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Full-Text Articles in Law
Customary International Law: An Instrument Choice Perspective, Laurence R. Helfer, Ingrid B. Wuerth
Customary International Law: An Instrument Choice Perspective, Laurence R. Helfer, Ingrid B. Wuerth
Michigan Journal of International Law
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II begins by considering custom’s design features, which the authors distinguish from the canonical elements of custom (state practice and opinio juris) and the individual doctrines associated with CIL. Specifically, they contend that, as an ideal-type, custom is non-negotiated, unwritten, and universal, three characteristics that distinguish CIL from both treaties and soft law, which are almost always negotiated, written, and rarely universal either in formation or application. These design features help to explain some of custom’s peculiar doctrinal characteristics, and they cut across the doctrinal divide which is said to distinguish “traditional” and …
Shared Responsibility In International Law: A Conceptual Framework, Andre Nollkaemper, Dov Jacobs
Shared Responsibility In International Law: A Conceptual Framework, Andre Nollkaemper, Dov Jacobs
Michigan Journal of International Law
In this Article we explore the phenomenon of shared international responsibility among multiple actors that contribute to harmful outcomes that international law seeks to prevent. We examine the foundations and manifestations of shared responsibility, explain why international law has had difficulty in grasping its complexity, and set forth a conceptual framework that allows us to better understand and study the phenomenon. Such a framework provides a basis for further development of principles of international law that correspond to the needs of an era characterized by joint and coordinated, rather than independent, action.
Game Theory And Customary International Law: A Response To Professors Goldsmith And Posner, Mark A. Chinen
Game Theory And Customary International Law: A Response To Professors Goldsmith And Posner, Mark A. Chinen
Michigan Journal of International Law
In a pair of recent articles, Professors Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner have used game theoretic principles to challenge the positivist account of customary international law. Their writings join other early attempts to apply game theory to the international law sources. The author has two purposes in this Article. The first is to evaluate game theory's potential for yielding greater insight into customary international law and international law more generally. The second is to respond to the conclusions about customary international law drawn by Professors Goldsmith and Posner.
Further Thoughts On Customary International Law, Jack L. Goldsmith, Eric A. Posner
Further Thoughts On Customary International Law, Jack L. Goldsmith, Eric A. Posner
Michigan Journal of International Law
In two earlier articles, the tools of game theory were used to sketch a positive theoretical account of customary international law ("CIL"). This theory rejected as question-begging the usual explanations of CIL based on legality, morality, opinio juris, and related concepts. It was argued instead that CIL emerges from nations' pursuit of self-interested policies on the international stage. This approach helps explain many overlooked features of CIL, including how CIL originates and changes, why the content of CIL tracks the interest of powerful nations, and why nations change their views of CIL when their interests change. Finally, the practices …
Enforcement And The Evolution Of Cooperation, George W. Downs
Enforcement And The Evolution Of Cooperation, George W. Downs
Michigan Journal of International Law
The purpose of this article is to broadly characterize the political economy or institutionalist theory of enforcement and to present data that is at least a first step toward evaluating the managerial and transformationalist critiques. The first section will present a short, schematic summary of the role of enforcement as it is currently viewed in the "new institutions" or political economy literature in international relations. While doubtless familiar to many readers, this is an important point of departure. A notable portion of the debate about the role of enforcement continues to stem from differences in terminology and from the fact …