Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Law Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

President/Executive Department

University of Michigan Law School

Michigan Law Review

Executive power

Articles 1 - 12 of 12

Full-Text Articles in Law

Article Ii And Antidiscrimination Norms, Aziz Z. Huq Jan 2019

Article Ii And Antidiscrimination Norms, Aziz Z. Huq

Michigan Law Review

The Supreme Court’s opinion in Trump v. Hawaii validated a prohibition on entry to the United States from several Muslim-majority countries and at the same time repudiated a longstanding precedent associated with the Japanese American internment of World War II. This Article closely analyzes the relationship of these twin rulings. It uses their dichotomous valences as a lens on the legal scope for discriminatory action by the federal executive. Parsing the various ways in which the internment of the 1940s and the 2017 exclusion order can be reconciled, the Article identifies a tension between the Court’s two holdings in Trump …


Law Matters, Even To The Executive, Julian Davis Mortenson Apr 2014

Law Matters, Even To The Executive, Julian Davis Mortenson

Michigan Law Review

In both constitutional and international law, many legal rules cannot be implemented without what most people would describe as the voluntary compliance of their target. Is that really “law”? Or is rule compliance in such circumstances just an expression of “interests”? Forget jurisprudence for the moment. As a practical matter, what does it mean to work as a lawyer in a field where the rules are not coercively enforced against private parties by an independent judiciary whose orders are implemented by a cooperative executive? This question has particularly high stakes for national security policy, where we find judicial deference at …


Plausible Absurdities And Practical Formalities: The Recess Appointments Clause In Theory And Practice, David Frisof Feb 2014

Plausible Absurdities And Practical Formalities: The Recess Appointments Clause In Theory And Practice, David Frisof

Michigan Law Review

The recent controversy surrounding President Obama’s recess appointments to the National Labor Relations Board and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau while the Senate was holding pro forma sessions illustrates the need to reach a new understanding of the Recess Appointments Clause of the Constitution. For the Recess Appointments Clause to be functional, it must fulfill two essential constitutional purposes: it must act as a fulcrum in the separation of powers, and it must ensure the continued exercise of the executive power. Achieving this functionality depends not only on the formal constructions of the Clause but also on the ways in …


Legislative Diplomacy, Ryan M. Scoville Dec 2013

Legislative Diplomacy, Ryan M. Scoville

Michigan Law Review

A traditional view in legal scholarship holds that the U.S. Constitution assigns the president exclusive power to carry on official diplomatic communications with foreign governments. But in fact, Congress and its members routinely engage in communications of their own. Congress, for example, receives heads of state and maintains official contacts with foreign parliaments. And individual members of the House and Senate frequently travel overseas on congressional delegations (“CODELs”) to confer with foreign leaders, investigate problems that arise, promote the interests of the United States and constituents, and even represent the president. Moreover, many of these activities have occurred ever since …


A Time For Presidential Power? War Time And The Constrained Executive, David Levine Apr 2013

A Time For Presidential Power? War Time And The Constrained Executive, David Levine

Michigan Law Review

Between 2002 and 2008 I served as an intelligence officer in the U.S. Air Force. Though I had been deployed overseas several times, my primary place of duty was in the United States. When I landed at Baghdad International Airport in June 2006, however, several things immediately changed for me as a result of military regulations. I had to carry my sidearm and dog tags at all times. I could not eat anywhere other than a U.S. military installation. I could not drink alcohol. My pay was a bit higher. Personally, I was more vigilant, more aware of my surroundings. …


Examining Presidential Power Through The Rubric Of Equity, Eric A. White Oct 2009

Examining Presidential Power Through The Rubric Of Equity, Eric A. White

Michigan Law Review

In this Note I propose a method to examine presidents' actions taken outside the normal bounds of executive power by employing the general rubric of equity, in an attempt to find when the president acts with what I term "practical legitimacy." This would be a new category for executive actions that, while perhaps arguably illegal, are so valuable that we want to treat them as legitimate exercises of executive power. To do so, I first examine the history of equity, noting the many relevant parallels to our modern conception of executive power In light of these parallels, I argue that …


International Law And Constitutional Interpretation: The Commander In Chief Clause Reconsidered, Ingrid Brunk Wuerth Oct 2007

