Law Commons^™

Martin V. United States, Mitch L. Werbell V

Public Land & Resources Law Review

In Martin v. United States, the Federal Circuit Court dismissed a Fifth Amendment regulatory takings and exaction claim for want of ripeness when the claimant failed to apply for a permit, which would have allowed for an assessment of the cost of compliance with governmentally imposed requirements. By finding the claim unripe, the court stood firm on the historical view that federal courts may only adjudicate land-use regulatory takings and inverse condemnation claims on the merits after a regulating entity has made a final decision. However, jurisprudential evolution of the ripeness doctrine and judicial review of takings claims may …

Murr V. Wisconsin, Nathan A. Burke

Public Land & Resources Law Review

In Murr v. Wisconsin, the Court redefined how to determine private property for a regulatory taking under the Fifth Amendment. Previously, courts have primarily relied on state property principles to determine the relevant unit of property for a regulatory takings claim. However, in this case, the Court adopted a three-factor standard to determine the landowner’s reasonable expectations regarding the treatment of their property. By relying on these factors rather than only on state laws, the Court created a litigation-specific definition of property that could potentially differ from state property boundaries. The three-factor standard may also give the government an …

Koontz V. St. Johns River Water Management District, Ross Keogh

Public Land & Resources Law Review

Koontz extends the application of Nollan and Dolan, which require exactions of real property for land-use permits to share a “nexus” and be “roughly proportional” to the regulation to be constitutional. A divided United States Supreme Court held that “monetary exactions,” potentially including building permit fees or impact fees, must satisfy the Nollan and Dolan requirements even if the government denies the permit.[1] The Court did not reach the merits of the petitioner’s appeal.

[1](Kagan, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting).