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Full-Text Articles in Law

The Importance Of Free And Frank Advice From The Public Service, Matthew S. R. Palmer Qc Nov 2013

The Importance Of Free And Frank Advice From The Public Service, Matthew S. R. Palmer Qc

The Hon Justice Matthew Palmer

There has been a systematic diminution in the quality of policy advice in the New Zealand executive government between about 1998 and 2008. That has been associated with a diminution in the willingness of public servants to provide free and frank advice. Leadership at senior political and bureaucratic levels is required to address this as well as cultural change throughout the policy capacity of the New Zealand public service.


Ministerial Responsibility And Chief Executive Accountability: The Implications Of The Better Public Services Reform Programme, Matthew S. R. Palmer Qc Apr 2013

Ministerial Responsibility And Chief Executive Accountability: The Implications Of The Better Public Services Reform Programme, Matthew S. R. Palmer Qc

The Hon Justice Matthew Palmer

This paper examines the current state of the constitutional convention of ministerial responsibility and its public service corollaries in New Zealand. It assesses the implications for them of the latest reform initiative in the New Zealand public service: Better Public Services. It concludes that the Better Public Services initiative does not disturb the constitutional underpinnings of the public service. But neither does it address the problem of the paucity of free and frank advice and wider problems of the quality of policy advice. Addressing those problems requires commitment by Ministers and leadership in the public service.


The Paradox Of Omnipotence: Courts, Constitutions, And Commitments, David S. Law Apr 2005

The Paradox Of Omnipotence: Courts, Constitutions, And Commitments, David S. Law

ExpressO

Sovereigns, like individuals, must sometimes make commitments that limit their own freedom of action in order to accomplish their goals. Social scientists have observed that constitutional arrangements can, by restricting a sovereign’s power, enable the sovereign to make such commitments. This essay advances several claims about the commitment problems that sovereigns face. First, constitutions do not necessarily solve such problems but can instead aggravate them, by entrenching inalienable governmental powers and immunities. Second, sovereigns and other actors face two distinct varieties of commitment problems – undercommitment and overcommitment – between which they must steer: an actor that can bind itself …


Public Relief Jan 1995

Public Relief

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.


Constitutional Design And Law: The Political Economy Of Cabinet And Congressional Government, Matthew S. R. Palmer Nov 1993

Constitutional Design And Law: The Political Economy Of Cabinet And Congressional Government, Matthew S. R. Palmer

The Hon Justice Matthew Palmer

The dissertation takes a political economy approach to constitutional design and legislation in the Westminster (Cabinet) and US (Congressional) models of government. Part I develops the economics of comparative political organization by constructing a theoretical framework for analyzing constitutional design. Part II applies the framework to distinguish the essences of the Cabinet and Congressional systems of constitutional design in the contexts of US and Canadian federal government. Part III analyzes the effects of the different constitutional designs on the processes of legislating in each system and on the substantive characteristics of legislation in each system. The analysis is subjected to …