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Thoughts, Crimes, And Thought Crimes, Gabriel S. Mendlow
Thoughts, Crimes, And Thought Crimes, Gabriel S. Mendlow
Michigan Law Review
Thought crimes are the stuff of dystopian fiction, not contemporary law. Or so we’re told. Yet our criminal legal system may in a sense punish thought regularly, even as our existing criminal theory lacks the resources to recognize this state of affairs for what it is—or to explain what might be wrong with it. The beginning of wisdom lies in the seeming rhetorical excesses of those who complain that certain terrorism and hate crime laws punish offenders for their malevolent intentions while purporting to punish them for their conduct. Behind this too-easily-written-off complaint is a half-buried precept of criminal jurisprudence, …
A Third Theory Of Paternalism, Nicolas Cornell
A Third Theory Of Paternalism, Nicolas Cornell
Michigan Law Review
This Article examines the normative significance of paternalism. That an action, a law, or a policy is paternalistic generally counts against it. This Article considers three reasons why this might be so—that is, three theories about what gives paternalism its normative character. This Article’s claim is that the two most common explanations for paternalism’s negative character are mistaken. The first view, which underlies the recent work by Professors Thaler and Sunstein, maintains that paternalism is negatively charged because it involves coercive interference with people’s choices. This approach proves inadequate, however, because more coercive actions can be a less objectionable form …
On Strict Liability Crimes: Preserving A Moral Framework For Criminal Intent In An Intent-Free Moral World, W. Robert Thomas
On Strict Liability Crimes: Preserving A Moral Framework For Criminal Intent In An Intent-Free Moral World, W. Robert Thomas
Michigan Law Review
The law has long recognized a presumption against criminal strict liability. This Note situates that presumption in terms of moral intuitions about the role of intention and the unique nature of criminal punishment. Two sources-recent laws from state legislatures and recent advances in moral philosophy-pose distinct challenges to the presumption against strict liability crimes. This Note offers a solution to the philosophical problem that informs how courts could address the legislative problem. First, it argues that the purported problem from philosophy stems from a mistaken relationship drawn between criminal law and morality. Second, it outlines a slightly more nuanced moral …