Law Commons^™

A Positive Theory Of Eminent Domain, Eric Kades

Eric A. Kades

The Policy Power And "Pubic Use": Balancing The Public Interest Against Private Rights Through Principled Constitutional Distinctions, Christopher Supino

West Virginia Law Review

No abstract provided.

"No Taking Without A Touching?" Questions From An Armchair Originalist, Nicole Stelle Garnett

Journal Articles

This paper is an invited contribution to the Bernard Siegan Memorial Conference on Economic Liberties, Property Rights, and the Original Meaning of the Constitution at the University of San Diego School of Law. The paper poses three questions about the historical evidence used to support the dominant academic view that the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause, as originally understood, extended only to physical appropriations or invasions of private property. First, the paper questions the relevance of state and local regulatory practices to the pre-incorporation understanding of the Takings Clause. Second, the paper expresses concern about the use of state-court cases decided …

Constitutional Limitations On The Ability Of States To Rehabilitate Their Failed Electric Utility Restructuring Plans, James M. Van Nostrand

Seattle University Law Review

This Article will review the constitutional limitations that come into play when a state seeks to rehabilitate its failed electric utility restructuring plan. Under the Constitution, utilities are entitled to earn a reasonable return on the assets devoted to public service. A situation in which retail rates are frozen may result in denial of a compensatory return if the electric utility is incurring higher costs to generate or procure its power supply. This is the traditional "takings" argument based on the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, as applied to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment. Apart from this commonly asserted …

Bargaining With The State, Robert D. Cooter

Robert Cooter

According to the economic theory of bargaining, each party to a voluntary agreement must receive at least the amount that he can get on his own (“threat value”), plus a share of the surplus from the bargain. Courts frequently monitor bargains between citizens and the state. To protect citizens, the courts should focus on the fairness and efficiency of the threat points of the citizens. Unfortunately, courts often focus on the terms of the agreement, not the threat points. The wrong focus leads courts to impose rules that block bargains that would benefit both parties. I analyze an example where …