Law Commons^™

The Statutory Separation Of Powers, Sharon B. Jacobs

Publications

Separation of powers forms the backbone of our constitutional democracy. But it also operates as an underappreciated structural principle in subconstitutional domains. This Article argues that Congress constructs statutory schemes of separation, checks, and balances through its delegations to administrative agencies. Like its constitutional counterpart, the “statutory separation of powers” seeks to prevent the dominance of factions and ensure policy stability. But separating and balancing statutory authority is a delicate business: the optimal balance is difficult to calibrate ex ante, the balance is unstable, and there are risks that executive agencies in particular might seek expansion of their authority vis-à-vis …

The President's Faithful Execution Duty, Harold H. Bruff

Publications

No abstract provided.

How Presidents Interpret The Constitution, Harold H. Bruff

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No abstract provided.

The President And Congress: Separation Of Powers In The United States Of America, Harold H. Bruff

Publications

Although the framers of the Australian Constitution adopted many features of the United States Constitution, they rejected the separation of legislative and executive power in favour of responsible government in a parliamentary system like that of the United Kingdom. In doing so, Australians depended on existing conventions about the nature of responsible government instead of specification of its attributes in constitutional text. The United States Constitution contains detailed provisions about separation of powers, but unwritten conventions have produced some central features of American government. This article reviews conventions developed by Congress that constrain Presidents in the domestic sphere with regard …

Placing Your Faith In The Constitution, Harold H. Bruff

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No abstract provided.

The Accounting: Habeas Corpus And Enemy Combatants, Emily Calhoun

Publications

The judiciary should impose a heavy burden of justification on the executive when a habeas petitioner challenges the accuracy of facts on which an enemy combatant designation rests. A heavy burden of justification will ensure that the essential institutional purposes of the writ--and legitimate, separated-powers government--are preserved, even during times of national exigency. The institutional purposes of the writ argue for robust judicial review rather than deference to the executive. Moreover, the procedural flexibility traditionally associated with the writ gives the judiciary the tools to ensure that a heavy burden of justification can be imposed.

Law Casebook Description And Table Of Contents: Constitutional Environmental And Natural Resources Law [Outline], Jim May, Robin Craig

The Future of Natural Resources Law and Policy (Summer Conference, June 6-8)

6 pages.

"James May, Widener University School of Law" -- Agenda

The Incompatibility Principle, Harold H. Bruff

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No abstract provided.

Executive Power And The Public Lands, Harold H. Bruff

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No abstract provided.

Nineteenth-Century Orthodoxy, Richard B. Collins

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No abstract provided.

That The Laws Shall Bind Equally On All: Congressional And Executive Roles In Applying Laws To Congress, Harold H. Bruff

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No abstract provided.

The Federalist Papers: The Framers Construct An Orrery, Harold H. Bruff

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No abstract provided.

Can Buckley Clear Customs?, Harold H. Bruff

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No abstract provided.

Public Programs, Private Deciders: The Constitutionality Of Arbitration In Federal Programs, Harold H. Bruff

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No abstract provided.

A Comment On The Rule Of Law Model Of Separation Of Powers, Robert F. Nagel

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No abstract provided.

Independent Counsel And The Constitution, Harold H. Bruff

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No abstract provided.

On The Constitutional Status Of The Administrative Agencies, Harold H. Bruff

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No abstract provided.

The Legislative Veto, The Constitution, And The Courts, Robert F. Nagel

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No abstract provided.

Judicial Review And The President's Statutory Powers, Harold H. Bruff

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No abstract provided.

Separation Of Powers And The Scope Of Federal Equitable Remedies, Robert F. Nagel

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No abstract provided.

Congressional Control Of Administrative Regulation: A Study Of Legislative Vetoes, Harold H. Bruff, Ernest Gellhorn

Publications

Several administrative programs contain provisions allowing Congress to veto agency rules, and there is now a bill before Congress to extend this veto power to all agency rulemaking. In this Article, Professor Bruff and Dean Gellhorn analyze the histories of five federal programs subject to the legislative veto to determine the effect of the veto on the rulemaking process and on the relationships between the branches of government. Extrapolating from this practical experience, they suggest that a general legislative veto is unlikely to increase the overall efficiency of the administrative process, may impede the achievement of reasoned decisionmaking based on …

Presidential Exemption From Mandatory Retirement Of Members Of The Independent Regulatory Commissions, Harold H. Bruff

Publications

No abstract provided.