Law Commons^™

The Trump Clemencies: Celebrities, Chaos, And Lost Opportunity, Mark Osler

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

The presidency of Donald Trump may have produced the most chaotic use of the constitutional pardon power in American history. Trump granted clemency to war criminals, to close friends, to celebrities, and to the friends of celebrities, with much of it coming in a mad rush at the end of his single term. Buried beneath this rolling disaster was a brief moment of hope and a lost opportunity: the chance for a restructure of the clemency process in the fall of 2018, enabled by a rare alignment of factors, including Trump’s alienation from the Department of Justice. This Article will …

The President And Individual Rights, Mark Tushnet

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

No abstract provided.

The Emerging Lessons Of Trump V. Hawaii, Shalini Bhargava Ray

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

In the years since the Supreme Court decided Trump v. Hawaii, federal district courts have adjudicated dozens of rights-based challenges to executive action in immigration law. Plaintiffs, including U.S. citizens, civil rights organizations, and immigrants themselves, have alleged violations of the First Amendment and the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause with some regularity based on President Trump’s animus toward immigrants. This Article assesses Hawaii’s impact on these challenges to immigration policy, and it offers two observations. First, Hawaii has amplified federal courts’ practice of privileging administrative law claims over constitutional ones. For example, courts considering …

Executive Unilateralism And Individual Rights In A Federalist System, Meredith Mclain, Sharece Thrower

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

Presidents have a wide array of tools at their disposal to unilaterally influence public policy, without the direct approval of Congress or the courts. These unilateral actions have the potential to affect a variety of individual rights, either profitably or adversely. Governors too can employ unilateral directives for similar purposes, often impacting an even wider range of rights. In this Article, we collect all executive orders and memoranda related to individual rights issued between 1981 and 2018 at the federal level, and across the U.S. states, to analyze their use over time. We find that chief executives of all kinds …

The Original Meaning Of The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause, The Right Of Natural Liberty, And Executive Discretion, John Harrison

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause of Article I, Section 9, is primarily a limit on Congress’s authority to authorize detention by the executive. It is not mainly concerned with the remedial writ of habeas corpus, but rather with the primary right of natural liberty. Suspensions of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus are statutes that vest very broad discretion in the executive to decide which individuals to hold in custody. Detention of combatants under the law of war need not rest on a valid suspension, whether the combatant is an alien or a citizen of the United States. …

Who Constrains Presidential Exercise Of Delegated Powers?, Rebecca L. Brown

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

Building on the work of administrative law scholars who have identified and illuminated the several components of the problem over the years, this Article will seek to show what has happened when a cluster of separate circumstances have come together to create a new and serious threat to individual liberty when the President exercises expansive delegated authority. Several doctrinal components lead to this confluence: First, the moribund “intelligible principle” test has evolved to provide little or no constraint on this or any other delegation. Second, a delegation to the President, specifically, is not subject to the procedural requirements of the …

Deconstructing Invisible Walls: Sotomayor's Dissents In An Era Of Immigration Exceptionalism, Karla Mckanders

William & Mary Journal of Race, Gender, and Social Justice

No abstract provided.

A Separation Of Powers Analysis Of Forum Non Conveniens’ Adequate Available Forum, Jason S. Palmer

St. John's Law Review

(Excerpt)

“Boehner snubs [White House], invites Netanyahu to address Congress.” These words, or words remarkably similar, headlined newspapers all around the United States on January 21, 2015. Without consulting President Obama, House Speaker John Boehner invited Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu to address a joint session of Congress in opposition to the White House’s overtures to Iran with respect to its nuclear program. Speaker Boehner extended the invitation in apparent response to President Obama’s State of the Union Address, in which he informed Congress that any further economic sanctions bill against Iran at that time would be detrimental to ongoing …

The Supreme Court Rules That Trump’S Daca Rescission Doesn’T Pass Muster, Peter Margulies

