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Full-Text Articles in Law

Ai In Adjudication And Administration, Cary Coglianese, Lavi M. Ben Dor Jan 2021

Ai In Adjudication And Administration, Cary Coglianese, Lavi M. Ben Dor

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The use of artificial intelligence has expanded rapidly in recent years across many aspects of the economy. For federal, state, and local governments in the United States, interest in artificial intelligence has manifested in the use of a series of digital tools, including the occasional deployment of machine learning, to aid in the performance of a variety of governmental functions. In this paper, we canvas the current uses of such digital tools and machine-learning technologies by the judiciary and administrative agencies in the United States. Although we have yet to see fully automated decision-making find its way into either adjudication …


Reconsidering Judicial Independence: Forty-Five Years In The Trenches And In The Tower, Stephen B. Burbank Jan 2019

Reconsidering Judicial Independence: Forty-Five Years In The Trenches And In The Tower, Stephen B. Burbank

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Trusting in the integrity of our institutions when they are not under stress, we focus attention on them both when they are under stress or when we need them to protect us against other institutions. In the case of the federal judiciary, the two conditions often coincide. In this essay, I use personal experience to provide practical context for some of the important lessons about judicial independence to be learned from the periods of stress for the federal judiciary I have observed as a lawyer and concerned citizen, and to provide theoretical context for lessons I have deemed significant as …


Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, Stephen B. Burbank, Sean Farhang Aug 2016

Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, Stephen B. Burbank, Sean Farhang

Sean Farhang

The program of regulation through private litigation that Democratic Congresses purposefully created starting in the late 1960s soon met opposition emanating primarily from the Republican party. In the long campaign for retrenchment that began in the Reagan administration, consequential reform proved difficult and ultimately failed in Congress. Litigation reformers turned to the courts and, in marked contrast to their legislative failure, were well-rewarded, achieving growing rates of voting support from an increasingly conservative Supreme Court on issues curtailing private enforcement under individual statutes. We also demonstrate that the judiciary’s control of procedure has been central to the campaign to retrench …


Administrative Law: The U.S. And Beyond, Cary Coglianese Jul 2016

Administrative Law: The U.S. And Beyond, Cary Coglianese

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Administrative law constrains and directs the behavior of officials in the many governmental bodies responsible for implementing legislation and handling governance responsibilities on a daily basis. This field of law consists of procedures for decision making by these administrative bodies, including rules about transparency and public participation. It also encompasses oversight practices provided by legislatures, courts, and elected executives. The way that administrative law affects the behavior of government officials holds important implications for the fulfillment of democratic principles as well as effective governance in society. This paper highlights salient political theory and legal issues fundamental to the U.S. administrative …


Federal Court Rulemaking And Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, Stephen B. Burbank, Sean Farhang Jan 2015

Federal Court Rulemaking And Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, Stephen B. Burbank, Sean Farhang

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The purpose of this article is to advance understanding of the role that federal court rulemaking has played in litigation reform. For that purpose, we created original data sets that include (1) information about every member of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules who served from 1960 to 2013, and (2) every proposal for amending the Federal Rules that the Advisory Committee approved for consideration by the Standing Committee during the same period and that had implications for private enforcement. We show that, beginning in 1971, when a succession of Chief Justices appointed by Republican Presidents have chosen committee members, …


Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, Stephen B. Burbank, Sean Farhang Jan 2014

Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, Stephen B. Burbank, Sean Farhang

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The program of regulation through private litigation that Democratic Congresses purposefully created starting in the late 1960s soon met opposition emanating primarily from the Republican party. In the long campaign for retrenchment that began in the Reagan administration, consequential reform proved difficult and ultimately failed in Congress. Litigation reformers turned to the courts and, in marked contrast to their legislative failure, were well-rewarded, achieving growing rates of voting support from an increasingly conservative Supreme Court on issues curtailing private enforcement under individual statutes. We also demonstrate that the judiciary’s control of procedure has been central to the campaign to retrench …


Seeing The Forest Through The Trees: Thinking Critically About Mental Health Courts, John A. Bozza Apr 2011

Seeing The Forest Through The Trees: Thinking Critically About Mental Health Courts, John A. Bozza

John A Bozza

The almost universal acceptance of the problem-solving court concept by both the courts and the academic community provides a good example of the hazards of the bandwagon effect on the de-velopment of public policy. The proponents of therapeutic juris-prudence have successfully promoted the adoption of these pro-grams by repeating and then having others repeat a mantra of success that grossly belies reality and ignores the compelling is-sues they raise. Not surprisingly, this has led to the develop-ment of an extensive bureaucracy fueled almost entirely by fed-eral money and encouraged by cheerleaders entrenched in the self-serving subculture of therapeutic jurisprudence. Unfortunately, …


Allocating Power Within Agencies, Elizabeth Magill, Adrian Vermeule Jan 2011

Allocating Power Within Agencies, Elizabeth Magill, Adrian Vermeule

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Standard questions in the theory of administrative law involve the allocation of power among legislatures, courts, the President, and various types of agencies. These questions are often heavily informed by normative commitments to particular allocations of governmental authority among the three branches of the national government. These discussions, however, are incomplete because agencies are typically treated as unitary entities. In this essay, we examine a different question: How does administrative law allocate power within agencies? Although scholars have sometimes cracked open the black box of agencies to peer inside, their insights are localized and confined to particular contexts. We will …


On The Study Of Judicial Behaviors: Of Law, Politics, Science And Humility, Stephen B. Burbank Jan 2011

On The Study Of Judicial Behaviors: Of Law, Politics, Science And Humility, Stephen B. Burbank

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In this paper, which was prepared to help set the stage at an interdisciplinary conference held at the University of Indiana (Bloomington) in March, I first briefly review what I take to be the key events and developments in the history of the study of judicial behavior in legal scholarship, with attention to corresponding developments in political science. I identify obstacles to cooperation in the past – such as indifference, professional self-interest and methodological imperialism -- as well as precedents for cross-fertilization in the future. Second, drawing on extensive reading in the political science and legal literatures concerning judicial behavior, …


Agency Choice Of Policymaking Form, Elizabeth Magill Jan 2004

Agency Choice Of Policymaking Form, Elizabeth Magill

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An administrative agency delegated some task--protect the environment, assure the integrity of the securities markets, improve auto safety--might carry out that obligation by adopting a rule, bringing or deciding a case, or announcing its interpretation of the statute. Although agencies are unique institutions in this respect, this state of affairs generates little comment. This Article aims to rectify that by identifying, evaluating, and coming to terms with the phenomenon of agency choice of policymaking form. That phenomenon can be simply stated: The typical administrative agency is authorized to use a range of distinct policymaking forms to effectuate its statutory mandate …