicated on the idea that public companies are a coherent class of firms that differ markedly from private companies. For more than fifty years after the adoption of the federal securities laws, this view was justified. During that period, the vast majority of successful and growing private firms eventually accepted the regulatory obligations of being public in order to access a wider and deeper pool of capital, among other …
Federal Forum Provisions And The Internal Affairs Doctrine, Dhruv Aggarwal, Albert H. Choi
Federal Forum Provisions And The Internal Affairs Doctrine, Dhruv Aggarwal, Albert H. Choi
Law & Economics Working Papers
A key question at the intersection of state and federal law is whether corporations can use their charters or bylaws to restrict securities litigation to federal court. In December 2018, the Delaware Chancery Court answered this question in the negative in the landmark decision Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg. The court invalidated “federal forum provisions” (“FFPs”) that allow companies to select federal district courts as the exclusive venue for claims brought under the Securities Act of 1933 (“1933 Act”). The decision held that the internal affairs doctrine, which is the bedrock of U.S. corporate law, does not permit charter and bylaw provisions …
Lead Plaintiffs And Their Lawyers: Mission Accomplished, Or More To Be Done?, Adam C. Pritchard, Stephen Choi
Lead Plaintiffs And Their Lawyers: Mission Accomplished, Or More To Be Done?, Adam C. Pritchard, Stephen Choi
Law & Economics Working Papers
This chapter, written for the Research Handbook on Shareholder Litigation, surveys empirical work studying the lead plaintiff provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). That work finds that the lead plaintiff provision has encouraged institutional investors to participate in securities class actions and that those institutional investors have negotiated lower attorneys' fees. Those benefits from the lead plaintiff provision are undercut, however, by political contributions made by plaintiffs' lawyers. We suggest additional reforms to promote transparency and competition among lawyers for lead plaintiffs. We also suggest reforms to the lead plaintiff provision intended to enhance the screening effect …
Sec Enforcement Attorneys: Should I Stay Of Should I Go?, Adam C. Pritchard, Stephen J. Choi
Sec Enforcement Attorneys: Should I Stay Of Should I Go?, Adam C. Pritchard, Stephen J. Choi
Law & Economics Working Papers
We examine the career paths of attorneys in the Enforcement Division at the SEC. Using a variety of performance metrics, we find evidence that long term lawyers and lawyers in regional offices do not perform as well as other SEC attorneys. We also report that men and women may differ in their career paths in this field. We find that early-stage female attorneys perform just as well as male attorneys. Notwithstanding their comparable performance, these early-stage women are less likely to get a raise or promotion. We find that women are more likely to stay at the SEC, at least …
Amending China's Insider Trading Prohibition - An Immodest Proposal, Nicholas C. Howson
Amending China's Insider Trading Prohibition - An Immodest Proposal, Nicholas C. Howson
Law & Economics Working Papers
Presented in China in conjunction with the proposed amendment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) Securities Law 2006, this paper critiques the form and application of the PRC's current insider trading prohibition and its misconceived fealty to Rule 10b-5-limiting U.S. Supreme Court-derived doctrines of fiduciary duty and misappropriation, and urges that China's amended statute and enforcement system look to the broader doctrinal formulations employed in the United Kingdom and the European Union, ironically already used by China's securities regulator pursuant to internal (and likely illegal) administrative "guidance" norms.