Law Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

President Trump Bars Uninsured Immigrants From The U.S., Peter Margulies

Law Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Unitariness And Independence: Solicitor General Control Over Independent Agency Litigation, Neal Devins

Neal E. Devins

With a few exceptions, the Solicitor General controls all aspects of independent agency litigation before the Supreme Court. Solicitor General control of Supreme Court litigation creates a tension between independent agency freedom and the Solicitor General's authority. On the one hand, Solicitor General control provides the United States with a unitary voice before the Supreme Court, and provides the Court with a trustworthy litigator to explicate the government's position. On the other hand, such control may undermine the autonomy of independent agency decision making. In this Article, the author argues for a hybrid model of independent agency litigation in the …

The Line Item Veto: Hearing Before The Subcommittee On The Constitution Of The Committee On The Judiciary, United States Senate, One Hundred First Congress, First Session, Paul Simon, Arnold Cantor, Neal Devins, Louis Fisher

Neal E. Devins

No abstract provided.

The Indefensible Duty To Defend, Neal Devins, Saikrishna B. Prakash

Neal E. Devins

Modern Justice Department opinions insist that the executive branch must enforce and defend laws. In the first article to systematically examine Department of Justice refusals to defend, we make four points. First, the duties to enforce and defend lack any sound basis in the Constitution. Hence, while President Obama is right to refuse to defend the Defense of Marriage Act, he is wrong to continue to enforce a law he believes is unconstitutional. Second, rather than being grounded in the Constitution, the duties are better explained by the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) desire to enhance its independence and status. By …

Signing Statements And Divided Government, Neal Devins

Neal E. Devins

No abstract provided.

Not-So-Independent Agencies: Party Polarization And The Limits Of Institutional Design, Neal Devins, David E. Lewis

Neal E. Devins

No abstract provided.

How Successfully Can The States' Item Veto Be Transferred To The President?, Louis Fisher, Neal Devins

Neal E. Devins

No abstract provided.

The Article Ii Safeguards Of Federal Jurisdiction, Tara Leigh Grove

Tara L. Grove

Jurisdiction stripping has long been treated as a battle between Congress and the federal judiciary. Scholars have thus overlooked the important (and surprising) role that the executive branch has played in these jurisdictional struggles. This Article seeks to fill that void. Drawing on two strands of social science research, the Article argues that the executive branch has a strong incentive to use its constitutional authority over the enactment and enforcement of federal law to oppose jurisdiction-stripping measures. Notably, this structural argument has considerable historical support. The executive branch has repeatedly opposed jurisdiction-stripping proposals in Congress. That has been true even …

Congress's (Limited) Power To Represent Itself In Court, Tara Leigh Grove, Neal Devins

Tara L. Grove

Scholars and jurists have long assumed that, when the executive branch declines to defend a federal statute, Congress may intervene in federal court to defend the law. When invalidating the Defense of Marriage Act, for example, no Supreme Court Justice challenged the authority of the House of Representatives to defend federal laws in at least some circumstances. At the same time, in recent litigation over the Fast and Furious gun-running case, the Department of Justice asserted that the House could not go to court to enforce a subpoena against the executive. In this Article, we seek to challenge both claims. …

The Erosion Of Congressional Checks On Presidential Power, Neal Devins

Neal E. Devins

No abstract provided.

Congress's (Limited) Power To Represent Itself In Court, Tara Leigh Grove, Neal Devins

Neal E. Devins

Scholars and jurists have long assumed that, when the executive branch declines to defend a federal statute, Congress may intervene in federal court to defend the law. When invalidating the Defense of Marriage Act, for example, no Supreme Court Justice challenged the authority of the House of Representatives to defend federal laws in at least some circumstances. At the same time, in recent litigation over the Fast and Furious gun-running case, the Department of Justice asserted that the House could not go to court to enforce a subpoena against the executive. In this Article, we seek to challenge both claims. …

Congress, Civil Liberties, And The War On Terrorism, Neal Devins

Neal E. Devins

In exercising his war-making powers, the President has historically pursued war-related initiatives that implicate civil liberties. Meanwhile, the Congress, with little incentive to resist these initiatives, has played a steadily declining role in warmaking. In this Essay, Professor Devins examines this dynamic, and argues that with Congress largely standing on the sidelines as the President leads the nation in war, it is the American public that has become the principal check on the powers of the President in wartime.

