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Full-Text Articles in Law
The Price Of Pay To Play In Securities Class Actions, Adam C. Pritchard, Stephen J. Choi, Drew T. Johnson-Skinner
The Price Of Pay To Play In Securities Class Actions, Adam C. Pritchard, Stephen J. Choi, Drew T. Johnson-Skinner
Articles
We study the effect of campaign contributions to lead plaintiffs—“pay to play”—on the level of attorney fees in securities class actions. We find that state pension funds generally pay lower attorney fees when they serve as lead plaintiffs in securities class actions than do individual investors serving in that capacity, and larger funds negotiate for lower fees. This differential disappears, however, when we control for campaign contributions made to offcials with infuence over state pension funds. This effect is most pronounced when we focus on state pension funds that receive the largest campaign contributions and that associate repeatedly as lead …
Private Equity's Three Lessons For Agency Theory, William Wilson Bratton
Private Equity's Three Lessons For Agency Theory, William Wilson Bratton
Articles
It is time to consider the lessons to be learned from the recent boom in private equity buyouts, not least in view of its abrupt termination in the wake of tightened credit. In the past, such inquiries have been undertaken in the context of agency theory and have focused on the buyout's implications for solving the problem of separation of ownership and control. This article reverses the pattern of inquiry to consider the buyout's implications for agency theory, pointing to three lessons. The first lesson addresses agency theory's three-way association among control transfers, governance discipline and hostile takeovers, suggesting that …