Law Commons^™

Initial Public Offerings And The Failed Promise Of Disintermediation, A. Christine Hurt

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory Organizations Be Considered Government Agencies?, Roberta S. Karmel

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory Organizations Be Considered Government Agencies?, Roberta S. Karmel

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Eu Challenge To The Sec, Roberta S. Karmel

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Eu Challenge To The Sec, Roberta S. Karmel

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Mere Thieves, Robert E. Steinbuch

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Regulation By Exemption: The Changing Definition Of An Accredited Investor, Roberta S. Karmel

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Regulation By Exemption: The Changing Definition Of An Accredited Investor, Roberta S. Karmel

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Experimenting With The Lead Plaintiff Selection Process In Securities Class Actions: A Suggestion For Pslra Reform, Andrew S. Gold

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Disclosure’S Failure In The Subprime Mortgage Crisis, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

This symposium article examines how disclosure, the regulatory focus of the federal securities laws, has failed to achieve transparency in the sub-prime mortgage crisis and what this failure means for modern financial securities markets.

Markets, Systemic Risk, And The Subprime Mortgage Crisis, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

The recent subprime mortgage meltdown is undermining financial market stability and has the potential to cause a true systemic breakdown, collapsing the world's financial systems like a row of dominoes. This essay uses the subprime crisis to demonstrate that existing protections against systemic risk, which focus on banks and largely ignore financial markets, are anachronistic and misguided. Because companies increasingly access financial markets without going through banks, an effective framework for containing systemic risk must focus on markets.

Accountability And Competition In Securities Class Actions: Why "Exit" Works Better Than "Voice", John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

A sizable literature on class actions has long suggested that the plaintiff’s attorney is an independent entrepreneur over whom the class members have only limited control. But the analysis cannot stop here. Why does this state of affairs exist? This essay will give two connected answers to this question as a prelude to evaluating what reforms are likely to work:

(1) The rules of "litigation governance" differ diametrically from those of corporate governance. An entrepreneur seeking capital for a business venture must convince investors to "opt in" and buy the securities of the entrepreneur's start-up corporation. In contrast, a plaintiffs …

Sovereign Wealth Funds And Corporate Governance: A Minimalist Response To The New Mercantilism, Ronald J. Gilson, Curtis J. Milhaupt

Faculty Scholarship

Keynes taught years ago that international cash flows are always political. Western response to the enormous increase in the number and the assets of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), and other government-directed investment vehicles that often get lumped together under the SWF label, proves Keynes right. To their most severe critics, SWFs are a threat to the sovereignty of the nations in whose corporations they invest. The heat of the metaphors matches the volume of the complaints. The nations whose corporations are targets of investments are said to be threatened with becoming "sharecropper" states if ownership of industry moves to foreign-government …

Reputational Sanctions In China's Securities Market, Benjamin L. Liebman, Curtis J. Milhaupt

Faculty Scholarship

Literature suggests two distinct paths to stock market development: an approach based on legal protections for investors, and an approach based on self-regulation of listed companies by stock exchanges. This Essay traces China's attempts to pursue both approaches, while focusing primarily on the role of the stock exchanges as regulators. Specifically, the Essay examines a fascinating but unstudied aspect of Chinese securities regulation – public criticism of listed companies by the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges. Based on both event study methodology and extensive interviews of market actors, we find that the public criticisms have significant effects on listed companies and …

There Are Plaintiffs And … There Are Plaintiffs: An Empirical Analysis Of Securities Class Action Settlements, James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas, Lynn Bai

Faculty Scholarship

In this paper, we examine the impact of the PSLRA and more particularly the impact the type of lead plaintiff on the size of settlements in securities fraud class actions. We thus provide insight into whether the type of plaintiff that heads the class action impacts the overall outcome of the case. Furthermore, we explore possible indicia that may explain why some suits settle for extremely small sums - small relative to the "provable losses" suffered by the class, small relative to the asset size of the defendant-company, and small relative to other settlements in our sample. This evidence bears …

Codes Of Ethics And State Fiduciary Duties: Where Is The Line?, Z. Jill Barclift

Faculty Scholarship

The important function of disclosure under federal securities laws and regulations, and the role of management in running the affairs of the corporation consistent with state fiduciary principles have a history of discord. The recent mandates of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX Act” or “SOX”), and the Security and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”) implementing regulations continue to increase the disclosure obligations of public companies. This article examines the implementation of code of ethics requirements under SOX. It examines the SEC’s regulations, which implement SOX requirements on the disclosure of codes of ethics, and self-regulatory agency (“SRO” or “listing agency”) rules on codes …