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Opting Out Of Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis Of Contractual Choice Of Law, Erin A. O'Hara
Opting Out Of Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis Of Contractual Choice Of Law, Erin A. O'Hara
Vanderbilt Law Review
This Article uses public choice theory to analyze the function of choice-of-law clauses in contracts. Choice-of-law clauses are now quite common and are increasingly enforced, especially with the proliferation of international and Internet transactions. Because these clauses can be used by parties to avoid regulation, academics are now vigorously debating the extent to which this contractual opt out should be permitted. The Article presents a positive political theory of the interplay of legislative action and the enforcement of choice of law. It demonstrates that the important normative debate over choice of law is somewhat misguided because both sides fail to …
Public Choice And The Future Of Public-Choice-Influenced Legal Scholarship, David A. Skeel, Jr.
Public Choice And The Future Of Public-Choice-Influenced Legal Scholarship, David A. Skeel, Jr.
Vanderbilt Law Review
By many yardsticks, public choice is the single most successful transplant from the world of economics to legal scholarship., As with other law-and-economics scholarship, critics have attacked its assumptions, its methodology, and its conclusions. But nearly everyone concedes the power of at least some of the insights of public choice, and many of its terms, including "public choice" itself, have become common coinage in the legal literature, even among those who would never overtly rely on law-and-economics perspectives in their work.
Although both Maxwell Stearns's collection of readings and commentary, Public Choice and Public Law, and much of this Review …
Public Choice, Public Opinion, And The Fuller Court, Jonathan R. Macey
Public Choice, Public Opinion, And The Fuller Court, Jonathan R. Macey
Vanderbilt Law Review
Everyone has his own, personal view about what role the United States Supreme Court should play in American political life. Conservatives of the Robert Bork variety prefer that supreme court justices treat congressional enactments with great deference and respect.' Liberals of the Laurence Tribe persuasion like judges to take an active role in ensuring certain individual rights, such as the right to abortion, while giving Congress latitude to regulate in the sphere of economic rights. Libertarians of the Bernard Siegan orientation strenuously deny the difference between economic liberties and other sorts of human rights and would have judges actively protect …