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Full-Text Articles in Law
Partial Takings, Abraham Bell, Gideon Parchomovsky
Partial Takings, Abraham Bell, Gideon Parchomovsky
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Partial takings allow the government to expropriate the parts of an asset it needs, leaving the owner the remainder. Both vital and common, partial takings present unique challenges to the standard rules of eminent domain. Partial takings may result in the creation of suboptimal, and even unusable, parcels. Additionally, partial takings create assessment problems that do not arise when parcels are taken as a whole. Finally, partial takings engender opportunities for inefficient strategic behavior on the part of the government after the partial taking has been carried out. Current jurisprudence fails to resolve these problems and can even exacerbate them. …
Is The Government Fiscally Blind? An Empirical Examination Of The Effect Of The Compensation Requirement On Eminent-Domain Exercises, Ronit Levine-Schnur, Gideon Parchomovsky
Is The Government Fiscally Blind? An Empirical Examination Of The Effect Of The Compensation Requirement On Eminent-Domain Exercises, Ronit Levine-Schnur, Gideon Parchomovsky
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We empirically test the fiscal-illusion hypothesis in the takings context in Israel. Israeli law allows local governments to expropriate up to 40 percent of any parcel without compensation. In 2001, the Israeli Supreme Court created a carve out for takings of 100 percent, requiring full compensation in such cases. We analyze data for 3,140 takings cases in Tel Aviv between 1990 and 2014. There was no disproportionate share of takings of just under 40 percent. Nor was there a long-term drop in the share of 100 percent takings after 2001. Although a short-term drop in the share of 100 percent …