Averting Government By Consent Decree: Constitutional Limits On The Enforcement Of Settlements With The Federal Government, Jeremy A. Rabkin, Neal Devins

Neal E. Devins

No abstract provided.

The "Ongoing Criminal Investigation" Constraint: Getting Away With Silence, Luke M. Milligan

Luke Milligan

No abstract provided.

Trump’S Travel Ban At The Supreme Court: Deference Joined By Nudges Toward Civility, Peter Margulies

Law Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

How To Think Constitutionally About Prerogative: A Study Of Early American Usage, Matthew J. Steilen

Journal Articles

This Article challenges the view of “prerogative” as a discretionary authority to act outside the law. For seventy years, political scientists, lawyers and judges have drawn on John Locke’s account of prerogative in the Second Treatise, using it to read foundational texts in American constitutional law. American writings on prerogative produced between 1760 and 1788 are rarely discussed (excepting The Federalist), though these materials exist in abundance. Based on a study of over 700 of these texts, including pamphlets, broadsides, letters, essays, newspaper items, state papers, and legislative debates, this Article argues that early Americans almost never used “prerogative” as …

Can The President Control The Department Of Justice?, Bruce Green, Rebecca Roiphe

Articles & Chapters

As the investigation into President Trump's campaign ties to Russia grows increasingly intense, it is critical to understand how much control the President has over the Attorney General and the Department of Justice. Some critics claim that the President has absolute power to direct federal prosecutors and control their decisions. The President and his lawyers, joined by several scholars, take this claim one step further by arguing that the chief executive could not be guilty of obstruction of justice because his control over all prosecutorial decisions is absolute. This issue last arose during the Nixon Administration. The Department of Justice …

The Fragility Of The Free American Press, Ronnell Andersen Jones, Sonja R. West

Northwestern University Law Review

President Donald Trump has faced criticism for attacking the press and for abandoning longstanding traditions of accommodating and respecting it. This Essay argues that the national discussion spurred by Trump’s treatment of the press has fallen short of capturing the true seriousness of the situation. Trump’s assault on the custom of press accommodation follows a generation-long collapse of other major press protections. In order to fully understand the critical juncture at which American press freedom now stands, we must expand the discussion beyond talk of a rogue president’s aberrant attacks on the press and consider the increasingly fragile edifice on …

Globalization And The Growth Of Executive Power: An Old Story, Alasdair Roberts

Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies

Americans have always worried about an undue concentration of power in the executive branch. Recently, people have worried that globalization might be making the problem even worse. But the concern is overstated, or at least misstated. Globalization is not a new phenomenon, and most of its effect on executive power was realized decades ago. And globalization might undermine executive power, rather than bolster it, either because globalization undermines the authority of the nation-state or shifts authority to technocrats. If there is a general tendency toward increased executive power in the twenty-first century, this is might attributable more directly to other …

Representative/Senator Trump?, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

The American presidency is a much more powerful office in 2017 than was contemplated by the Constitution of 1788. In large measure, that is because Congress has unconstitutionally subdelegated many of its legislative powers to the President. The President thus effectively functions as the Congress to a significant degree, which not only perverts the constitutional structure but also significantly raises the stakes of presidential elections. There is no good reason to expect Congress or the courts to stem the tide of subdelegation. Presidents, however, have a number of tools available to resist, and even reverse, that tide. While there is …

The Ninth Circuit’S Refugee Eo Decision: Methodically Misreading The Immigration Statute, Peter Margulies

Law Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.