Reverse Cross-Listings -- The Coming Race To List In Emerging Markets And An Enhanced Understanding Of Classical Bonding, Nicholas C. Howson, Vikramaditya S. Khanna
Reverse Cross-Listings -- The Coming Race To List In Emerging Markets And An Enhanced Understanding Of Classical Bonding, Nicholas C. Howson, Vikramaditya S. Khanna
Law & Economics Working Papers
This paper examines the implications for the traditional "legal bonding" hypothesis arising from future "reverse" cross-listings, meaning the cross-listing by issuers from jurisdictions with stronger investor protections into capital markets and on exchanges where investor protections are deemed less robust. We use as examples the first "Indian Depositary Receipt" or IDR IPO in May 2010, and IPOs we believe will complete on a future Shanghai Stock Exchange "international board". This analysis serves to dilute one of the long-standing negative implications of the traditional legal bonding account -- that reverse cross-listings by issuers from jurisdictions with stronger investor protections into weaker …
Protecting The State From Itself? Regulatory Interventions In Corporate Governance And The Financing Of China’S 'State Capitalism', Nicholas C. Howson
Protecting The State From Itself? Regulatory Interventions In Corporate Governance And The Financing Of China’S 'State Capitalism', Nicholas C. Howson
Law & Economics Working Papers
From the start of China’s "corporatization without privatization" process in the late 1980s, a Chinese corporate governance regime apparently shareholder-empowering and determined by enabling legal norms has been altered by mandatory governance mechanisms imposed by a state administrative agency, most often to protect minority shareholders against exploitation by the party state controlling shareholders which are the accepted powers of "state capitalism." This chapter reviews the path of that benign intervention and the structural reasons for it, and then speculates on why this novel identity of the Chinese party state’s “fragmented authoritarianism” continues to be tolerated by the same party state, …
Carrot Or Stick? The Shift From Voluntary To Mandatory Disclosure Of Risk Factors, Karen K. Nelson, Adam C. Pritchard
Carrot Or Stick? The Shift From Voluntary To Mandatory Disclosure Of Risk Factors, Karen K. Nelson, Adam C. Pritchard
Law & Economics Working Papers
This study investigates risk factor disclosures under the voluntary, incentive-based disclosure regime provided by the safe harbor provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act and the SEC’s subsequent disclosure mandate. Firms subject to greater litigation risk disclose more risk factors, update the language more from year-to-year, and use more readable language than firms with lower litigation risk. These differences in the quality of disclosure are pronounced in the voluntary disclosure regime, but converge following the SEC mandate. Consistent with these findings, the risk factor disclosures of high litigation risk firms are significantly more informative about systematic and idiosyncratic firm …
Scandal Enforcement At The Sec: The Arc Of The Option Backdating Investigations, Stephen Choi, Adam C. Pritchard, Anat C. Wiechman
Scandal Enforcement At The Sec: The Arc Of The Option Backdating Investigations, Stephen Choi, Adam C. Pritchard, Anat C. Wiechman
Law & Economics Working Papers
We study the SEC’s allocation of enforcement resources in the wake of a salient public scandal. We focus on the SEC’s investigations of option backdating in the wake of numerous media articles on the practice of backdating. We find that the SEC shifted its mix of investigations significantly toward backdating investigations and away from investigations involving other accounting issues. We test the hypothesis that SEC pursued more marginal investigations into backdating at the expense of pursuing more egregious accounting issues. Our event study of stock market reactions to the initial disclosure of backdating investigations shows that those reactions declined over …
'Quack Corporate Governance' As Traditional Chinese Medicine – The Securities Regulation Cannibalization Of China's Corporate Law And A State Regulator's Battle Against State Political Economic Power, Nicholas C. Howson
Law & Economics Working Papers
From the start of the PRC’s “corporatization” project in the late 1980s, a Chinese corporate governance regime subject to increasingly enabling legal norms has been determined by mandatory regulations imposed by the PRC securities regulator, the CSRC. Indeed, the Chinese corporate law system has been cannibalized by allencompassing securities regulation directed at corporate governance, at least for companies with listed stock. This article traces the path of that sustained intervention, and makes a case – wholly contrary to the “quack corporate governance” critique much aired in the U.S. – that for the PRC this phenomenon is necessary and appropriate, and …
