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Full-Text Articles in Law

Are Investors’ Gains And Losses From Securities Fraud Equal Over Time? Theory And Evidence, Alicia J. Davis Oct 2010

Are Investors’ Gains And Losses From Securities Fraud Equal Over Time? Theory And Evidence, Alicia J. Davis

Law & Economics Working Papers

Most leading securities regulation scholars argue that compensating securities fraud victims is inefficient. They maintain that because diversified investors that trade frequently are as likely to gain from trading in fraud-tainted stocks as they are to suffer harm from doing so, these investors should have no expected net losses from fraud over the long term. This assertion, which analogizes trading in fraud-tainted stocks to participating in a coin toss game in which players win $1 on heads and lose $1 on tails, is problematic for a number of reasons. First, even if we accept this analogy, probability theory holds that …


Securities Law In The Roberts Court: Agenda Or Indifference?, Adam C. Pritchard Oct 2010

Securities Law In The Roberts Court: Agenda Or Indifference?, Adam C. Pritchard

Law & Economics Working Papers

Historically, securities law has not been a high priority for the Supreme Court. The first five years of the Roberts Court, however, suggest an upsurge of interest in the federal securities laws, with nine cases decided, a significant increase from the Rehnquist Court’s average. These numbers are deceptive. Analysis of the opinions deciding these cases – and more importantly, the issues debated by the justices – suggests that the Court is not interested in the substance of the securities laws or the policies that animate them. Instead, securities law serves as a backdrop for debates over statutory interpretation and the …


The Redemption Puzzle, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah Aug 2010

The Redemption Puzzle, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah

Articles

After the adoption of partial integration in 2003, there has been only a modest rise in dividends, but a sixfold increase in redemptions. This article argues that the explanation for that lies in the different treatment of dividends and capital gains to foreign shareholders and that Congress should respond by making sections 302 and 304 inapplicable to foreign shareholders.


The Price Of Pay To Play In Securities Class Actions, Stephen Choi, Drew T. Johnson-Skinner, Adam C. Pritchard Aug 2010

The Price Of Pay To Play In Securities Class Actions, Stephen Choi, Drew T. Johnson-Skinner, Adam C. Pritchard

Law & Economics Working Papers

This paper studies the effect of campaign contributions to lead plaintiffs — “pay to play’’ — on the level of attorneys’ fees in securities class actions. We find that state pension funds generally pay lower attorneys’ fees when they serve as lead plaintiffs in securities class actions than do individual investors serving in that capacity. This differential disappears, however, when we control for campaign contributions made to officials with influence over state pension funds. Thus, pay to play appears to increase agency costs borne by shareholders in securities class actions.


Attorneys As Arbitrators, Adam C. Pritchard, Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch Jan 2010

Attorneys As Arbitrators, Adam C. Pritchard, Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch

Articles

We study the role of attorneys as arbitrators in securities arbitration. We find that arbitrators who also represent brokerage firms or brokers in other arbitrations award significantly less compensation to investor-claimants than do other arbitrators. We find no significant effect for attorney-arbitrators who represent investors or both investors and brokerage firms. The relation between representing brokerage firms and arbitration awards remains significant even when we control for political outlook. Arbitrators who donate money to Democratic political candidates award greater compensation than do arbitrators who donate to Republican can-didates. We also study the dynamics of panel interaction. We find that the …


Populist Retribution And International Competition In Financial Services Regulation, Adam C. Pritchard Jan 2010

Populist Retribution And International Competition In Financial Services Regulation, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

The pattern of regulatory reform in financial services regulation follows a predictable pattern in democratic states. A hyperactive market generates a bubble, the bubble deflates, and much financial pain ensues for those individuals who bought at the top of the market. The financial mess brings the scrutiny of politicians, who vow "Never again!" A political battle ensues, with representatives of the financial services industry fighting a rearguard action to preserve its prerogatives amidst cries for the bankers' scalps. Regulations, carefully crafted to win the last war, are promulgated. Memories fade of the foolish enthusiasm that fed the last bubble. Slowly, …


Securities Class Actions Move North: A Doctrinal And Empirical Analysis Of Securities Class Actions In Canada, Adam C. Pritchard, Janis P. Sarra Jan 2010

Securities Class Actions Move North: A Doctrinal And Empirical Analysis Of Securities Class Actions In Canada, Adam C. Pritchard, Janis P. Sarra

Articles

The article explores securities class actions involving Canadian issuers since the provinces added secondary market class action provisions to their securities legislation. It examines the development of civil liability provisions, and class proceedings legislation and their effect on one another. Through analyses of the substance and framework of the statutory provisions, the article presents an empirical and comparative examination of cases involving Canadian issuers in both Canada and the United States. In addition, it explores how both the availability and pricing of director and officer insurance have been affected by the potential for secondary market class action liability. The article …