Law Commons^™

A Major Answer To The Major Questions Doctrine, Edward L. Rubin

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

The Supreme Court’s use of the major questions doctrine in West Virginia v. Environmental Protection Agency to invalidate the agency’s regulation of greenhouse gas emission has elicited widespread criticism from commentators. David Driesen’s contribution to this chorus of condemnation goes to the heart of the issue, focusing on the role that the Supreme Court has arrogated to itself in reaching this decision.

The Court’s based its decision on the relationship between Congress and the Executive, speaking at length about the structural roles of these two institutions. What it forgot, as Professor Driesen notes, is that the Court is also an …

An Honest But Fearless Fighter: The Adversarial Ideal Of Public Defenders In 1930s And ’40s Los Angeles, Sara Mayeux

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Vercoe's self-description as a courtroom "fighter" illuminates public defenders' professional identity in the United States in the decades after the criminal courts had developed into a modem bureaucracy, but before the Warren Court constitutionalized criminal procedure. Historians have characterized lawyering for the poor as outside the mainstream of adversar- ial legal culture, describing a "two-tiered legal system" in which lawyers celebrated courtroom combat on behalf of paying clients but relegated the indigent to a lesser form of advocacy that valorized "compromise." Comporting with this characterization, legal scholars have portrayed early public defenders as "assembly-line" workers who conducted little factual investigation …

The Myth Of The Condorcet Winner, Paul H. Edelman

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

There is consensus among legal scholars that, when choosing among multiple alternatives, the Condorcet winner, should it exist, is the preferred option. In this essay I will refute that claim, both normatively and positively. In addition, I will suggest that a different approach, based in behavioral economics, might be a more productive way to model the choices that legislatures make among multiple alternatives.

Behavioral Public Choice: The Behavioral Paradox Of Government Policy, W. Kip Viscusi

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Although government agencies increasingly use behavioral irrationalities as a justification for government intervention, the paradox is that these same government policies are also subject to similar behavioral inadequacies across a broad range of policies. This article develops an analysis of behavioral public choice in which we recognize that government officials are human and subject to behavioral anomalies and to public choice incentives that could further lead to welfare-reducing policies. Moreover, the existence of behavioral failures by the general public will lead to public pressures on government agencies to foster policies in response to these behavioral inadequacies. This article presents a …

Order Without Social Norms: How Personal Norm Activation Can Protect The Environment, Michael P. Vandenbergh

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

This Article tackles a leading problem confronting norms theorists and regulators: how can the law induce changes in behavior when the material costs to the individual outweigh the benefits and there is no close-knit community to impose sanctions for failure to change? Because private individuals and households are now surprisingly large contributors to environmental problems ranging from toxic pollution to climate change, environmental policy makers face compelling examples of these negative-payoff, loose-knit group situations. This Article suggests that internalized personal norms, rather than social norms, are the most important initial target of opportunity for influencing this kind of behavior.

Drawing …

Moving Public Law Out Of The Deference Trap In Regulated Industries, Jim Rossi

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

This Article argues that public law has fallen into what I call a deference trap in addressing conflicts in deregulated industries, such as telecommunications and electric power. The deference trap describes a judicial reluctance to intervene in disputes involving political institutions, such as regulatory agencies and states. By reassessing the deference trap across the legal doctrines that are effecting emerging telecommunications and electric power markets, public law can deliver much more for deregulated markets. The deference trap poses a particular cost as markets are deregulated, one that may not have been present during previous regulatory eras in which public and …

Paradoxes Of Fair Division, Paul H. Edelman, Steven J. Brams, Peter C. Fishburn

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Paradoxes, if they do not define a field, render its problems intriguing and often perplexing, especially insofar as the paradoxes remain unresolved. Voting theory, for example, has been greatly stimulated by the Condorcet paradox, which is the discovery by the Marquis de Condorcet that there may be no alternative that is preferred by a majority to every other alternative, producing so-called cyclical majorities. Its modern extension and generalization is Arrow's theorem, which says, roughly speaking, that a certain set of reasonable conditions for aggregating individuals' preferences into some social choice are inconsistent. In the last fifty years, hundreds of books …

Common Law Duty, Jim Rossi

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

This article addresses the implications of retail competition in public utility industries, particularly electricity, for utility service obligations. After tracing the history of the common law duty to serve applicable to public utilities, the efficiency of utility service obligations in the context of rate regulation is explored. Retail competition, many suggest, poses a threat to utility service obligations. However, regulators can minimize the inefficiency of traditional utility service obligations without sacrificing the benefits of retail competition if they pay attention to the structural efficiency of competitive retail markets. The article advocates imposition of basic service obligations on the DisCo and …

Public Choice Theory And The Fragmented Web Of The Contemporary Administrative State, Jim Rossi

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

In the recent book, Greed, Chaos and Governance: Using Public Choice to Improve Public Law (Yale U. Press 1997), Jerry Mashaw addresses the convergence between public choice and administrative law. This review essay summarizes Mashaw's arguments and explores his use of public choice tools. The review suggests that, absent some unifying theoretical perspective for understanding administrative governance outside of public choice method, little more than rampant pessimism or fragmented lessons about the administrative state can be taken.