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Accusers As Adjudicators In Agency Enforcement Proceedings, Andrew N. Vollmer Oct 2018

Accusers As Adjudicators In Agency Enforcement Proceedings, Andrew N. Vollmer

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Largely because of the Supreme Court’s 1975 decision in Withrow v. Larkin, the accepted view for decades has been that a federal administrative agency does not violate the Due Process Clause by combining the functions of investigating, charging, and then resolving allegations that a person violated the law. Many federal agencies have this structure, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Federal Trade Commission.

In 2016, the Supreme Court decided Williams v. Pennsylvania, a judicial disqualification case that, without addressing administrative agencies, nonetheless raises a substantial question about one aspect of the combination of functions at agencies. …


No More Quid Pro Quo: Abandoning The Personal Benefit Requirement In Insider Trading Law, Shannon Seiferth Jan 2016

No More Quid Pro Quo: Abandoning The Personal Benefit Requirement In Insider Trading Law, Shannon Seiferth

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

A circuit split between the Second Circuit’s 2014 decision, United States v. Newman, and the Ninth Circuit’s 2015 decision, United States v. Salman, illustrates problems in insider trading law dating back over thirty years to the Supreme Court’s decision in Dirks v. SEC. Dirks held that when a corporate insider provides information to an outside party who then trades on the information, it must be shown that the insider received some form of a personal benefit for providing the information in order to impute liability. The courts in Newman and Salman disagreed on the sort of evidence …


The Two Faces Of Janus: The Jurisprudential Past And New Beginning Of Rule 10b-5, John Patrick Clayton Apr 2014

The Two Faces Of Janus: The Jurisprudential Past And New Beginning Of Rule 10b-5, John Patrick Clayton

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and its implementing Rule 10b-5 are the primary antifraud provisions for both private and public enforcement of the federal securities laws. Neither the statute nor the rule expressly provides for a private right of action, but federal courts have long recognized such an implied right, and the Securities and Exchange Commission has supported the implied private right of action as a “necessary supplement” to its own efforts. However, after a decade of applying an expansive interpretation to Section 10(b), in the early 1970s the U.S. Supreme Court began to narrowly interpret this implied …


The Future Of Securities Class Actions Against Foreign Companies: China And Comity Concerns, Dana M. Muir, Junhai Liu, Haiyan Xu Jun 2013

The Future Of Securities Class Actions Against Foreign Companies: China And Comity Concerns, Dana M. Muir, Junhai Liu, Haiyan Xu

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

In Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., the U.S. Supreme Court limited the application of U.S. securities fraud law in transnational situations. The Supreme Court noted that its decision was influenced by international comity considerations. In this Article, we evaluate the availability of class actions in China in cases involving alleged securities fraud. Because we find that the availability of those actions is too limited to fully protect U.S. shareholders, we argue that U.S. investors should be permitted to bring securities fraud class actions against non-U.S. companies whose securities are traded on a U.S. exchange regardless of where those investors …


Protecting Nonshareholder Interests In The Market For Corporate Control: A Role For State Takeover Statutes, Frank J. Garcia Apr 1990

Protecting Nonshareholder Interests In The Market For Corporate Control: A Role For State Takeover Statutes, Frank J. Garcia

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Part I of this Note describes a phenomenon of modern corporate activity first identified over fifty years ago as the "separation of ownership and control." This separation gives rise to the need for a governing corporate norm; recognizing the normative aspect of this phenomenon has direct implications for the takeover debate.

Part II analyzes the problem of a target board's fiduciary duty as the modern version of the fundamental normative issue of corporate law. It argues that the norm of shareholder wealth maximization, assumed as the starting point by those most in favor of an active and minimally regulated control …