Law Commons^™

Religion, Conscience, And The Law: Reasons, Bases, And Limits For Exemptions, Kent Greenawalt

Faculty Scholarship

Kent Greenawalt discusses the permissibility, scope, and rationale for law to provide exemptions to protect religious and nonreligious conscience in the United States. It may be difficult for the law to determine which sentiments amount to conscience given differences in individuals’ perception and the strength of their convictions. Even the notion of a religious conscience is complex. Religious citizens’ conclusions about matters of interest to religion may proceed from both religion and reason, or only from reason. It is not clear what should count as religious, given differences between denominations and their ideas over time. There are a host of …

Exclusion And Equality: How Exclusion From The Political Process Renders Religious Liberty Unequal, Philip A. Hamburger

Faculty Scholarship

Exclusion from the political process is a central question in American law. Thus far, however, it has not been recognized how religious Americans are excluded from the political process and what this means for religious equality.

Put simply, both administrative lawmaking and § 501 (c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code substantially exclude religious Americans from the political process that produces laws. As a result, apparently equal laws are apt, in reality, to be unequal for religious Americans. Political exclusion threatens religious equality.

The primary practical conclusion concerns administrative law. It will be seen that this sort of "law" is made …

Rfra Exemptions From The Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation Of Religion, Frederick Mark Gedicks, Rebecca G. Van Tassell

Faculty Scholarship

Litigation surrounding use of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to exempt employers from the Affordable Care Act’s “contraception mandate” is moving steadily towards resolution in the U.S. Supreme Court. Both opponents and supporters of the mandate, however, have overlooked the Establishment Clause limits on such exemptions.

The heated religious-liberty rhetoric aimed at the mandate has obscured that RFRA is a “permissive” rather than “mandatory” accommodation of religion — a government concession to religious belief and practice that is not required by the Free Exercise Clause. Permissive accommodations must satisfy Establishment Clause constraints, notably the requirement that the accommodation not impose …

Towards A Defensible Free Exercise Doctrine, Frederick Mark Gedicks

Faculty Scholarship

Almost from the moment that the Supreme Court abandoned the religious exemption doctrine in Employment Division v. Smith, its defenders have worked to bring it back. More than a decade later, however, Smith remains well-entrenched; not only has the Court confirmed Smith's basic holding, but it also struck the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Congress's first effort to restore the exemption doctrine, at least as it applied to the states.

Proponents of religious exemptions cannot ignore the hard truth that they can no longer be defended. During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, American society viewed the practice of religion-mostly Christian …