Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Law Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Law

Toward Transatlantic Convergence In Financial Regulation, Hwa-Jin Kim May 2011

Toward Transatlantic Convergence In Financial Regulation, Hwa-Jin Kim

Law & Economics Working Papers

This Article reviews the historical background of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 along with the developments in the markets that led to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999. It analyzes the discussions on the Volcker Rule in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 from a comparative perspective. It shows how the reform in the United States may impact financial institutions and markets in other jurisdictions. Germany and Switzerland, where universal banking is the hallmark of the financial services industry, are the primary jurisdictions of interest. After taking a historical and political look at the regulation of …


Securities Law In The Roberts Court: Agenda Or Indifference?, Adam C. Pritchard Jan 2011

Securities Law In The Roberts Court: Agenda Or Indifference?, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

To outsiders, securities law is not all that interesting. The body of the law consists of an interconnecting web of statutes and regulations that fit together in ways that are decidedly counter-intuitive. Securities law rivals tax law in its reputation for complexity and dreariness. Worse yet, the subject regulated-capital markets-can be mystifying to those uninitiated in modem finance. Moreover, those markets rapidly evolve, continually increasing their complexity. If you do not understand how the financial markets work, it is hard to understand how securities law affects those markets.


The Price Of Pay To Play In Securities Class Actions, Adam C. Pritchard, Stephen J. Choi, Drew T. Johnson-Skinner Jan 2011

The Price Of Pay To Play In Securities Class Actions, Adam C. Pritchard, Stephen J. Choi, Drew T. Johnson-Skinner

Articles

We study the effect of campaign contributions to lead plaintiffs—“pay to play”—on the level of attorney fees in securities class actions. We find that state pension funds generally pay lower attorney fees when they serve as lead plaintiffs in securities class actions than do individual investors serving in that capacity, and larger funds negotiate for lower fees. This differential disappears, however, when we control for campaign contributions made to offcials with infuence over state pension funds. This effect is most pronounced when we focus on state pension funds that receive the largest campaign contributions and that associate repeatedly as lead …