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Full-Text Articles in Law

The Effects Of Ballot Position On Election Outcomes, Jonathan G.S. Koppell, Jennifer A. Steen Feb 2004

The Effects Of Ballot Position On Election Outcomes, Jonathan G.S. Koppell, Jennifer A. Steen

Publications from President Jonathan G.S. Koppell

This article presents evidence of name-order effects in balloting from a study of the 1998 Democratic primary in New York City, in which the order of candidates' names was rotated by precinct. In 71 of 79 individual nominating contests, candidates received a greater proportion of the vote when listed first than when listed in any other position. In seven of those 71 contests, the advantage to first position exceeded the winner's margin of victory, suggesting that ballot position would have determined the election outcomes if one candidate had held the top spot in all precincts.


Hybrid Organizations And The Alignment Of Interests: The Case Of Fannie Mae And Freddie Mac, Jonathan G.S. Koppell Jul 2001

Hybrid Organizations And The Alignment Of Interests: The Case Of Fannie Mae And Freddie Mac, Jonathan G.S. Koppell

Publications from President Jonathan G.S. Koppell

This article explores the political influence of government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs). Using Congress's overhaul of the regulatory infrastructure for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as a case study, the article presents two principal findings: (1) The characteristics that distinguish government-sponsored enterprises from traditional government agencies and private companies endow Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac with unique political resources; and (2) the alignment of interest groups around Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is subject to strategic manipulation by the GSEs. A triangular model of this alignment is proposed and employed to analyze the legislative outcome. The case has implications for students of …


Differentiating Regulation Of Public And Private Institutions: A Preliminary Inquiry, Jonathan G.S. Koppell Jan 1998

Differentiating Regulation Of Public And Private Institutions: A Preliminary Inquiry, Jonathan G.S. Koppell

Publications from President Jonathan G.S. Koppell

Twenty years ago, James Q. Wilson and Patricia Rachal argued that government cannot regulate itself. In an era of revived federalism, increased reliance on contractors, and proliferation of quasi-public organizations, the importance of government self-regulation is greater than ever. This paper tests an underlying assumption of Wilson and Rachal's claim: that regulation of public and private organizations can be differentiated. Employing a meta-research design, this pilot study uses existing regulatory case studies to create "regulatory relationship profiles" for public and private organizations. These profiles include information on the structure of the regulator, the intent of the regulation, the enforcement tools …