Law Commons^™

Obama's Conversion On Same-Sex Marriage: The Social Foundations Of Individual Rights, Robert L. Tsai

Faculty Scholarship

This essay explores how presidents who wish to seize a leadership role over the development of rights must tend to the social foundations of those rights. Broad cultural changes alone do not guarantee success, nor do they dictate the substance of constitutional ideas. Rather, presidential aides must actively re-characterize the social conditions in which rights are made, disseminated, and enforced. An administration must articulate a strategically plausible theory of a particular right, ensure there is cultural and institutional support for that right, and work to minimize blowback. Executive branch officials must seek to transform and popularize legal concepts while working …

Newsroom: Is Wall Between Church And State Crumbling? 10-10-2017, Diana Hassel

Life of the Law School (1993- )

No abstract provided.

Rwu First Amendment Blog: Diana Hassel's Blog: Is The Wall Between Church And State Crumbling? 10-07-2017, Diana Hassel

Law School Blogs

No abstract provided.

Open Source: The Enewsletter Of Rwu Law 09-22-2017, Roger Williams University School Of Law

Life of the Law School (1993- )

No abstract provided.

Newsroom: Donald Trump Vs. Roger Williams 05-09-2017, David Logan

Life of the Law School (1993- )

No abstract provided.

Newsroom: Slate: Goldstein On Travel Ban 02-17-2017, Jared A. Goldstein

Life of the Law School (1993- )

No abstract provided.

Rwu First Amendment Blog: Jared A. Goldstein's Blog: Trump's Order Violates Bedrock Principles Of Roger Williams And Ri 01-30-2017, Jared A. Goldstein

Law School Blogs

No abstract provided.

Stochastic Constraint, Neal K. Katyal

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This essay reviews Power and Constraint: The Accountable Presidency After 9/11 by Jack Goldsmith (2012).

With The Terror Presidency, Professor Jack Goldsmith wrote, hands down, the very best analysis of the national security issues surrounding President George W. Bush's tenure. In Power and Constraint: The Accountable Presidency After 9/11, Goldsmith returns to the same set of problems, but adopts a different tack. He argues that the modern wartime Executive is constrained in new ways beyond the traditional system of checks and balances, and that these new constraints combine to create an effective system that checks executive power. Though …

Presidential Power And Constitutional Responsibility, Thomas P. Crocker

Faculty Publications

Some constitutional theorists defend unbounded executive power to respond to emergencies or expansive discretionary powers to complete statutory directives. Against these anti-Madisonian approaches, this Article examines how the textual assignment of republican virtues helps to constitute and constrain the president's power. The Madisonian solution for constitutional constraint both creates institutions for unenlightened statesmen and relies on virtue to make governing possible. Constitutional responsibility is a consistent textual theme found in the command to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," the responsibility to remain faithful to the office of president, and the obligation to preserve the Constitution itself. Although …

The Political Branches And The Law Of Nations, Bradford R. Clark, Anthony J. Bellia

Journal Articles

In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the U.S. Supreme Court went out of its way to follow background rules of the law of nations, particularly the law of state-state relations. As we have recently argued, the Court followed the law of nations because adherence to such law preserved the constitutional prerogatives of the political branches to conduct foreign relations and decide momentous questions of war and peace. Although we focused primarily on the extent to which the Constitution obligated courts to follow the law of nations in the early republic, the explanation we offered rested on an important, …

State Secrets & Executive Accountability, Christina E. Wells

Faculty Publications

This essay, part of a symposium on executive power, examines use of the state secrets privilege in the Obama administration. Specifically, it views the Obama administration’s approach to the state secrets privilege through the lens of “explanatory accountability” – i.e., the notion that executive officials must explain and justify their decisions or face negative consequences.Although President Obama entered office criticizing the Bush administration’s overly broad assertions of the state secrets privilege, Obama officials nevertheless continued the Bush administration’s actions in various lawsuits. In response to sharp criticism, however, the Obama administration eventually revealed a new policy promising greater accountability and …

Designing Transparency: The 9/11 Commission And Institutional Form, Mark Fenster

UF Law Faculty Publications

Surpassing the low expectations established by previous investigatory commissions and overcoming the political and legal obstacles created by the Bush administration's opposition to its creation, the 9/11 Commission accomplished what appeared to be the impossible: an authoritative investigation, a widely-read final report, and direct influence on significant legislation. This Article argues that the 9/11 Commission represents an important institutional model for encouraging or forcing the Executive Branch to disclose information about an especially significant and controversial past event or future decision. It suggests that Congress or the President consider establishing such commissions when information held by the Executive Branch can …

Slides: Meaningful Engagement: The Public's Role In Resource Decisions, Mark Squillace

The Future of Natural Resources Law and Policy (Summer Conference, June 6-8)

Presenter: Mark Squillace, Director, Natural Resources Law Center, University of Colorado Law School

22 slides

The Unitary Executive In The Modern Era, 1945-2004, Anthony J. Colangelo, Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi

Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

Since the impeachment of President Clinton, there has been renewed debate over whether Congress can create institutions such as special counsels and independent agencies that restrict the president's control over the administration of the law. Initially, debate centered on whether the Constitution rejected the executive by committee used by the Articles of Confederation in favor of a unitary executive, in which all administrative authority is centralized in the president. More recently, the debate has focused on historical practices. Some scholars suggest that independent agencies and special counsels are such established features of the constitutional landscape that any argument in favor …

Foreword - Interdisciplinary Perspectives On Fear And Risk Perception In Times Of Democratic Crisis (Symposium), Christina E. Wells, Jennifer K. Robbennolt

Faculty Publications

The articles and essays included or referenced in this volume discuss both the factors that affect decision making in times of crisis and their implications for law and democratic theory. Professor Cass Sunstein's keynote address, Fear and Liberty, noted that psychological biases such as the availability heuristic and probability neglect can skew risk perception, leading to excessive public fear of national security risks and unreasonable curtailment of civil liberties. According to Sunstein, courts, which are typically responsible for protecting civil liberties, often lack sufficient information to assess whether national security concerns justify incursions on civil liberties. Nevertheless, he concluded that …

Avoiding Constitutional Questions As A Three-Branch Problem, William K. Kelley

Journal Articles

This article criticizes the cardinal rule of statutory construction known as the avoidance canon - that statutes must be interpreted to avoid raising serious constitutional questions - as failing to respect the proper constitutional roles of both Congress and the Executive. It argues that the avoidance canon in practice cannot be grounded in legislative supremacy, which is the common justification for it offered by the Supreme Court, because it assumes without foundation that Congress would always prefer not to come close to the constitutional line in enacting statutes. Instead, the avoidance canon creates pressure for courts to adopt statutory meanings …