Sec Investigations And Securities Class Actions: An Empirical Comparison, Stephen Choi, Adam Pritchard
Sec Investigations And Securities Class Actions: An Empirical Comparison, Stephen Choi, Adam Pritchard
Law & Economics Working Papers
We compare investigations by the SEC with securities fraud class action filings involving public companies. Using actions with both an SEC investigation and a class action as our baseline, we compare SEC-only investigations with class action-only lawsuits. We find evidence that the stock market reacts more negatively to the class actions relative to SEC investigations. We also find that institutional ownership and stock turnover decline more for class actions compared with SEC investigations. Lastly, the incidence and magnitude of settlements, as well as the incidence of top officer resignation, are greater for class actions relative to SEC investigations. This evidence …
Facebook, The Jobs Act, And Abolishing Ipos, Adam C. Pritchard
Facebook, The Jobs Act, And Abolishing Ipos, Adam C. Pritchard
Law & Economics Working Papers
The market for initial public offerings (IPOs) — the first sale of private firms’ stock to the public — is notorious for its swings from peaks to valleys. This paper argues that these swings reflect serious flaws in the IPO scheme, and that U.S. capital markets should move toward a more stable alternative. Specifically, this paper argues for a two-tier market system in which new stock issuers initially participate in a less-regulated private capital market of accredited investors and then, if they choose, they can move to a more regulated, broader public market. Likewise, firms currently participating in the public …
Toward Transatlantic Convergence In Financial Regulation, Hwa-Jin Kim
Toward Transatlantic Convergence In Financial Regulation, Hwa-Jin Kim
Law & Economics Working Papers
This Article reviews the historical background of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 along with the developments in the markets that led to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999. It analyzes the discussions on the Volcker Rule in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 from a comparative perspective. It shows how the reform in the United States may impact financial institutions and markets in other jurisdictions. Germany and Switzerland, where universal banking is the hallmark of the financial services industry, are the primary jurisdictions of interest. After taking a historical and political look at the regulation of …
Are Investors’ Gains And Losses From Securities Fraud Equal Over Time? Theory And Evidence, Alicia J. Davis
Are Investors’ Gains And Losses From Securities Fraud Equal Over Time? Theory And Evidence, Alicia J. Davis
Law & Economics Working Papers
Most leading securities regulation scholars argue that compensating securities fraud victims is inefficient. They maintain that because diversified investors that trade frequently are as likely to gain from trading in fraud-tainted stocks as they are to suffer harm from doing so, these investors should have no expected net losses from fraud over the long term. This assertion, which analogizes trading in fraud-tainted stocks to participating in a coin toss game in which players win $1 on heads and lose $1 on tails, is problematic for a number of reasons. First, even if we accept this analogy, probability theory holds that …
Securities Law In The Roberts Court: Agenda Or Indifference?, Adam C. Pritchard
Securities Law In The Roberts Court: Agenda Or Indifference?, Adam C. Pritchard
Law & Economics Working Papers
Historically, securities law has not been a high priority for the Supreme Court. The first five years of the Roberts Court, however, suggest an upsurge of interest in the federal securities laws, with nine cases decided, a significant increase from the Rehnquist Court’s average. These numbers are deceptive. Analysis of the opinions deciding these cases – and more importantly, the issues debated by the justices – suggests that the Court is not interested in the substance of the securities laws or the policies that animate them. Instead, securities law serves as a backdrop for debates over statutory interpretation and the …
The Price Of Pay To Play In Securities Class Actions, Stephen Choi, Drew T. Johnson-Skinner, Adam C. Pritchard
The Price Of Pay To Play In Securities Class Actions, Stephen Choi, Drew T. Johnson-Skinner, Adam C. Pritchard
Law & Economics Working Papers
This paper studies the effect of campaign contributions to lead plaintiffs — “pay to play’’ — on the level of attorneys’ fees in securities class actions. We find that state pension funds generally pay lower attorneys’ fees when they serve as lead plaintiffs in securities class actions than do individual investors serving in that capacity. This differential disappears, however, when we control for campaign contributions made to officials with influence over state pension funds. Thus, pay to play appears to increase agency costs borne by shareholders in securities class actions.