Law Commons^™

The President's Fourth Branch?, Bijal Shah

Fordham Law Review

Unitary executive theory has taken hold of the administrative state, motivated by the view that agencies constitute a rogue fourth branch of government. Emboldened by the U.S. Supreme Court, the President has begun to interfere with administrative accountability to important criteria including statutory procedural requirements that impact both public participation and administrative due process, the expectation that agencies engage neutral expertise to implement the law, and the obligations of judicial review. As a result, this Essay argues, rather than constituting a fourth branch that is unaccountable to the President, the administrative state has been encouraged by the President and courts …

The Diffuse Executive, Anya Bernstein, Cristina Rodriguez

Fordham Law Review

A unitary executive is an exacting ideal. It asks that all power in an administration be gathered in the person of the President, who should have full authority to determine the actions of officials and employees. Even if the President does not directly control every executive action (how could he?), when officials fail to implement presidential preferences, the unitary theory dictates that the President must have the power to remove them. The model posits a tightly organized hierarchy—every rung implementing the substantive decisions of the rung above, with orders flowing from the top: a command-and-control structure for government action. And, …

Third Parties And The Electoral College: How Ranked Choice Voting Can Stop The Third-Party Disruptor Effect, Hillary Bendert, Jacqueline Hayes, Kevin Ruane

Fordham Law Voting Rights and Democracy Forum

No abstract provided.

Presidential Election Disruptions: Balancing The Rule Of Law And Emergency Response, Jason D'Andrea, Sonia Montejano, Matthew Vaughan

Fordham Law Voting Rights and Democracy Forum

No abstract provided.

The President's Subjective And Objective Legal Obligations, Shalev Gad Roisman

Fordham Law Review

Congress has granted the President enormous power. This is well known, but how we are to assess the legality of exercises of such power still is not. Put simply, there is no clear framework to understand the legality of presidential exercises of statutory power. Scholars have noticed this and, in response, have largely turned to administrative law for guidance. This turn to administrative law is somewhat intuitive but misguided.

Administrative law is a highly reticulated body of law that has developed over decades to regulate executive branch agencies, not the President. It has focused on legitimizing agency power in the …

A Government Of Laws And Not Of Men: Why Justice Brandeis Was Right To Assume Congress Can Restrain The President's Removal Power, Danielle Rosenblum

Fordham Law Voting Rights and Democracy Forum

Since the Founding, the extent of the president’s power to remove executive officials from office remains unsettled. While the Appointments Clause in Article II, Section 2 empowers Congress to participate in the hiring of executive officials, the United States Constitution’s text is silent on whether Congress can limit the president’s ability to fire such employees. The debate on the proper scope of the president’s removal power is significant because it serves as a proxy for a larger constitutional question: whether constraints on presidential power advance or sit in tension with democracy. This Article argues that Justice Brandeis was right to …

The President's Approval Power, Christine Kexel Chabot

Fordham Law Review

This Essay introduces the President’s approval power as it was originally understood in the United States. Leading proponents of a unitary executive President have asserted that the President’s absolute power to control subordinate officers includes power to veto or approve subordinates’ discretionary actions before they take effect. This Essay reconsiders the approval power’s purportedly unitary function and presents previously overlooked evidence of the originalist foundations of a presidential approval power. My comprehensive analysis of every public act passed by the First Congress shows that the founding generation never understood Article II to grant the President general authority to approve subordinates’ …