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Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Law
A Response To Professor Rascoff's Presidential Intelligence, Philip C. Bobbitt
A Response To Professor Rascoff's Presidential Intelligence, Philip C. Bobbitt
Faculty Scholarship
Professor Samuel Rascoff’s Presidential Intelligence reflects both the conceptual and research strengths of the author, which are formidable, and the practical difficulties of intelligence reform, which are no less so. Rascoff is certainly right that to be effective – in the still-unfolding constitutional environment that must contend with terror groups armed with unprecedented weapons and communications technology – the intelligence community (IC) must act within the law and the rules governing that community must be reformed to make this possible. He is inclined to believe that the answer lies in heightened presidential management. I’m not so sure. The actual presidential …
Things Left Unsaid, Questions Not Asked, Peter L. Strauss
Things Left Unsaid, Questions Not Asked, Peter L. Strauss
Faculty Scholarship
The University of Pennsylvania Law Review’s symposium on executive discretion, held in the fall of 2015 but just published this November, is an important undertaking, but it is remarkable for several silences – for things left unsaid on this important subject – and for questions not asked. First, although the Constitution’s “Take Care” Clause is extensively discussed, the one power Article II gives the President over domestic administration – to require the “Opinion, in writing” of the heads of the agencies Congress has invested with administrative duties – is not. Second, the discussion of the President’s undoubted but possibly …
Politics And Agencies In The Administrative State: The U.S. Case, Peter L. Strauss
Politics And Agencies In The Administrative State: The U.S. Case, Peter L. Strauss
Faculty Scholarship
The pending American presidential election, culminating a period of extreme political partisanship in our national government generally, gives point to an essay on politics and agencies in the American regulatory state. In our two-party system, it has often been the case in recent times, including the last six years, that the President comes from one of our two major political parties and one or both houses of Congress are controlled by the other. All American agencies (including, in the American case, the so-called independent regulatory bodies) are associated with the President in the executive branch, yet dependent on the Senate …