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Full-Text Articles in Law
Presidential Inaction And The Separation Of Powers, Jeffrey A. Love, Arpit K. Garg
Presidential Inaction And The Separation Of Powers, Jeffrey A. Love, Arpit K. Garg
Michigan Law Review
Imagine two presidents. The first campaigned on an issue that requires him to expand the role of the federal government-—maybe it was civil rights legislation or stricter sentencing for federal criminals. In contrast, the second president pushes policies—-financial deregulation, perhaps, or drug decriminalization—-that mean less government involvement. Each is elected in a decisive fashion, and each claims a mandate to advance his agenda. The remaining question is what steps each must take to achieve his goals. The answer is clear, and it is surprising. To implement his preferred policies, the first president faces the full gauntlet of checks and balances-—from …
The Institutions Of Antitrust Law: How Structure Shapes Substance, William E. Kovacic
The Institutions Of Antitrust Law: How Structure Shapes Substance, William E. Kovacic
Michigan Law Review
Daniel Crane's The Institutional Structure of Antitrust Enforcement ("Institutional Structure") may do for antitrust law what Essence of Decision did for public administration. Unlike most literature on antitrust law, this superb volume does not address pressing issues of substantive analysis (e.g., when can dominant firms offer loyalty discounts?). Instead, Institutional Structure studies the design and operation of the institutions of U.S. antitrust enforcement. Professor Crane skillfully advances a basic and powerful proposition: to master analytical principles without deep knowledge of the policy implementation mechanism is dangerously incomplete preparation for understanding the U.S. antitrust system, or any body of competition law. …
Inside Agency Preemption, Catherine M. Sharkey
Inside Agency Preemption, Catherine M. Sharkey
Michigan Law Review
A subtle shift has taken place in the mechanics of preemption, the doctrine that determines when federal law displaces state law. In the past, Congress was the leading actor, and courts and commentators focused almost exclusively on the precise wording of its statutory directives as a clue to its intent to displace state law. Federal agencies were, if not ignored, certainly no more than supporting players. But the twenty-first century has witnessed a role reversal. Federal agencies now play the dominant role in statutory interpretation. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the ascendancy of federal agencies in preemption disputes-an ascendancy …
Optimal Political Control Of The Bureaucracy, Matthew C. Stephenson
Optimal Political Control Of The Bureaucracy, Matthew C. Stephenson
Michigan Law Review
It is widely believed that insulating an administrative agency from the influence of elected officials, whatever its other benefits orjustifications, reduces the agency's responsiveness to the preferences of political majorities. This Article argues, to the contrary, that a moderate degree of bureaucratic insulation from political control alleviates rather than exacerbates the countermajoritarian problems inherent in bureaucratic policymaking. An elected politician, though responsive to majoritarian preferences, will almost always deviate from the majority in one direction or the other Therefore, even if the average policy position of a given elected official tends to track the policy views of the median voter …
Beyond The Limits Of Executive Power: Presidential Control Of Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, Morton Rosenberg
Beyond The Limits Of Executive Power: Presidential Control Of Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, Morton Rosenberg
Michigan Law Review
This Article addresses the substantial legal problems posed by Executive Order 12,291. Part I argues that the Order, taken as a whole or separated into its procedural and substantive components, violates the constitutional separation of powers. Drawing on the analytic framework outlined by Justice Jackson in the Steel Seizure case, Part I maintains that courts should demand clear congressional support for the Order's requirements. The available evidence, however, conclusively demonstrates Congress's intent to deny the President formalized, substantive control over administrative policymaking. As interpreted by the Supreme Court, moreover, the informal rulemaking provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (AP A) …
The Solicitor General And Intragovernmental Conflict, Michigan Law Review
The Solicitor General And Intragovernmental Conflict, Michigan Law Review
Michigan Law Review
This Note considers the way in which the Solicitor General has resolved-and should resolve-such ambiguities in his role as advocate for the United States. First, the Note examines the accommodation of interests represented by the Solicitor General's responses to discordant obligations. Second, it analyzes the common law and statutory sources of the Solicitor General's responsibilities. Finally, the proper role of the Solicitor General is assessed, giving due consideration to his position .as mediator among interest groups within the government and to the institutional constraints to which he is subject.