Law Commons^™

Moral Hazard And The Initial Public Offering, A. Christine Hurt

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Reform Of Public Company Disclosure In Europe, Roberta S. Karmel

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Reform Of Public Company Disclosure In Europa, Roberta S. Karmel

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

From "Federalization" To "Mixed Governance" In Corporate Law: A Defense Of Sarbanes-Oxley, Robert B. Ahdieh

Faculty Scholarship

Since the very moment of its adoption, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been subject to a litany of critiques, many of them seemingly well-placed. The almost universal condemnation of the Act for its asserted 'federalization' of corporate law, by contrast, deserves short shrift. Though widely invoked - and blithely accepted - dissection of this argument against the legislation shows it to rely either on flawed assumptions or on normative preferences not ordinarily acknowledged (or perhaps even accepted) by those who criticize Sarbanes-Oxley for its federalization of state corporate law.

Once we appreciate as much, we can begin by replacing …

Mutual Funds, Pension Funds, Hedge Funds And Stock Market Volatility: What Regulation By The Securities And Exchange Commission Is Appropriate?, Roberta S. Karmel

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Mutual Funds, Pension Funds, Hedge Funds And Stock Market Volatility - What Regulation By The Securities And Exchange Commission Is Appropriate, Roberta S. Karmel

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Sarbanes-Oxley, Corporate Federalism, And The Declining Significance Of Federal Reforms On State Director Independence Standards, Lisa M. Fairfax

Faculty Scholarship

Commentators have argued that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley” or the “Act”) raises federalism concerns because it regulates the internal affairs of a corporation, including the composition of, and qualifications for, corporate boards, in a manner traditionally reserved to states. This Article responds to those claims, arguing that the Act reflects a relatively minimal intrusion into state law, particularly with regard to issues of director independence. This Article further argues that the Act’s failure to disturb state law on these issues may impede its ability to tighten director independence standards and by extension may undermine its ability to improve …

Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers: Empirical Evidence And Legal Implications Of The Failure Of Financial Institutions To Participate In Securities Class Action Settlements, James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas

Faculty Scholarship

In a pilot study we published two years ago, we reported that nearly two-thirds of the institutional investors with financial losses in 53 settled securities class actions fail to submit claims. As a consequence of this failure substantial sums they were entitled to receive were given to others. This article presents the results of a much more extensive investigation of the frequency with which financial institutions submit claims in settled securities class actions. We combine an empirical study of a much larger set of settlements with the results of a survey of institutional investors about their claims filing practices. Consistent …

Uncovering A Gatekeeper: Why The Sec Should Mandate Disclosure Of Details Concerning Directors' And Officers' Liability Insurance Policies, Sean J. Griffith

Faculty Scholarship

This Article explores the connection between corporate governance and directors’ and officers’ (D&O) insurance. It argues that D&O insurers act as gatekeepers and guarantors of corporate governance, screening and pricing corporate governance risks to maintain the profitability of their risk pools. As a result, in a well-working insurance market, D&O insurance premiums would convey the insurer's assessment of a firm's governance quality. Simply stated, firms with better corporate governance would pay relatively low D&O premiums, while firms with worse corporate governance would pay more. This simple relationship could signal important information to investors and other capital market participants. Unfortunately, the …

The Corporation As Insider Trader, William K.S. Wang, Mark J. Loewenstein

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Realizing The Dream Of William O. Douglas: The Securities And Exchange Commission Takes Charge Of Corporate Governance, Roberta S. Karmel

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Suitability Claims And Unrecommended Securities Purchases: An Agency Theory Of Broker-Dealer Liability, Frederick Mark Gedicks

Faculty Scholarship

It is well-established that full-service broker-dealers have an obligation to recommend to their customers only the purchase of securities that are "suitable" to the customer's investment objectives and financial situation. There seems to be widespread agreement, however, that a broker-dealer cannot incur liability on suitability grounds unless it first recommends a securities purchase to a customer.

Accordingly, discount broker-dealers argue they are necessarily immune from liability on suitability claims because they act as "order clerks" who merely execute unsolicited customer orders; online discounters have adopted the same position. Full-service broker-dealers similarly argue that although they owe a suitability obligation for …

Demystifying Causation In Fraud-On-The-Market Actions, Merritt B. Fox

Faculty Scholarship

An issuer makes a positive, material misstatement in violation of Rule 10b-5. What must an investor who purchases the issuer's shares on the open market show to establish causation in a "fraud-on-the-market" action for damages? After years of confusion in the lower courts, the Supreme Court recently granted certiorari on the question in the case of Broudo v. Dura Pharmaceuticals.

This Article argues that the confusion in the lower courts has arisen because they have analyzed the issue in terms of the twin concepts of "transaction causation" and "loss causation." They initially developed this bifurcated framework as a way …

Lost In Translation: From U.S. Corporate Charter Competition To Issuer Choice In International Securities Regulation, Frederick Tung

Faculty Scholarship

Corporate charter competition among U.S. states has been held out as a model of welfare-enhancing regulatory competition. Proponents of this story also rely on it as a basis for promoting regulatory competition in international securities regulation. Issuer choice proponents argue that an issuer of securities should be permitted to choose the securities regulation of any nation to govern its securities offerings and trading worldwide. This Article challenges the notion that the claimed success of corporate charter competition among U.S. states argues in favor of issuer choice for international securities regulation.

Even granting the assumptions of race-to-the-top advocates and accepting the …

Executive Compensation: If There's A Problem, What's The Remedy? The Case For "Compensation Discussion And Analysis", Jeffrey N. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

High levels of executive compensation have triggered an intense debate over whether compensation results primarily from competitive pressures in the market for managerial services or from managerial overreaching. Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried have advanced the debate with their recent book, Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation, which forcefully argues that current compensation levels are best explained by managerial rent-seeking, not by arm's-length bargaining designed to create the optimum pay and performance nexus. This paper expresses three sorts of reservations with their analysis and advances its own proposals. First, enhancing shareholder welfare is not, as a …

Understanding Dura, Merritt B. Fox

Faculty Scholarship

On April 19, 2005, the Supreme Court announced its unanimous opinion in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, concerning what a plaintiff must show to establish causation in a Rule 10b-5 fraud-on-the-market suit for damages. The opinion had been awaited with considerable anticipation, being described at the time of oral argument in the Financial Times, for example, as the "most important securities case in a decade." After the opinion was handed down, a representative of the plaintiffs' bar lauded it as a unanimous ruling protecting investors' ability to sue. A representative of the defendant's bar equally enthusiastically hailed it as …

Causation By Presumption? Why The Supreme Court Should Reject Phantom Losses And Reverse Broudo, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

Over a quarter of a century ago, Judge Henry Friendly coined the term "fraud by hindsight" in upholding the dismissal of a proposed securities class action. As he explained, it was too simple to look backward with full knowledge of actual events and allege what should have been earlier disclosed by a public corporation in its Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings. Because hindsight has twenty/twenty vision, plaintiffs could not fairly "seize [] upon disclosures" in later reports, he ruled, to show what defendants should have disclosed earlier.

Today, a parallel concept – "causation by presumption" – is before the …