International Law And Constitutional Interpretation: The Commander In Chief Clause Reconsidered, Ingrid Brunk Wuerth

Michigan Law Review

The Commander in Chief Clause is a difficult, underexplored area of constitutional interpretation. It is also a context in which international law is often mentioned, but not fully defended, as a possible method of interpreting the Constitution. This Article analyzes why the Commander in Chief Clause is difficult and argues that international law helps resolve some of the problems that the Clause presents. Because of weaknesses in originalist analysis, changes over time, and lack of judicial competence in military matters, the Court and commentators have relied on second-order interpretive norms like congressional authorization and executive branch practice in interpreting the …


The Unfulfilled Promise Of The Constitution In Executive Hands, Cornelia T.L. Pillard Feb 2005

The Unfulfilled Promise Of The Constitution In Executive Hands, Cornelia T.L. Pillard

Michigan Law Review

Many leading constitutional scholars now argue for greater reliance on the political branches to supplement or even supplant judicial enforcement of the Constitution. Responding to our national preoccupation with the judiciary as the mechanism of constitutional enforcement, these scholars stress that the executive and legislature, too, bear responsibility to think about the Constitution for themselves and to take steps to fulfill the Constitution's promise. Joining a debate that goes back at least as far as Marbury v. Madison, current scholars seek to reawaken the political branches to their constitutional potential, and urge the Supreme Court to leave the other …


Executive Power Essentialism And Foreign Affairs, Curtis A. Bradley, Martin S. Flaherty Feb 2004

Executive Power Essentialism And Foreign Affairs, Curtis A. Bradley, Martin S. Flaherty

Michigan Law Review

Conflict abroad almost always enhances executive power at home. This expectation has held true at least since the constitutions of antiquity. It holds no less true for modern constitutions, including the Constitution of the United States. Constitutional arguments for executive power likewise escalate with increased perceptions of foreign threat. It is therefore hardly surprising that broad assertions of presidential power have become commonplace after the events of September 11, 2001, and the ensuing war on international terrorism. One perennial weapon in the executive arsenal is the so-called "Vesting Clause" of Article II of the Constitution. This clause, which provides that …


Article Ii Revisionism, Cass R. Sunstein Oct 1993

Article Ii Revisionism, Cass R. Sunstein

Michigan Law Review

One of the most striking developments of the last decade has been the new use of Article II in public law adjudication. Article II is a prominent feature not only of cases involving the creation of federal institutions that are independent of the President, but also of new disputes involving reviewability, scope of review, and standing.

Professor Krent and Mr. Shenkman have performed a valuable service in spelling out the argument that Article II, rather than Article III, justifies constitutional limits on legislative grants of standing. Indeed, on several important matters, we are very much in agreement. In this brief …


Beyond The Limits Of Executive Power: Presidential Control Of Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, Morton Rosenberg Dec 1981

Beyond The Limits Of Executive Power: Presidential Control Of Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, Morton Rosenberg

Michigan Law Review

This Article addresses the substantial legal problems posed by Executive Order 12,291. Part I argues that the Order, taken as a whole or separated into its procedural and substantive components, violates the constitutional separation of powers. Drawing on the analytic framework outlined by Justice Jackson in the Steel Seizure case, Part I maintains that courts should demand clear congressional support for the Order's requirements. The available evidence, however, conclusively demonstrates Congress's intent to deny the President formalized, substantive control over administrative policymaking. As interpreted by the Supreme Court, moreover, the informal rulemaking provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (AP A) …


Power Of The President Over Foreign Affairs, Allen Welsh Dulles Apr 1916

Power Of The President Over Foreign Affairs, Allen Welsh Dulles

Michigan Law Review

In a recent article former Assistant Attorney General James M. Beck challenges the constitutionality of the measures which President Wilson has taken in the carrying out of the foreign affairs policy of this government. While his criticism is especially directed against the action of the President in appointing such confidential agents as John Lind and Colonel House without the consent of the Senate, he makes the sweeping assertion that the President must share the general control of foreign affairs with the Senate. Mr. Beck's position is clearly shown in the following quotations from his article: "Those provisions of the Constitution …