Law Commons^™

Disappropriation, Matthew Lawrence

Matthew B. Lawrence

Congress, The Courts, And Party Polarization: Why Congress Rarely Checks The President And Why The Courts Should Not Take Congress’S Place, Neal Devins

Neal E. Devins

No abstract provided.

Unitariness And Independence: Solicitor General Control Over Independent Agency Litigation, Neal Devins

Neal E. Devins

With a few exceptions, the Solicitor General controls all aspects of independent agency litigation before the Supreme Court. Solicitor General control of Supreme Court litigation creates a tension between independent agency freedom and the Solicitor General's authority. On the one hand, Solicitor General control provides the United States with a unitary voice before the Supreme Court, and provides the Court with a trustworthy litigator to explicate the government's position. On the other hand, such control may undermine the autonomy of independent agency decision making. In this Article, the author argues for a hybrid model of independent agency litigation in the …

The Steel Seizure Case: One Of A Kind?, Neal Devins, Louis Fisher

Neal E. Devins

No abstract provided.

The Line Item Veto: Hearing Before The Subcommittee On The Constitution Of The Committee On The Judiciary, United States Senate, One Hundred First Congress, First Session, Paul Simon, Arnold Cantor, Neal Devins, Louis Fisher

Neal E. Devins

No abstract provided.

The Indefensible Duty To Defend, Neal Devins, Saikrishna B. Prakash

Neal E. Devins

Modern Justice Department opinions insist that the executive branch must enforce and defend laws. In the first article to systematically examine Department of Justice refusals to defend, we make four points. First, the duties to enforce and defend lack any sound basis in the Constitution. Hence, while President Obama is right to refuse to defend the Defense of Marriage Act, he is wrong to continue to enforce a law he believes is unconstitutional. Second, rather than being grounded in the Constitution, the duties are better explained by the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) desire to enhance its independence and status. By …

Signing Statements And Divided Government, Neal Devins

Neal E. Devins

No abstract provided.

Not-So-Independent Agencies: Party Polarization And The Limits Of Institutional Design, Neal Devins, David E. Lewis

Neal E. Devins

No abstract provided.

How Successfully Can The States' Item Veto Be Transferred To The President?, Louis Fisher, Neal Devins

Neal E. Devins

No abstract provided.

The Article Ii Safeguards Of Federal Jurisdiction, Tara Leigh Grove

Tara L. Grove

Jurisdiction stripping has long been treated as a battle between Congress and the federal judiciary. Scholars have thus overlooked the important (and surprising) role that the executive branch has played in these jurisdictional struggles. This Article seeks to fill that void. Drawing on two strands of social science research, the Article argues that the executive branch has a strong incentive to use its constitutional authority over the enactment and enforcement of federal law to oppose jurisdiction-stripping measures. Notably, this structural argument has considerable historical support. The executive branch has repeatedly opposed jurisdiction-stripping proposals in Congress. That has been true even …

Standing Outside Article Iii, Tara Leigh Grove

Tara L. Grove

The U.S. Supreme Court has insisted that standing doctrine is a “bedrock” requirement only of Article III. Accordingly, both jurists and scholars have assumed that the standing of the executive branch and the legislature, like that of other parties, depends solely on Article III. But I argue that these commentators have overlooked a basic constitutional principle: federal institutions must have affirmative authority for their actions, including the power to bring suit or appeal in federal court. Article III defines the federal “judicial Power” and does not purport to confer any authority on the executive branch or the legislature. Executive and …

Congress's (Limited) Power To Represent Itself In Court, Tara Leigh Grove, Neal Devins

Tara L. Grove

Scholars and jurists have long assumed that, when the executive branch declines to defend a federal statute, Congress may intervene in federal court to defend the law. When invalidating the Defense of Marriage Act, for example, no Supreme Court Justice challenged the authority of the House of Representatives to defend federal laws in at least some circumstances. At the same time, in recent litigation over the Fast and Furious gun-running case, the Department of Justice asserted that the House could not go to court to enforce a subpoena against the executive. In this Article, we seek to challenge both claims. …

The Emperor’S New Clothes: The Variety Of Stakeholders In Climate Change Regulation Assuming The Mantle Of Federal And International Authority, Linda A. Malone

Linda A. Malone

In June 2017, President Donald Trump announced the United States would be withdrawing from the Paris Climate Accord. President Trump believes the United States should be more focused on its economic wellbeing than on environmental concerns. Since being elected, President Trump has, with the help of the Environmental Protection Agency, been rolling back, or attempting to roll back, major climate change regulations. However, this Article points out that due to factors such as international law, the United States Constitution, and the Administrative Procedure Act, one cannotjust simply withdraw from an international agreement, such as the Paris Accord, or take back …

The Erosion Of Congressional Checks On Presidential Power, Neal Devins

Neal E. Devins

No abstract provided.

Congressional-Executive Information Access Disputes: A Modest Proposal - Do Nothing, Neal Devins

Neal E. Devins

No abstract provided.

