Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Law Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Articles 1 - 8 of 8

Full-Text Articles in Law

Disaggregating Corpus Christi: The Illiberal Implications Of Hobby Lobby's Right To Free Exercise, Katharine Jackson Sep 2016

Disaggregating Corpus Christi: The Illiberal Implications Of Hobby Lobby's Right To Free Exercise, Katharine Jackson

Katharine Jackson

This paper first examines and critiques the group rights to religious exercise derived from the three ontologies of the corporation suggested by different legal conceptions of corporate personhood often invoked by Courts. Finding the implicated groups rights inimical to individual religious freedom, the paper then presents an argument as to why a discourse of intra-corporate toleration and voluntariness does a better job at protecting religious liberty.


The Role Of Religiously Affiliated Law Schools In The Renewal Of American Democracy, Bruce Ledewitz Dec 2015

The Role Of Religiously Affiliated Law Schools In The Renewal Of American Democracy, Bruce Ledewitz

Bruce Ledewitz

American Democracy has broken down.  This crisis was on dramatic display in the 2016 Presidential Campaign.  Americans are resentful, distrustful and pessimistic.  We find it easy to blame “the other side” for the deadlock, mendacity and irresponsibility in American public life.  By virtue of their public role, American law schools have an obligation to address the breakdown in order to understand and try to ameliorate it.  That task is currently unfulfilled by law schools individually and collectively, which are distracted by marketing and pedagogy.  Religious law schools, which retain the traits of normative discourse, mission, Truth and tragic limit to …


Religions As Sovereigns: Why Religion Is "Special", Elizabeth A. Clark Feb 2013

Religions As Sovereigns: Why Religion Is "Special", Elizabeth A. Clark

Elizabeth A. Clark

Commentators increasingly challenge religion’s privileged legal status, arguing that it is not “special” or distinct from other associations or philosophical or conscientious claims. I propose that religion is “special” because it functions metaphorically as a legal sovereign, asserting supreme authority over a realm of human life. Under a religion-as-sovereign theory, religious freedom can be understood as at least partial deference to a religious sovereign in a system of shared or overlapping sovereignty. This Article suggests that federalism, which also involves shared sovereignty, can provide a useful heuristic device for examining religious freedom. Specifically, the Article examines a range of federalism …


The Ministerial Exception And The Limits Of Religious Sovereignty, Ian C. Bartrum Jul 2012

The Ministerial Exception And The Limits Of Religious Sovereignty, Ian C. Bartrum

Ian C Bartrum

This paper explores the scope of independent religious sovereignty in the context of the ministerial exception.


Justice Douglas, Justice O'Connor, And George Orwell: Does The Constitution Compel Us To Disown Our Past, Steven D. Smith Dec 2011

Justice Douglas, Justice O'Connor, And George Orwell: Does The Constitution Compel Us To Disown Our Past, Steven D. Smith

Steven D. Smith

Justice William O. Douglas's majority opinion in Zorach v. Clauson famously asserted that "[w]e are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." What did Douglas mean, and was he right? More recently, in cases involving the Ten Commandments, the Pledge of Allegiance and other public expressions and symbols, the Supreme Court has said that the Constitution prohibits government from endorsing religion. Can Douglas's "Supreme Being" assertion be reconciled with the "no endorsement" prohibition? And does the more modern doctrine demand that we forget, falsify, or forswear our pervasively religious political heritage? This essay, presented as the William O. …


R (On The Application Of E) (Respondent) V Governing Body Of Jfs And The Admissions Appeal Panel Of Jfs (Appellants) And Others (Case Note) [2009] Uksc 15, Reuven (Ruvi) Ziegler Jan 2010

R (On The Application Of E) (Respondent) V Governing Body Of Jfs And The Admissions Appeal Panel Of Jfs (Appellants) And Others (Case Note) [2009] Uksc 15, Reuven (Ruvi) Ziegler

Dr. Reuven (Ruvi) Ziegler

This case-note offers comparative perspectives on the UK Supreme Court’s judgment in the JFS case (alleged racially discriminatory school admissions policy) and the Israeli Supreme Court’s judgment in the Emanuel Haredi school case (alleged Ashkenazi/Sephardi segregation arrangements).


The Constitutional Canon As Argumentative Metonymy, Ian C. Bartrum Jan 2010

The Constitutional Canon As Argumentative Metonymy, Ian C. Bartrum

Ian C Bartrum

This article builds on Philip Bobbitt's Wittgensteinian insights into constitutional argument and law. I examine the way that we interact with canonical texts as we construct arguments in the forms that Bobbitt has described. I contend that these texts serve as metonyms for larger sets of associated principles and values, and that their invocation usually is not meant to point to the literal meaning of the text itself. This conception helps explain how a canonical text's meaning in constitutional argument can evolve over time, and hopefully offers the creative practitioner some insight into the kinds of arguments that might accomplish …


Exploring The Foundations Of Dworkin's Empire: The Discovery Of An Underground Positivist, Brian M. Mccall Dec 2008

Exploring The Foundations Of Dworkin's Empire: The Discovery Of An Underground Positivist, Brian M. Mccall

Brian M McCall

This review essay examines the jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin as presented in the anthology: Exploring Law's Empire: The Jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin, edited by Scott Hershovitz. Notwithstanding the influence Dworkin's jurisprudence has had on the reconsideration of moral reasoning within legal reasoning, the essay concludes that at its foundation Dworkin's jurisprudence is based upon Legal Positivist principles. The essay first summarizes the jurisprudence of Dworkin and then contrasts his jurisprudence with traditional Natural Law Legal Theory and finally exposes the Positivist foundations of Dworkin's Legal Empire.