Law Commons^™

Overview Of Bicameral Legislatures’ Potential Impact On The Executive Selection Process, Kyle Kopchak

Indiana Journal of Constitutional Design

Bicameral legislature is a common constitutional design model, with bicameral legislatures making up roughly 41 percent of all legislatures worldwide. As of April 2014, 79 bicameral and 113 unicameral systems were recorded in the database of the Inter-Parliamentary Union. In general, “bicameralism is more common in federal, large, and presidential states, while unicameralism is more common in unitary, small, parliamentary ones”. Bicameral systems operate two legislative chambers, both of which play a role in drafting and passing national legislation. However, each house often fulfills a unique role in the legislative process and is usually elected by different methods. Proponents of …

Enforcing Interstate Compacts In Federal Systems, Michael Osborn

Indiana Journal of Constitutional Design

The central goal of a federal system is for local government units to retain degrees of independence, specifically over matters of importance to that local unit. A logical corollary to that independence is the ability for local units to negotiate and contract with other local units on matters of importance. Therefore, it is not surprising that almost every federal system allows, either implicitly or explicitly, member states to form binding compacts with other states, the union government, or municipalities.1 Some federal democracies even allow member states to compact with foreign governments. Furthermore, almost every federal constitution includes a provision outlining …

Minority Vetoes In Consociational Legislatures: Ultimately Weaponized?, Devin Haymond

Indiana Journal of Constitutional Design

In societies emerging from or at risk for conflict, dividing power among rival groups—called power-sharing—can be an appropriate arrangement to maintaining peace. But how can groups, who are often emerging from violent conflict, trust sharing a government with rival groups that were just recently shooting at them?

A potential solution is the minority veto, which is allows minority groups to block the government from harming those groups’ vital interests. But what sorts of change blocking mechanisms constitute a minority veto? Who gets the veto power, and when can they be used? Do minority vetoes function as effective incentives for ensuring …

Judicial Independence And The Budget: A Taxonomy Of Judicial Budgeting Mechanisms, Alexander Rosselli

Indiana Journal of Constitutional Design

This Paper addresses three aspects of judicial budgeting. First, it will identify the four broad families of constitutional provisions that consider the judicial budget. While the majority of procedures and requirements that govern judicial budgeting are found in statues, many nations’ constitutions explicitly address judicial salaries. Other constitutions only broadly address judicial budgeting. Second, we will analyze different approaches to judicial councils. Third, this Paper will address several different approaches to the judicial budgeting process. This includes how the judiciary’s budget is proposed, as well as how it is allocated and managed. Finally, this Paper will touch upon the tension …

Taxonomy Of Minority Governments, Lisa La Fornara

Indiana Journal of Constitutional Design

A minority government in its most basic form is a government in which the party holding the most parliamentary seats still has fewer than half the seats in parliament and therefore cannot pass legislation or advance policy without support from unaffiliated parties. Because seats in minority parliaments are more evenly distributed amongst multiple parties, opposition parties have greater opportunity to block legislation. A minority government must therefore negotiate with external parties and adjust its policies to garner the majority of votes required to advance its initiatives.

This paper serves as a taxonomy of minority governments in recent history and proceeds …

The Voice Of The People: Public Participation In The African Continent, Rafael Macia

Indiana Journal of Constitutional Design

Public participation is becoming a more common characteristic of constitutional drafting processes around the world, and Africa has not been an exception in this regard. This paper seeks to survey several of the public participation processes undertaken in a number of African nations, in order to examine the methods followed and the effects produced by such processes. For that purpose, I have analyzed the constitutional drafting efforts in South Africa, Uganda, Eritrea, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Kenya, and Egypt. These processes all show different circumstances and approaches, with variations in terms of their top-down or bottom-up nature, and, more importantly, in terms …