Congress's (Limited) Power To Represent Itself In Court, Tara Leigh Grove, Neal Devins

Neal E. Devins

Scholars and jurists have long assumed that, when the executive branch declines to defend a federal statute, Congress may intervene in federal court to defend the law. When invalidating the Defense of Marriage Act, for example, no Supreme Court Justice challenged the authority of the House of Representatives to defend federal laws in at least some circumstances. At the same time, in recent litigation over the Fast and Furious gun-running case, the Department of Justice asserted that the House could not go to court to enforce a subpoena against the executive. In this Article, we seek to challenge both claims. …

Congress, Civil Liberties, And The War On Terrorism, Neal Devins

Neal E. Devins

In exercising his war-making powers, the President has historically pursued war-related initiatives that implicate civil liberties. Meanwhile, the Congress, with little incentive to resist these initiatives, has played a steadily declining role in warmaking. In this Essay, Professor Devins examines this dynamic, and argues that with Congress largely standing on the sidelines as the President leads the nation in war, it is the American public that has become the principal check on the powers of the President in wartime.

Averting Government By Consent Decree: Constitutional Limits On The Enforcement Of Settlements With The Federal Government, Jeremy A. Rabkin, Neal Devins

Neal E. Devins

No abstract provided.

Abdication By Another Name: An Ode To Lou Fisher, Neal Devins

Neal E. Devins

No abstract provided.

Bring Back The Draft?, Neal Devins

Neal E. Devins

No abstract provided.

Regulatory Review In Anti-Regulatory Times, Daniel A. Farber

Daniel A Farber

This article investigates the role of cost-benefit analysis during an antiregulatory period. The period since 2016 has seen several new developments, including the first vigorous use by Congress of its power to overturn recently issued regulations and the creation of novel deregulatory mechanisms layered on top of cost-benefit analysis. This period also contains important examples of sharply reversed CBAs, in which regulations that were said to have large net benefits under Obama are instead said to have net costs under Trump. The Trump Administration’s regulatory review initiatives focus heavily on costs, with limited attention to benefits. Case studies of three …

Alj Support Systems: Staff Attorneys And Decision Writers, Russell L. Weaver

Russell L. Weaver

No abstract provided.

The "Ongoing Criminal Investigation" Constraint: Getting Away With Silence, Luke M. Milligan

Luke Milligan

No abstract provided.

"Enemy Of The People": Negotiating News At The White House, Carol Pauli

Carol Pauli

How can the press serve as a check on executive power when the president calls it “fake” and the White House denies facts? As journalists debate the right response, this article offers advice from the perspective of a journalist who is now in the legal academy. Drawing on legal scholarship in the field of conflict resolution — as well as literature in journalism and political science — this article analyzes the White House press briefing as a negotiation over both the content of news and the relationship of the press and president. It aims to help the press fulfill the …

Governing The Presidential Nomination Commons, Brigham Daniels

Brigham Daniels

States jockeying to hold primaries and caucuses as early as possible has become the central theme of the presidential primary system. While the trend of racing to vote is not new, it has increased alarmingly. In 2008, more than half the states held contests by the first week of February. This free-for-all hurts the democratic process by encouraging uninformed voting, emphasizing the role of money in campaigns, and pressing candidates to rely on sound-bite campaigning. Because the presidential nomination is one of the most important decisions left to voters in the United States, this problem is well-recognized. It is also …

Taking Cues From Congress: Judicial Review, Congressional Authorization, And The Expansion Of Presidential Power, David H. Moore

David H. Moore

In evaluating whether presidential acts are constitutional, the Supreme Court often takes its cues from Congress. Under the Court's two most prominent approaches for gauging presidential power-Justice Jackson's tripartite framework and the historical gloss on executive power-congressional approval of presidential conduct produces a finding of constitutionality. Yet courts and commentators have failed to recognize that congressional authorization may result from a failure of checks and balances. Congress may transfer power to the President against institutional interest for a variety of reasons. This key insight calls into question the Court's reflexive reliance on congressional authorization. Through this reliance, the Court overlooks …

Presidential Pronouncements Of Customary International Law As An Alternative To The Senate’S Advice And Consent, Eric Talbot Jensen

Eric Talbot Jensen

The Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States has thus far focused on the status of treaties in United States law, and has not specifically considered the topic of customary international law. While the American Law Institute undoubtedly has good reasons for its approach, there is an emerging presidential practice that should catch the attention of the drafters and encourage them to make at least a small foray into customary international law’s impact on the domestic law of the United States. This practice consists of presidents proclaiming to the international community that certain provisions of treaties that …

Introduction To Constraining The Executive, Tom Campbell

Tom Campbell

Absolute Immunity: General Principles And Recent Developments, Erwin Chemerinsky

Erwin Chemerinsky

No abstract provided.

The President’S Pen And The Bureaucrat’S Fiefdom, John C. Eastman

John C. Eastman